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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Reputational Considerations within Prosocial Behavior
by
Rachel Gershon
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Cynthia Cryder, Chair

Consumers and companies often consider the welfare of others when making decisions.
Consumers might spend their money donating to meaningful causes or choose to purchase from
socially responsible companies. Companies must also choose whether and how to prioritize behaving
Prosocially or “giving back”. One reason that both companies and individuals behave prosocially is
to be viewed positively by others, or in other words, to gain charitable credit. In my research, I
explore this impression management motivation behind prosocial behavior.
In Chapter one, I show that low-warmth actors are often assumed to lack communal (or
other-oriented) intentions, even when acting generously. Low-warmth donors must therefore send
stronger signals of their communal intent when donating to receive the same amount of charitable
credit as high-warmth donors. Because goods are linked with communal norms, we find that
donating goods allows low-warmth donors to signal communal intent and increase charitable credit
received. Study 1 establishes that low-warmth donors receive less credit for unspecified donations
than their high-warmth counterparts. Studies 2A and 2B show that goods donations, compared to
equally valued monetary or unspecified donations, increase charitable credit for low-warmth donors.
Studies 3A and 3B show that donating goods boosts charitable credit for low-warmth donors in
particular; high-warmth donors are assumed to have communal intentions, and receive large amounts
viii

of credit, regardless of donation type. Finally, study 4 shows that low-warmth donors can increase
charitable credit for monetary donations by describing the donation in communal terms, specifically,
as a gift. This research has clear practical implications, for example, many corporations are viewed as
low-warmth, and most corporate donations are monetary. Yet, companies always have the option to
donate goods instead.
While Chapter One examined the reputational benefits, or “charitable credit” companies and
other low-warmth donors receive for making donations, Chapter Two goes on to study the
reputational benefits involved in another common consumer behavior: customer referrals. In Chapter
Two, I show that while selfish incentives typically outperform prosocial incentives, in the context

of customer referral rewards, prosocial incentives can be more effective. Companies frequently
offer “selfish” (i.e., sender-benefiting) referral incentives, offering customers financial incentive
for recruiting new customers. However, companies can alternatively offer “prosocial” (i.e.,
recipient-benefiting) referral incentives. In two field experiments and an incentive-compatible
lab experiment, we find that recipient-benefiting referrals, relative to sender-benefiting referrals,
result in more new customers. In five subsequent experiments, we explain why this effect occurs.
Specifically, we provide evidence of a two-stage process account that invokes two countervailing forces: reputational benefits versus action costs. First, at the referral stage, senders expect
reputational benefits when making a recipient-benefiting referral: senders expect the people
whom they refer to view them more favorably for providing an opportunity to earn a reward. At
the same time, the task of referring someone is relatively easy, often amounting to entering an
email address. As a result, recipient-benefiting referral programs are just as effective as senderbenefiting programs at inducing referrals. Then, at the uptake stage, recipient-benefiting referrals
are more effective than sender-benefiting referrals. This is because recipient-benefiting referrals
directly incent what is typically the more effortful action in referral programs: uptake (i.e.,
ix

signing up for a new product or service), as opposed to referral, thereby providing impetus for
recipients to act. The relative prevalence of sender-benefiting referral offers in the marketplace
suggests these forces play out in ways that are unanticipated by marketers who design incentive
schemes.

x

Chapter 1: Goods Donations Increase
Charitable Credit for Low-Warmth Donors1
1.1 Introduction
In 2012, the devastation of Hurricane Sandy prompted over $380 million in charitable
donations (Lawrence et al. 2014). All types of donors gave, often donating in different forms.
American Express contributed a $1,000,000 monetary donation. Ikea donated in-kind goods,
giving more than 40,000 blankets, pillows, and towels (BCLC 2015). A teacher and her 5th grade
class raised funds to make a monetary donation (Graham 2012). Meanwhile, a hedge fund
manager from the Upper West Side donated goods such as canned food and medical supplies
(Rampell 2012). While all of these donations provided valuable resources to displaced victims,
both the traits of the donors and the types of donations varied substantially. In this research, we
propose that such variations in both donor traits and donation type can alter how people award
charitable credit to those who give.
People who engage in prosocial behavior are often rewarded with higher status and
reputation benefits (Berman et al. 2015; Flynn 2003; Flynn et al. 2006); in other words, people
grant donors “charitable credit” for their generous acts (Lin-Healy and Small 2012). However,
the charitable credit that a donor receives does not correspond perfectly with the donation’s
impact. Instead, judgments of a donor’s intentions for donating also play a significant role
(Barasch et al. 2014; Lin-Healy and Small 2012), and can be even more important than the
donation’s actual impact for earning charitable credit (Newman and Cain 2014).
1

The paper based on the first chapter of my dissertation is published in the Journal of Consumer Research:

Gershon, R., & Cryder, C. (2018). Goods donations increase charitable credit for low-warmth donors. Journal of
Consumer Research, 45, 451–469. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucx126
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Because presumed intentions are a critical component of the credit a donor receives, this
research proposes that two factors that influence intention judgments will affect charitable credit
as well. First, trait warmth, a central dimension on which people assess others, is closely linked
with perceptions of others’ good intentions (Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick 2007). Whereas highwarmth actors are assumed to be well-intentioned, previous research suggests that even when
low-warmth actors behave prosocially, observers may assume they possess ulterior motives
(Cuddy, Glick, and Beninger 2011).
Second, donation type has potential to influence intention judgments. Giving goods is
often the norm within social or communal relationships (Cheal 1987; Douglas and Isherwood
1979; Heyman and Ariely 2004; Webley, Lea, and Portalska 1983). Accordingly, goods
donations (compared to monetary donations) may signal that a donor has donated for communal,
or other-focused, reasons.
In this research, we specifically predict that donor warmth and donation type will
interact to influence the judgments about donors’ communal intentions, ultimately influencing
charitable credit received. High-warmth actors are typically assumed to have communal or otherfocused intentions (Fiske et al. 2007) and therefore may receive high charitable credit regardless
of donation type; any prosocial act reinforces prior beliefs that high-warmth givers act with
others’ welfare in mind. By contrast, low-warmth actors are typically assumed to act in
accordance with their own interests, and such suspicion surrounding intent may result in lower
charitable credit for donating. Therefore, low-warmth donors may need to send additional signals
of communal intent to gain equal levels of charitable credit. We show that donations of goods,
because of their link with communality, allow low-warmth donors to strengthen their signal of
communal intent and earn more credit for their charitable acts.
2

1.2 Conceptual Background
1.2.1 The Link between Trait Warmth and Communal Intent
Warmth refers to the extent to which an individual (or organization; Aaker, Vohs, and
Mogilner 2010) is friendly, good-natured, and trustworthy (Fiske et al. 2007), and is central to
the way that people assess one another. People make warmth judgments before judgments of
intelligence or competence when forming impressions, and warmth judgments receive greater
attention and weight in impression formation than other interpersonal judgments (Wojciszke,
Bazinska, and Jaworski 1998; Wojciszke and Abele 2008). Being judged as low-warmth can
have negative repercussions, for example, low-warmth individuals are often feared or resented
(Fiske et al. 2002), and tend to receive less social support (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2007).
Warmth judgments and their consequences also extend beyond individuals, for example, lowwarmth companies inspire less customer loyalty than their high-warmth counterparts (Kervyn,
Fiske, and Malone 2012). Due to the fundamental importance of warmth in social judgments,
warmth has been studied in a wide range of contexts including romantic partner decisions
(Sinclair and Fehr 2005), hiring decisions (Casciaro and Lobo 2008), purchase decisions (Aaker
et al. 2010), and customer satisfaction (Andrzejewski and Mooney 2016).
Warmth may be particularly relevant to the prosocial domain because people rely on
warmth judgments to predict whether or not someone is well-intentioned (Fiske et al. 2002).
Indeed, judgments of low-warmth are linked with competitive and exploitative intentions rather
than cooperative and well-meaning intentions (Fiske et al. 2007; Fournier and Alvarez 2012;
Kervyn et al. 2012). This association extends to the realm of corporate social responsibility;
consumers typically perceive for-profit companies as low in warmth (Aaker et al. 2010) and they
tend to be suspicious of companies’ motives for engaging in prosocial behavior (Vlachos et al.
3

2009). Multiple studies find that the reputational benefits of donating are attenuated, or even
reversed, when consumers believe that charitable giving was motivated by profit or was
inauthentic in any way (Koschate-Fischer, Stefan, and Hoyer 2012; Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz
2009; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, and Schwarz 2006).
In this research, we hypothesize that low-warmth donors’ intentions are viewed
specifically as less “communal” than high-warmth donors’ intentions. Research in social
psychology distinguishes between two categories of social relationships: communal and
exchange-based relationships. In communal relationships, benefits are given to others noncontingently and with the recipient’s welfare in mind. Relationships between parents and
children or romantic partners typically follow communal norms (Clark and Mills 1979; 2011),
such as when parents provide food and shelter for their children without the expectation of being
paid back. By contrast, business transactions and most interactions with strangers and
acquaintances typically follow exchange norms common in exchange-based relationships;
benefits are given to others with the expectation that the giver will receive comparable benefits
in return (Clark and Mills 1979; 2011). For example, when selling a car, both the salesperson and
the customer give something and expect to receive something of comparable value in return.
Although the communal versus exchange distinction was originally conceptualized to describe
human relationships (Clark and Mills 1979), consumers also interpret their interactions with
companies through the lens of communal or exchange norms, judging some companies to behave
more consistently with communal norms and others to behave more consistently with exchange
norms (Aggarwal 2004; Aggarwal and Law 2005).
We conducted a correlational study as an initial investigation into the relationship
between donor warmth and judgments of communal intentions. We asked 96 Mechanical Turk
4

participants about each company on Interbrand’s list of the 10 most valuable global brands from
2016 (Apple, Google, Coca-Cola, Microsoft, Toyota, IBM, Samsung, Amazon, Mercedes-Benz,
or General Electric; Interbrand 2017). Participants rated each company on trait warmth (that is,
to what extent do the following traits describe the company in general:” friendly, wellintentioned, trustworthy, warm, good-natured, sincere; Fiske et al. 2002; (α = .96)). Next,
participants imagined that the company had behaved prosocially in a generalized context
(“Imagine that some people needed help and Coca-Cola helped them. How would you interpret
this action by Coca-Cola?”). They then rated the company's intentions on a five item measure of
communal intentions: 1) The company did not expect to receive any benefits from helping, 2)
The company helped to respond to others' needs, 3) The company has a genuine desire to help
others, 4) The company helped with hopes of benefiting themselves (reverse-coded), and 5) The
company helped in order to get ahead (reverse coded; α = .80). Results showed that, as expected,
trait warmth and communal intentions were significantly positively correlated (r = 0.35, p <
.001; full details in appendix A).
We propose that such connections between trait warmth and communal, or otheroriented, intentions have the potential to influence the amount of charitable credit that donors
receive. Donations that are perceived as communal in nature, that is, motivated by recipients’
needs, tend to be evaluated positively whereas similar donations that are viewed as self-serving
or exchange-based are typically evaluated more negatively (Lin-Healy and Small 2013; Newman
and Cain 2014). When judging charitable behavior, people balance the information that the
donor has done something good with signals about whether or not the donor truly cared about the
recipient’s welfare to arrive at a final judgment of how favorably the good deed should be
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perceived (Berman et al. 2015); in short, judgments of donors’ communal intentions can be a key
factor in determining charitable credit received.
Although people may assume that low-warmth donors have self-interested motives, links
between goods and communality may allow low-warmth donors who donate goods (compared to
money or an unspecified donation) to more effectively signal communal intent, and ultimately,
improve charitable credit.

1.2.2 Goods Signal Communal Intent
While the prosocial consumer behavior literature has distinguished between donations of
money and time (Liu and Aaker 2008; Macdonnell and White 2015; Reed, Aquino, and Levy
2007), there is minimal work investigating goods donations. This gap is notable because donors
frequently give in-kind donations of tangible goods such as medical supplies, food, water, and
clothing (Charity Navigator 2017). Because of links between giving goods and communality, we
propose that donating goods can increase the extent to which low-warmth donors’ contributions
are viewed as communally motivated.
Giving goods is often the norm within social or communal interactions (Heyman and
Ariely 2004), such as in the realm of gift giving (Cheal 1987; Douglas and Isherwood 1979).
Exchanges of goods are considered appropriate within close social relationships whereas
comparable exchanges of money are viewed as taboo within these relationships (Belk and Coon
1993; Webley et al. 1983). Although charities themselves tend to prefer monetary donations over
other contributions because money is fully fungible and offers flexibility to cover a charity’s
most pressing needs (Conan 2011), goods may be more consistent with psychological
representations of communality and prosociality. The connection between goods and
communality is further supported by research about incentives. In some cases, people are less
6

generous when a monetary incentive is offered for generous behavior compared to no incentive
at all (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2007; Frey and Goette 1999), however, goods incentives such
as T-shirts and lottery tickets, can have neutral or even positive effects on giving (Goette,
Stutzer, and Frey 2010; Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim 2013).
Research in a similar vein suggests that goods effectively signal communal norms
(Gasiorowska et al. 2016; Jiang, Chen, and Wyer 2014; McGraw and Tetlock 2005). When
offered a monetary reward, participants report a lower likelihood of helping a friend when the
reward is small than when it is large, a pattern consistent with exchange norms whereby effort
corresponds with incentive size. When offered a reward of goods, however, participants report an
equal (and high) likelihood of helping a friend regardless of reward size, a pattern of noncontingent helping that is consistent with communal norms (Clark and Mills 1979; 2011;
Heyman and Ariely 2004). A related experiment by Kube and colleagues (2012) found that
workers were more productive when given a small goods (vs. monetary) bonus by their
employer. The authors concluded that employees responded favorably to the gift of goods
because goods sent more credible signals of the employer’s caring and altruistic intent.
Additional work on gift giving shows that although cash is often more valuable to recipients,
gifts of goods can more effectively signal altruistic intent and yield higher esteem for the giver
(Ellingsen and Johanneson 2011).
Due to differing inferences that arise from goods versus monetary transactions, lowwarmth donors may boost signals of communal intent when they donate goods. Further, because
goods donations signal positive regard for a recipient (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2011), goods
donations may promote communal inferences above and beyond not only monetary donations,
but unspecified donations as well.
7

1.2.3 Present Research
We predict that low-warmth donors, but not high-warmth donors, will receive greater
credit for donating goods compared to money due to differing inferences about communal intent.
Because of links between trait warmth and communal intentions (Fiske et al. 2007), and because
perceptions of good intentions are critical for gaining credit from charitable giving (Barasch et
al. 2014; Newman and Cain 2014), we first hypothesize that trait warmth will play an important
role in how much credit a donor receives for giving. Further, we predict that high-warmth donors
may receive high credit for generous acts regardless of the substance of that act; any prosocial
act reinforces a prior belief that the high-warmth giver was acting with others’ welfare in mind,
making donation type less influential. Low-warmth donors, by contrast, may comparatively
struggle to receive credit because people doubt the benevolence of their intent (Figure 1.1,
Conceptual Model Step 1: Charitable Credit for an Unspecified Donation).
Therefore, low-warmth donors may need to send stronger signals of their communal
intent compared to their high-warmth counterparts in order to receive similar levels of charitable
credit. Due to links between goods and communal norms, we predict that donations of goods (vs.
money or unspecified donations) may allow low-warmth donors to strengthen the signal of their
communal intent, and increase the amount of credit that they receive (Figure 1.1, Conceptual
Model Step 2: Charitable Credit with Donation Type Specified).

FIGURE 1.1
CONCEPTUAL MODEL STEP 1: CHARITABLE CREDIT FOR AN UNSPECIFIED
DONATION

8

Step 1: Conceptual model outlining the relationship between Donor Image, Judged Intent, and
Charitable Credit based on generalized prosocial acts.

CONCEPTUAL MODEL STEP 2: CHARITABLE CREDIT WITH DONATION TYPE
SPECIFIED

Step 2: Conceptual model outlining the relationship between the variables in Step 1 when
Donation Type is specified.

9

1.2.4 Overview of Constructs and Studies
Throughout our research, we focus on three primary psychological constructs: trait
warmth, communal intent, and charitable credit. First, the construct of warmth refers to a
character trait regarding how friendly, trustworthy, and good-natured someone is (Fiske 1999).
We propose that trait warmth is a key predictor of the influence of donation type on charitable
credit. Second, communal (vs. exchange-based) intentions serve as our mediating variable.
Judgments of communal, or other-regarding, intentions have been identified as feeding into
judgments about generosity (Barasch et al. 2014). Finally, “charitable credit,” or image-related
benefits that accrue due to a prosocial act (Lin-Healy and Small 2012; Newman and Cain 2014)
serves as our primary dependent variable of interest. Charitable credit is conceptualized as the
credit received when someone acts benevolently (Lin-Healy and Small 2012).
While all of these constructs are related, they also are clearly distinct from one another.
Warmth refers to a broad and relatively stable trait-level evaluation of a person or organization.
Communal intent, the proposed mediating construct, refers to perceptions of the donor’s motives
behind the prosocial act, specifically the extent to which the generous act was done with the
recipient’s welfare in mind. Although at times previous work uses warmth and communion
interchangeably (e.g., Fiske et al. 2002), we distinguish here between a broad-level trait
(warmth) and a judgment about the intentions that drive a particular act (communal intent).
These two do not always match, as with our previous example of a parent providing for a child; a
parent may be generally low-warmth, but provide for their child with only the child’s interests in
mind, expecting nothing in return. Finally, charitable credit refers to the amount of credit or
esteem a donor receives based on a particular prosocial act (though we note this does not
necessarily change global trait perceptions of the donor; Lin-Healy and Small 2012). In the
studies where these constructs are measured, we aim to specify in our measurement whether we
10

are asking participants to judge a stable trait (warmth), the motives behind the act (communal
intent), or the generosity of the act (charitable credit). We also empirically distinguish these
constructs in all studies in which they are measured via confirmatory factor analyses (all reported
in appendix A).
Six studies in the main text, as well as eight additional studies reported in the appendix,
test key pieces of our conceptual model. Study 1 establishes the relationship between warmth,
communal intent, and the amount of credit a donor receives, showing that consumers grant more
charitable credit to high-warmth donors compared to low-warmth donors for unspecified
donations, even when they perceive the donations to have equal value. Studies 2A and 2B then
demonstrate that low-warmth donors receive more credit for donating goods than equivalent
monetary amounts or unspecified donations, and that this is due to differing perceptions of
communal intent. Studies 3A and 3B, test the full conceptual model from Step 2 (Figure 1.1),
finding that donor warmth moderates the increased credit for goods donations compared to
monetary donations. When low-warmth donors give, they receive more credit for goods
donations; when high-warmth donors give, they receive high charitable credit for all donation
types. Finally, in Study 4, we show one way in which low-warmth donors can increase the
charitable credit they receive for monetary donations (which charities typically prefer): lowwarmth donors can frame their monetary donations communally, specifically, as a gift. Eight
studies in the Appendix replicate these patterns and rule out alternative explanations.
Throughout these studies, we test multiple types of goods donations in addition to
varying donation sizes. We also show this pattern when describing both corporate and individual
donors. Further, the studies use multiple different manipulations of warmth —by considering
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both characteristics of firms (caring vs. indifferent) and characteristics of individual donors (high
vs. low-warmth professions).

1.3 Study 1: The Impact of Donor Warmth on Charitable
Credit
Study 1 tests the relationship predicted by Step 1 of our conceptual model (Figure 1.1).
We predict that low-warmth donors will be judged to have lower communal intent than highwarmth donors, and that this will result in less charitable credit for low-warmth (vs. highwarmth) donors. Previous research finds that for-profit companies tend to be viewed as lowwarmth (Aaker et al. 2010), and, in this study the low-warmth donor is a for-profit company.
Nevertheless, within companies judged warmth can still vary substantially, with some companies
viewed as high-warmth (Kervyn et al. 2012). In the high-warmth condition, we describe the
same company from the low-warmth condition, but portray the company as particularly high in
warmth. Because in this study we are most interested in the general relationship between
warmth, communal intent, and charitable credit, we do not specify donation type, however,
donation type is a key element that we test in our remaining studies.

1.3.1 Methods
Pre-test Methods
For all studies in this article, sample size and exclusion criteria were determined ex ante.
Based on the exclusion criteria, we analyzed data only from those participants who completed
the study and passed an instructional attention check designed to identify inattentive participants
(Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema 2013; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009; appendix B
for specific checks used in all studies). Following recommendations from Simmons, Nelson, and
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Simonsohn (2012), we report all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures for all
studies.
We first conducted a pre-test in which we recruited 109 Mechanical Turk participants, 91 of
whom met our inclusion criteria (MAge = 34.89, 52.75% female); nine participants were removed
for failing to complete the study and nine for failing the attention check. In this pre-test, we
manipulated donor warmth. In the low-warmth condition, participants read “Spades Hardware is
a company that sells home improvement goods.” In the high-warmth condition, participants read,
“Spades Hardware is a friendly company that sells home improvement goods. Spades Hardware
is always warm and welcoming toward visitors.” Participants then rated the company on the six
item perceived warmth scale (see correlational study in the introduction) with items presented in
a randomized order.

Pre-test Results
The descriptions used in the pre-test successfully manipulated donor warmth. In the highwarmth condition Spades Hardware was rated as warmer (MHigh-Warmth = 5.98, SD = 0.81) than in
the low-warmth condition (MLow-Wamrth = 4.53, SD = 1.36, t(89) = 6.14, p < .001, d = 1.30).

Main Study Methods
We recruited 320 Mechanical Turk participants, 274 of whom met our inclusion criteria
(MAge = 33.53, 52.31% female); 28 participants were removed for failing to complete the study
and 18 for failing the attention check. Using the same descriptions of the low- and high-warmth
companies from our pre-test, participants in both conditions, then read about an unspecified
donation, specifically that, “This past weekend Spades Hardware made a donation.”
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In all conditions, participants indicated the charitable credit that they would award to the
donating company. Specifically, participants were asked, “How favorably do you view Spades
Hardware on the characteristics below as a result of their donation?” Participants rated to what
extent they viewed the company as generous, helpful, and charitable as a result of their donation;
participants also rated how beneficial they believed the company is and to what extent the
company makes the world a better place as a result of their donation (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very
much so; all items adapted from Lin-Healy and Small 2012; Newman and Cain 2014; appendix
B for all measures). Although we originally anticipated that the measures of charitable
descriptors (generous, helpful, and charitable; Lin-Healy and Small 2012) and charitable benefit
(how beneficial they believed the donation was and to what extent the donor made the world a
better place; Newman and Cain 2014) would assess distinct constructs, responses to all items
loaded onto a single factor that was highly reliable (α = .86). Therefore, we combined all five
items to create a single and comprehensive “charitable credit” measure, which we use throughout
the paper.
To assess mediation of communal intent, we asked participants to rate the donor on the
extent to which they signaled communal versus exchange-based intentions using the five item
scale of communal intent described in the correlational study from this article’s introduction (see
also appendix B). As a manipulation check, participants also rated the donor on trait warmth
using the six item scale of warmth described in the introduction’s correlational study.
Importantly, warmth judgments are often at odds with competence judgments; for example,
while elderly individuals are viewed as high-warmth, they are also seen as low in competence;
analogously, professionals are stereotyped to be low-warmth, but high in competence (Fiske et
al. 2002). Additionally, perceived economic wealth correlates negatively with perceived warmth
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(Cuddy et al. 2008), which may affect judgments of the two donors. We therefore measured both
competence and perceived wealth in this study to ensure that they did not account for any
findings. Competence judgments were measured using the competence scale from Fiske et al.
(2002), which included the following items: competent, confident, capable, efficient, intelligent,
and skillful (α = .93). We measured perceived wealth by asking, “How wealthy do you think
Spades Hardware is?” (1=Not at all wealthy, 7=Extremely Wealthy).
Because the donor was a company, we measured purchase likelihood to gauge
correspondence between charitable credit and consumer choices. Participants read: “Please rate
how likely you would be to go to Spades Hardware next time you need home improvement
goods” (1 = Not at all likely, 7 = Very likely). The order of all dependent measures was
counterbalanced.
Finally, as a follow-up measure, we asked participants “How much would you estimate
Spades Hardware's donation was worth?” to ensure that differences in donation value estimation
did not account for any findings. Participants could enter any value that they wished.
Please see appendix A for factor analysis results for measures in all studies.

1.3.2 Results
Main Study Results
Warmth Manipulation Check. The manipulation check indicated that our manipulation
was successful; the high-warmth company was rated as warmer (MHigh-Warmth = 5.79, SD = 0.87)
than the low-warmth company (MLow-warmth = 4.99, SD = 1.19; t(272) = 6.01, p < .001, d = .73).
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Charitable Credit. Participants awarded the high-warmth company more charitable credit
(MHigh-Warmth = 5.54, SD = 0.84) than the low-warmth company (MLow-warmth = 5.21, SD = 1.07;
t(272) = 2.80, p = .005, d = .32).
Communal Intent. Participants also perceived the company which was explicitly
described as warm to have higher communal intent (MHigh-Warmth = 4.71, SD = 1.02) than the lowwarmth company (MLow-warmth = 4.24, SD = 1.09; t(272) = 3.66, p < .001, d = .44).
Purchase Likelihood. Participants reported greater purchase likelihood for the highwarmth company (MHigh-warmth = 5.72, SD = 1.04) than for the low-warmth company (MLow-warmth
= 5.10, SD = 1.35; t(268) = 4.21, p < .001, d = .51).
Competence. Participants perceived the high-warmth company as more competent (MHighwarmth =

5.37, SD = 1.00) than the low-warmth company (MLow-warmth = 4.94, SD = 1.19; t(272)=

3.24, p=.001, d = .39).
Perceived Wealth. We found no difference in wealth perceptions between conditions
(MHigh-warmth = 5.12, SD = 0.90 vs. MLow-warmth = 5.04, SD = 1.10; t(269)= .65, p =.51).
Estimated Donation Value. Using free response, participants estimated that the donation
was worth a median value of $2,000 in both conditions (A Mann-Whitney test indicated that
there was a non-significant difference between the two conditions; U = 9288.50, Z = - .04, p =
.97). This implies that the donor warmth manipulation did not influence the perceived value of
the donation.
Mediation. The mediation analysis showed that perceptions of communal intent mediated
the effect of manipulated donor warmth on charitable credit. Using methods prescribed by Hayes
(2013 – Model 4) we tested the significance of communal (vs. exchange) intent as the mediator
by calculating standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples and found that
16

communal intent mediates the effect of donor warmth on charitable credit (Indirect effect = 0.25;
95% CI [0.11, 0.39]; direct effect = 0.08; 95% CI [-0.11, 0.27]). This pattern remains significant
when we control for competence and perceived wealth (indirect effect = 0.12; 95% CI [0.02,
0.23]; direct effect = 0.02; 95% CI [-0.15, 0.19]; figure 1.2). We also find that communal intent
partially mediated the effect of donor warmth on purchase likelihood (appendix A).

FIGURE 1.2
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Figure 1.2: The relationship between donor warmth and charitable credit for an
unspecified donation, as mediated by communal intent.

1.3.3 Discussion
Consistent with Step 1 of our conceptual model, this study finds that people ascribe
charitable credit differently based on who a donor is. In our findings, a high-warmth company
received greater charitable credit for a donation than a low-warmth company because donations
from high-warmth donors are viewed as more communal.
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These results set up our following studies, which test Step 2 of our conceptual model
(Figure 1.1). Specifically, we first test whether goods donations increase the amount of credit
that a low-warmth donor receives and second, we test how donor warmth interacts with donation
type to influence the charitable credit a donor receives.

1.4 Study 2A: Corporate Donations of Goods receive more
Credit
Study 2A begins to test Step 2 of our conceptual model (Figure 1.1) by testing whether
consumers judge a low-warmth donor more favorably for a goods donation than for a monetary
donation. We also include a control condition where the donation type is not specified. We use
the same description of a for-profit company from the “low-warmth” condition in Study 1 to
operationalize a low-warmth donor in this study.

1.4.1 Methods
We recruited 450 Mechanical Turk participants, 406 of whom met our inclusion criteria
(MAge = 34.51, 40.25% female); 30 participants were removed for failing to complete the study
and 14 for failing the attention check. Participants read the same description of the donor from
the “low-warmth” condition in Study 1: “Spades Hardware is a large corporation that sells home
improvement goods.” Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: 1) Control condition
– “This past weekend Spades Hardware donated to a food bank”, 2) Monetary donation
condition – “This past weekend Spades Hardware donated $2,000 to a food bank”, or 3) Goods
donation condition – “This past weekend Spades Hardware donated boxes of canned food to a
food bank. (The donation cost the company $2,000 and it would have cost the food bank the
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same amount to obtain those goods).” We did not include a donation value for the control
condition, due to a concern that mentioning the value would lead participants to assume the
company made a monetary donation. However, we described the donations in the other
conditions to be worth $2,000 because that was the median estimated value of the unspecified
donations in Study 1; we intended this value to approximate estimates of donation value for the
control condition as well.
We included information about the cost for the company and value of the donation for the
food bank in the goods condition to ensure that participants would not assume the actual value
for the charity was greater than $2,000 when the company donated goods.
In all conditions, participants rated the company on the five item charitable credit scale.
As in Study 1, we also measured purchase likelihood and asked participants in the control
condition, “How much would you estimate Spades Hardware's donation was worth?”
Participants could enter any value that they wished. Finally, we asked all participants “Who
would get more canned food for $2,000?” 1) Spades Hardware, 2) The Food Bank, 3) They can
get the same amount. This question was intended to confirm that participants did not assume that
the donor could provide greater value by donating goods rather than money. (We note that in this
initial test of the preference for goods donations from low-warmth donors, we did not measure
communal intent, but do so in Studies 2B-4).

1.4.2 Results
Charitable Credit. Planned comparisons showed that participants awarded the company
more charitable credit for donating goods (MGoods = 5.84, SD = .80) than money (MMoney = 5.48,
SD = .92; t(270) = 3.48, p = .001, d = .42), or for making an unspecified donation (control
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condition); MControl = 5.52, SD = .92; t(273) = 3.12, p = .002, d = .38). There was no difference in
charitable credit between the monetary and unspecified (control) donation condition (t(263) =
.31, p = .75; Figure 1.3).

FIGURE 1.3
STUDY 2A: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONATION TYPE
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Estimated Donation Value. Using free response, participants in the control condition
estimated that the donation was worth a median value of $1,000. This is lower than the value we
used for the other two conditions, so as an additional test, we looked at only participants who
gave estimates in the top 50% (Median = $5,000) and found that this group still rated the
donating company as marginally significantly less charitable (MControl = 5.62, SD = .86) than
those in the goods donation condition (MGoods = 5.84, SD = .80; t(206) = 1.86, p =.065),
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suggesting that lower assumed donation values in the control (unspecified donation) condition do
not account for the low levels of charitable credit in that condition.
Purchase Likelihood. Using planned comparisons, we found that participants indicated a
non-significant, but directionally higher likelihood of purchasing from Spades Hardware when
they donated goods (MGoods = 5.58, SD = .99) compared to when they donated money (MMoney =
5.37, SD = .95; t(268)=1.76, p = .079). There was a non-significant difference in purchase
likelihood between the goods donation and the control (unspecified) donation conditions (MControl
= 5.46, SD = .93; t(271) = .90, p = .37) and between the monetary and control donation
conditions (t(263) = .77, p = .44).
Donation Value Inferences. As a follow-up measure, participants in all conditions
responded to the question “Who would be able to get the most canned food for $2,000”. 45.81%
of participants responded that the food bank would be able to buy more canned food with $2,000
and 48.28% believed that the food bank and hardware store could acquire the same amount of
canned food for that amount of cash. Only 5.91% of participants believed that Spades Hardware
would get the most bang for their buck. These patterns indicate that participants did not rate
charitable credit higher for goods donations because they thought that the donor was able to
acquire, and thus donate, more canned food than the charity could buy for the same amount. In
fact, participants most frequently indicated that the charity could buy as much or more canned
food as the donor, a pattern that is commonly true in the real world because nonprofits often
receive discounts on the goods that assist their mission (Conan 2011; White 2015).
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1.4.3 Discussion
Consistent with our conceptual model, we observe a significant increase in the charitable
credit that a low-warmth donor receives when donating goods versus money. Further, we
observe that the boost in charitable credit for goods donations not only occurs in comparison to a
monetary donation, but also in comparison to an unspecified donation. An additional study
(appendix C – Study 1) found that while a goods donation from a low-warmth donor garnered
more charitable credit than a monetary donation, both donations received more credit than a
control condition in which the company made no donation. These results suggest that, for lowwarmth donors, donating goods results in a unique boost in charitable credit compared to other
donation types, but that giving money also increases charitable credit compared to making no
donation at all. In Study 2B, we test whether judgments about the communal nature of a goods
donation is responsible for greater charitable credit received by low-warmth donors who give
goods.
One challenge in designing this study was holding the perceived value of the donations
equivalent across conditions. Although food banks tend to receive discounts on food products
(Conan 2011), we were concerned that participants may believe the company could buy these
goods more cheaply than the food bank, and would therefore think that the value of $2,000 worth
of goods would be more than $2,000 cash for the food bank. However, the vast majority of
participants believed the food bank could get the same amount if not more food than the
hardware store for the amount of money given, yet, we still find the company receives greater
credit for giving goods rather than their equivalent cash value. As an especially conservative test
of the image benefits of goods donations (Appendix C, Study 2) we compared three donations in
a three-cell between-subjects experiment: 1) a monetary donation of $1,000, 2) an equivalent
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goods donation - $1,000 worth of canned food, and 3) a smaller goods donation - $900 worth of
canned food. We found that both goods donations received higher charitable credit (and purchase
likelihood) than the monetary donation, and the two goods donations were perceived as equally
charitable. These results showed that the charitable credit benefits of goods donations still
emerge even when the goods donation has a substantially lower value than the monetary
donation. We conclude that the benefits of goods donations for low-warmth donors cannot be
explained by higher interpreted financial value of goods donations.
Moving forward, in all studies, we continue to explicitly state a donation value in the
goods condition that matches the donation amount in the monetary donation condition. Even
though mentioning a monetary value has potential to dampen communality effects for goods
transactions (Heyman and Ariely 2004), it is essential for us to hold donation value constant
across conditions to ensure greater donation value is not inferred when donors give goods. Please
also see appendix C, Study 3 for a description of an additional study that replicates these findings
and compares a monetary donation to two goods donations, one with and one without a monetary
value. While both goods donations were given more charitable credit than the monetary
donation, this study finds that the effect is indeed stronger when the monetary value of a goods
donation is absent.

1.5 Study 2B: Communal (vs. Exchange) Intentions as
Mediator
Study 2B further explores consumer preferences for goods donations by low-warmth
donors by testing mediating factors. We test whether goods versus monetary donations trigger
inferences of communal versus exchange-based intentions, resulting in different levels of
charitable credit.
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We additionally test two other potential mediators behind the preference for corporate
goods donations: perceptions of effort and sacrifice. Consumers may reasonably infer that
companies exert more effort, more sacrifice, or both when donating tangible goods compared to
simply writing a check to a charity (goods need to be chosen, procured, delivered, etc.). We
therefore also measure and test perceived effort and sacrifice as potential contributors to the
greater credit for goods donations by low-warmth donors.

1.5.1 Methods
For Study 2B, we recruited 240 Mechanical Turk participants, 212 of whom met our
inclusion criteria (MAge = 32.93, 53.7% female); 17 participants were removed for failing to
complete the study and 11 for failing the attention check. Participants were randomly assigned to
either a monetary donation or goods donation condition and read the following scenario: “Spades
Hardware is a large corporation that sells home improvement goods. This past weekend, Spades
Hardware made a donation of $1,000,000 ($1,000,000 worth of medical supplies) to
humanitarian aid efforts.”
Participants next rated Spades Hardware on the charitable credit items from Study 1 (see
also appendix B). To measure mediating factors, participants also rated Spades Hardware on the
five item scale of communal intent described in the correlational study in this article’s
introduction and Study 1 (see also appendix B).
We additionally measured perceived effort and sacrifice related to the donation.
Participants were asked to what extent they agree with the following statements: “Spades
Hardware put a lot of effort into this donation”, “Spades Hardware worked hard on this
donation”, and “Spades Hardware put thought into this donation” (Bechwati and Xia 2003). We
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evaluated perceived sacrifice by asking the extent to which participants agreed that “Spades
Hardware sacrificed when making this donation” as well as asking “How big was Spades
Hardware’s sacrifice when making this donation?” While we planned to test effort and sacrifice
as separate constructs, these two potential mediators loaded onto a single factor that was highly
reliable (α = .92), and therefore items were combined to create a single effort/sacrifice measure.
Finally, we measured purchase likelihood by asking participants, “How likely would you
be to go to Spades Hardware next time you need home improvement goods?” (1 = not at all
likely, 7 = very likely).
The order of all dependent measures was counterbalanced.

1.5.2 Results
Charitable Credit. In line with Study 2A, participants awarded the company more
charitable credit when the company donated goods rather than money (MGoods = 5.95, SD = .84
vs. MMoney = 5.65, SD = .90; t(210) = 2.55, p = .01, d = .35).
Purchase Likelihood. Participants reported a marginally higher likelihood of purchasing
from the company following a goods donation (MGoods = 5.49, SD = 1.13) rather than a monetary
donation (MMoney = 5.23, SD = 1.12; t(208) = 1.70, p = .09, d = .24).
Communal Intent. Participants believed the company signaled communal (vs. exchange)
intentions to a greater extent when they donated goods (in this case, medical supplies; MGoods =
4.66, SD = 1.03) rather than money (MMoney = 4.34, SD = 1.23; t(210) = 2.07, p = .04, d = .29).
Effort/Sacrifice. There was a non-significant difference in perceived effort and sacrifice
for donations of goods versus money (MGoods = 5.04, SD = 1.36 vs. MMoney = 4.92, SD = 1.43;
t(210) = .64, p = .52).
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Mediation. The mediation analysis showed that perceptions of communal intent mediated
the effect of donation type on charitable credit. Using methods prescribed by Hayes (2013 –
model 4) we simultaneously tested the significance of both mediators by calculating standardized
indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples and found that communal intent mediates the
effect of donation type on charitable credit (Total indirect effect = 0.19; 95% CI [0.02, 0.36];
direct effect = 0.14; 95% CI [-0.04, 0.34]). We found a statistically significant indirect effect of
perceived communal intent (0.15; 95% CI [0.01, 0.30]). The indirect effect of effort and sacrifice
was not significant (0.04; 95% CI [-0.09, 0.17]; Figure 1.4).

FIGURE 1.4
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Figure 1.4: The relationship between donation type and charitable credit for a lowwarmth donor as mediated by communal intent.
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1.5.3 Discussion
Results from Study 2B show that differences in perceptions of communal intent based on
goods versus monetary donations explain the effect of donation type on charitable credit for lowwarmth donors. These results suggest that consumers judge that low-warmth donors who donate
goods have communal intentions for doing so whereas low-warmth donors who donate money
have relatively exchange-based intentions for doing so; this communal versus exchange
signaling in turn influences on the charitable credit received. Perceived effort and sacrifice,
although almost certainly important in assessments of many donations, did not significantly
differ due to donation type in this scenario.
As a robustness check, we replicated these findings in an additional study (appendix C –
Study 4). Participants imagined that a natural disaster impacted a neighboring town and Spades
Hardware donated to the relief efforts. Participants read that the store donated either 1) $1,000,
2) $1,000 worth of food, or 3) $1,000 worth of lumber to the cause; the latter two conditions
were both included to test whether the “fit” between the donation and the company matters. (For
Spades Hardware, lumber was pre-tested as a substantially “higher fit” donation than food (p <
.001)). Once again in this study, companies that donated either type of goods received greater
charitable credit (MFood = 5.76; MLumber = 5.54) than the company that donated money (MMoney =
5.19; t(177) = 3.34, p = .001; t(175) = 1.96, p = .05, respectively). There was no significant
difference between the “high fit” and “low fit” goods conditions for charitable credit received
(t(178) = 1.46, p = .15)). In this study, both perceived communal intent and sacrifice/effort had
significant and separate mediating effects; when simultaneously tested in the same mediation
model, the two mediators fully accounted for the effect of donation type on charitable credit
(Total indirect effect = 0.16; 95% CI [0.07, 0.26]; direct effect = 0.06; 95% CI [-0.05, 0.17]).
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We also note that in this follow-up study, we tested a donation that was both relevant to
the company, and thus potentially higher value to the charity when considering cost of goods
(lumber from Spades Hardware) and, a donation that was somewhat irrelevant to the company
and thus little benefit in terms of cost of goods (food from Spades Hardware). The finding that
consumers considered both types of goods donations to be equally charitable when compared to
each other, and both more charitable than the monetary donation, lead us to believe that
consumers are not incorporating potential increases in financial benefit to the charitable cause
when companies donate wholesale goods.
Results from Study 2B demonstrate support for the mediating role of communal intent for
this pattern; in the follow-up study, effort and sacrifice simultaneously mediated the effect of
donation type on charitable credit alongside communal intent. Taken together, we interpret these
mediation results to mean that increased perceptions of effort and sacrifice can contribute to
increased charitable credit for goods donations, however, even when goods donations do not
increase perceptions of effort and sacrifice (as in the main Study 2B), judgments of communal
intent can drive the overall effect.
In addition to providing insight about process, these studies also provide evidence about
the robustness of the preference for goods donations by low-warmth donors by testing two new
contexts (humanitarian aid efforts and a sudden disaster) and two new donations (medical
supplies and lumber). We conclude that the increased credit given to low-warmth donors for
donations of goods is not limited to a particular type of cause or specific type of goods donation.

1.6 Studies 3A and 3B: The Interaction of Donor Warmth
and Donation Type
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Studies 3A and 3B were designed to test the full conceptual model (Figure 1.1; step 2),
incorporating the moderating role of warmth in the preference for goods donations. In an early
study for this project (appendix C – Study 5), we measured perceptions of charitable credit for a
donation of either money or goods by two types of donors: a low-warmth for-profit company
(Spades Hardware) and a high-warmth family (the Jones Family). We observed a significant
interaction between donor warmth and donation type; the (low-warmth) company received more
credit for a donation of goods than the monetary donation, while the (high-warmth) family
received more credit for a donation of money. Although these results are consistent with the
conceptual model, there are many differences between companies and families besides perceived
warmth. In studies 3A and 3B, we attempt to build on this initial result and more precisely
manipulate warmth.
Thus far we have relied on for-profit companies as the operationalization of a lowwarmth donor. In Study 3A, we describe individual donors, and manipulate whether they are
high- versus low-warmth. Past research shows that certain groups of individuals who tend to be
viewed as subordinate and noncompetitive, for example elderly individuals and homemakers,
tend to be viewed as high-warmth (Cuddy et al. 2004). In contrast, those who are high in status
and/or competitive, for example, educated individuals, tend to be viewed as low-warmth (Fiske
et al. 2002). Previous research examines warmth and competence perceptions of individuals in a
variety of professions and found that people’s perceived warmth varies significantly based on
their profession (Imhoff et al. 2013). Based on this literature we operationalized a high-warmth
donor as a nursery school teacher and a low-warmth donor as a corporate manager in Study 3A.
We hypothesized that, consistent with our conceptual model, low-warmth donors will receive
more charitable credit for goods donations due to increased perceptions of communal intent
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whereas high-warmth donors will receive high charitable credit regardless of donation type
(because of high communal intent inferred across donation type). Because, as in Study 1, the
high-warmth and low-warmth donors may vary in perceived competence and wealth, we
measure those factors as well to ensure that they do not account for any findings.

1.7 Study 3A: The Moderating Role of Warmth –
Individual Donors
1.7.1 Methods
Pre-test Methods
We recruited 110 Mechanical Turk participants, 105 of whom met our inclusion criteria
(MAge = 35.63, 50% female); three participants were removed for failing to complete the study
and two for failing the attention check. In this pre-test, we manipulated donor warmth. In a highwarmth condition, participants read “Heather is a 41-year-old nursery school teacher.” In the
low-warmth condition, participants read, “Heather is a 41-year-old corporate manager.”
Participants were then asked to rate the target on the six item perceived warmth scale
(correlational study in the introduction) with items presented in a randomized order.

Pre-test Results
The descriptions in the pre-test successfully manipulated donor warmth. Heather the
nursery school teacher was rated as significantly warmer (MHigh-Warmth = 5.70, SD = .90) than
Heather the corporate manager (MLow-Wamrth = 4.30, SD = 1.09, t(103) = 7.15, p < .001, d = 1.40).

Main Study Methods
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We recruited 675 Mechanical Turk participants, 599 of whom met our inclusion criteria
(Mage =35.75, 60.77% female); 39 participants were removed for failing to complete the study
and 37 for failing the attention check.
As in the pre-test, participants in the high-warmth [low-warmth] condition, read the
following donor descriptions “Heather is a 41-year-old nursery school teacher [corporate
manager]. Participants were then informed that this past weekend, Heather contributed either 1) a
monetary donation – “$100” or 2) a goods donation – “$100 worth of canned food” to her local
food bank.
We measured charitable credit, communal intent, perceived effort/sacrifice, and trait
warmth (as a manipulation check). In addition, due to potential differences in perceived
competence and wealth for high-warmth and low-warmth donors, we also measured these factors
to ensure that they did not account for any findings. The order of all dependent measures was
counterbalanced (appendix B).

1.7.2 Results
Main Study Results
Warmth Manipulation Check. The high-warmth individual was perceived as significantly
warmer (MHigh-Warmth = 6.01, SD = .88) than the low-warmth individual, (MLow-Warmth = 5.58, SD =
.93; t(596) = 5.78, p < .001, d = .23). Based on a 2 x 2 ANOVA, we found a main effect of the
warmth manipulation on perceived warmth (F(1, 598) = 33.63, p < .001); donation type did not
exert a significant main effect on warmth (F(1, 598) = .11, p = .74). We observed a marginally
significant interaction between donation type and manipulated donor warmth on measured
warmth (F(1, 598) = 3.67, p = .06; please also see a similar analysis in Study 3B).
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Charitable Credit. We observed a significant main effect of donor type on charitable
credit; the high-warmth individual received more charitable credit for her donation than the lowwarmth individual (F(1, 599) = 41.70, p < .001, η2p = .07). Donation type also had a significant
main effect; donations of goods received more credit than donations of money (F(1, 599) = 5.78,
p = .017, η2p = .01). Most importantly, the 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a significant interaction
between donation type (goods/money) and donor warmth (low-warmth/high-warmth; (F(1, 599)
= 5.29, p = .022, η2p = .01). Specifically, the low-warmth donor received more charitable credit
for a goods donation than a monetary donation (MGoods = 5.75, SD = 1.00 vs. MMoney = 5.37, SD =
1.24; t(304) = -2.96, p = .003 , d = .17). The high-warmth donor, however, received equal (and
high) credit for both goods and monetary donations (MGoods = 6.09, SD = .98 vs. MMoney = 6.08,
SD = .85; t(291) = -0.09, p = .93; Figure 1.5).

FIGURE 1.5
STUDY 3A: CHARITABLE CREDIT FOR INDIVIDUAL DONORS AS A FUNCTION OF
DONOR WARMTH AND DONATION TYPE
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NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean

Communal Intent. The donor warmth manipulation had a significant main effect on
communal intent; overall the high-warmth donor’s intent was perceived to be more communal
than the low-warmth donor’s intent (F(1, 599) = 32.35, p < .001, η2p = .05). Donation type had a
non-significant main effect; (F(1, 599) = 2.50, p = .11). Further, the 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a
marginally significant interaction between donation type (goods/money) and donor warmth (lowwarmth/high-warmth; F(1, 599) = 3.39, p = .066, η2p = .01) on communal intent. For the lowwarmth donor, a goods donation produced significantly higher perceptions of communal intent
than a monetary donation (MGoods = 5.70, SD = .98 vs. MMoney = 5.42, SD = 1.25; t(304) = -2.20 ,
p = .027, d = .12). There was no difference in perceptions of communal intent by donation type
for the high-warmth donor (MGoods = 6.05, SD = .90 vs. MMoney = 6.02, SD = .90; t(291) = .21, p =
.84).
Effort/Sacrifice. The donor warmth manipulation had a significant main effect on
perceived effort and sacrifice; overall the high-warmth individual was seen as putting in more
effort than the low-warmth individual (F(1, 599) = 77.09, p < .001, η2p = .12). Donation type,
however, did not show a significant main effect; donations of goods and money were viewed as
equally effortful (F(1, 599) = .26, p = .61). There was a non-significant interaction between
donation type and donor warmth on effort/sacrifice, (F(1, 599) = 1.97, p = .16). There was no
significant difference in perceptions of effort and sacrifice by donation type for the low-warmth
individual (MGoods = 4.43, SD = 1.29 vs. MMoney = 4.25, SD = 1.23; t(304) = -1.26, p = .21), nor
was there a significant difference in effort perceptions for the high-warmth individual (MGoods
=5.13, SD = 1.10 vs. MMoney = 5.22, SD = 1.00; t(291) = .70, p = .49).
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Competence. There was a non-significant main effect of manipulated donor warmth on
perceived competence (F(1, 596) = 2.61, p = .11) and a non-significant main effect of donation
type on perceived competence (F(1, 596) = 0.23, p = .63). The interaction between donor
warmth and donation type on competence was also not significant, (F(1, 596) = .07, p = .79).
Perceived Wealth. The donor warmth manipulation had a significant main effect on
perceived wealth; the high-warmth individual was assumed to be less wealthy than the lowwarmth individual (F(1, 579) = 197.60, p < .001, η2p = .26). Donation type also had a significant
main effect on perceived wealth (F(1, 579) = 6.49, p = .011, η2p = .01). There was a nonsignificant interaction between donor warmth and donation type on perceived wealth, (F(1, 579)
= 1.47, p = .23).
Moderated Mediation. We conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2013model 8) to test the predicted relationship of donation type by low or high-warmth donors on
charitable credit, simultaneously testing both communal intent and effort/sacrifice as mediators.
We tested the significance of both mediators by calculating standardized indirect effects for
5,000 bootstrapped samples and found that the model mediates the effect of donation type on
charitable credit (direct effect = 0.07; 95% CI [-0.01, 0.26]). More specifically, we found that
donation type produced an indirect effect of communal intent on charitable credit that was
conditional on individual warmth, but found no indirect effect of effort/sacrifice. As
hypothesized, inferences about communal intent mediated the effect of donation type on
charitable credit for the low-warmth individual (indirect effect = 0.12 (95% CI [0.02, 0.26])), but
not for the high-warmth individual (indirect effect = -0.01 (95% CI [-0.10, 0.08])). Effort and
sacrifice did not mediate the effect for the low-warmth individual (indirect effect = 0.05, 95% CI
[-0.03, 0.14]), nor for the high-warmth individual (indirect effect = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.04]).
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The index of moderated mediation was not significant at the 95% level of confidence. However,
at the 90% level of confidence, the index of moderated mediation was significant for communal
intent (Index = -.13 (90% CI [-0.27, -0.02]) but not for effort/sacrifice (Index = -.07 (90% CI [0.16, 0.01]). We find a similar and significant pattern of results when controlling for both
competence and perceived wealth (appendix A). Please see table 1 for descriptive results for all
dependent variables measured in studies 3A and 3B.

TABLE 1.1
STUDY 3A AND 3B RESULTS
Study
3A

Donor
Warmth

Donation
Type

Charitable

Communal
Intent°

Credit°

Effort/

Warmth

Purchase
Likelihood

Competence

Perceived
Wealth

5.32
(.95)
5.26
(1.12)
5.16
(1.06)
5.14
(1.16)

4.83
(.85)
4.94
(.92)
3.52
(1.22)
3.84*
(1.11)

Competence

Perceived
Wealth

Sacrifice

Condition
Low
Warmth

Money

5.37
(1.24)
5.75**
(1.00)
6.08
(.85)
6.09
(.80)

5.42
(1.25)
5.70*
(.98)
6.05
(.90)
6.02
(.90)

4.25
(1.23)
4.43
(1.29)
5.22
(1.00)
5.13
(1.10)

5.52
(.95)
5.64
(.91)
6.09
(.83)
5.92
(.92)

Donation
Type

Charitable
Credit°

Communal
Intent°

Effort/
Sacrifice°

Warmth

Purchase
Likelihood

Money

4.77
(1.21)
5.05†
(1.23)
5.77
(1.00)
5.89
(0.86)

4.02
(1.31)
4.37*
(1.33)
5.15
(0.86)
5.25
(1.19)

3.48
(1.44)
3.94**
(1.40)
4.81
(1.17)
4.89
(1.21)

3.92
(1.41)
4.07
(1.36)
5.97
(1.09)
6.08
(0.87)

4.23
(1.59)
4.54†
(1.49
5.81
(1.11)
5.82
(1.08)

Goods
High
Warmth

Money
Goods

Study
3B

Donor
Warmth
Condition
Low
Warmth

Goods
High
Warmth

Money
Goods

† p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01; these significance notations refer to differences in mean
evaluations for monetary donations compared to goods donations with standard deviations in
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parentheses. A° symbol next to the variable name indicates that there is a significant interaction
between donor warmth and donation type on this variable at a p < .05 level.

1.7.3 Discussion
Results from Study 3A replicate the pattern of preferences from Studies 2A and 2B for
donations of goods, but only when the donor is perceived as low-warmth. In contrast to lowwarmth donors who receive more credit for goods donations, high-warmth donors receive the
same amount of (high) charitable credit regardless of donation type. This pattern provides insight
into the role of warmth in the preference for donations of goods (vs. money); when perceived
warmth is high, communal intentions are assumed and are less likely to fluctuate based on the
donation’s substance. When perceived warmth is low, however, judgments of communal intent
are more sensitive to donation type; specifically, low-warmth donors receive a boost in charitable
credit for goods donations.

1.8 Study 3A: The Moderating Role of Warmth –
Corporate Donors
In Study 3B, we aim to replicate the patterns from Study 3A when studying corporate
donors and using a new, and more direct, manipulation of warmth.

1.8.1 Methods
Pre-test Methods
We first conducted a pre-test in which we recruited 120 Mechanical Turk participants,
102 of whom met our inclusion criteria (MAge = 34.96, 56% female); 13 participants were
removed for failing to complete the study and five for failing the attention check. In this pre-test,
36

we manipulated company warmth using a manipulation similar to the one used in Study 1. In a
high-warmth condition, participants read “Spades Hardware is a small, friendly hardware store
that is always competent and also warm and welcoming toward visitors.” In the low-warmth
condition, participants read, “Spades Hardware is a small, corporate hardware store that is
always competent though also cold and indifferent toward visitors.” Participants then rated the
company on the six items from the perceived warmth scale used in Study 3A, presented in a
randomized order.

Pre-test Results
The descriptions used in the pre-test successfully manipulated donor warmth. The highwarmth donor was rated as warmer (MHigh-Warmth = 6.07, SD = .94) than the low-warmth donor
(MLow-Wamrth = 3.42, SD = 1.46, t(99) = 10.69, p < .001, d = 2.15).

Main Study Methods
For Study 3B, we recruited 615 Mechanical Turk participants, 565 of whom met our
inclusion criteria (MAge = 35.14, 58% female); 34 participants were removed for failing to
complete the study and 16 for failing the attention check. The study used a 2 (donor warmth:
high, low) x 2 (donation type: $1000, canned food worth $1000) between-subjects experimental
design. For the low-warmth and high-warmth conditions, Spades Hardware was described in the
same way as in the pre-test. Then, participants were told that the company donated either
“$1,000” or “canned food worth $1,000” to their local food bank. Participants also rated the
company on the five item scale of charitable credit to measure how favorably they viewed the
company after the donation. In addition, participants rated the company on the five item scale of
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communal intent and the effort/sacrifice scale from Study 2; patterns from these measures are
reported in Table 1.1. As a manipulation check, trait warmth assessments were again collected.
Participants also reported purchase likelihood for Spades Hardware. The order of all dependent
measures was counterbalanced.

1.8.2 Results
Main Study Results
Warmth Manipulation Check. The high-warmth company was perceived as warmer
(MHigh-Warmth = 6.02, SD = .99) than the low-warmth company (MLow-Warmth = 3.99, SD = 1.39;
t(563) = 20.06, p < .001, d = 1.69). When testing a 2 X 2 ANOVA, we observed a main effect of
the warmth manipulation on perceived warmth (F(1, 561) = 402.33, p < .001, η2p = .42). Looking
at additional patterns, we observe that donation type did not have a main effect on measured
warmth (F(1, 561) = 1.82, p = .18) nor did we observe an interaction between donation type and
manipulated donor warmth on measured warmth (F(1, 561) = 0.06, p = .80). Similar to Study
3A, these patterns suggest that the warmth construct is a relatively stable trait that is minimally
influenced by donation type from any one donation, exhibiting distinct patterns compared to the
other constructs under study such as communal intent and charitable credit.
Charitable Credit. The warmth manipulation had a significant main effect; overall the
high-warmth company received more charitable credit for their donation than the low-warmth
company (F(1, 563) = 102.2 , p < .001, η2p = .15). Donation type did not show a significant main
effect (F(1, 561) = 0.66 , p = .42). Most importantly, the 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a significant
interaction between donation type (money/goods) and donor image (low-warmth/high-warmth),
(F(1, 561) = 4.65, p = .03, η2p = .01). In line with the previous findings, when the company was
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described as low-warmth, they received a marginally significant increase in charitable credit for
a goods donation (MGoods = 5.05, SD = 1.23) compared to an equivalent monetary donation
(MMoney = 4.77, SD = 1.21; t(274) = 1.92, p = .056, d = .23). However, when the company was
described as having a high-warmth image, there was a non-significant difference in charitable
credit between donation types (MGoods = 5.77, SD = 1.00 vs. MMoney = 5.89, SD = .86; t(287) = 1.08, p = .28; Figure 1.6).

FIGURE 1.6
EXPERIMENT 3B: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONOR WARMTH AND
DONATION TYPE

7

Charitable Credit

6.5
5.89

6

5.77
Money

5.5

Goods
5.05

5

4.77

4.5
4
Low-Warmth

High-Warmth

Donor Warmth

NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean
Communal Intent. The donor manipulation had a significant main effect on communal
intent; the high-warmth company’s donation was perceived as more communal than the lowwarmth company’s donation (F(1, 561) = 93.86, p < .001, η2p = .14). Donation type also had a
significant main effect; goods donations were seen as more communal than donations of money
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(F(1, 561) = 5.03, p = .025, η2p = .01). However, in this study we did not find a significant
interaction between donation type (money/goods) and donor warmth (low-warmth/high-warmth;
F(1, 561) = 1.66, p = .198. For the low-warmth company, a donation of goods produced
significantly higher perceptions of communal intent (MGoods = 4.37, SD = 1.33 vs. MMoney = 4.02,
SD = 1.31; t(274) = 2.21, p = .028, d = .27). There was no difference in perceptions of communal
intent by donation type for the high-warmth company (MGoods = 5.25, SD = 1.19 vs. MMoney =
5.15, SD = 1.12; t(287) = .75, p = .45).
Effort/Sacrifice. The donor warmth manipulation had a significant main effect on
perceived effort and sacrifice; the high-warmth company was seen as putting in more effort than
the low-warmth company (F(1, 561) = 108.70, p < .001, η2p = .16). Furthermore, there was a
marginally significant main effect of donation type; the donation of goods was viewed as
marginally more effortful than the donation of money (F(1, 561) = 2.80, p = .095). We also
observed a significant interaction between donation type and donor warmth (F(1, 561) = 5.90, p
< .02, η2p = .01). There was a significant difference in perceptions of effort and sacrifice by
donation type for the low-warmth company (MGoods = 3.94, SD = 1.44 vs. MMoney = 3.48, SD =
1.39; t(274) = 2.71, p = .007, d = .33), and we did not observe a difference in effort perceptions
for the high-warmth company (MGoods = 4.81, SD = 1.17 vs. MMoney = 4.89, SD = 1.21; t(287) =
.55, p = .58).
Moderated Mediation. We conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2013model 8) to test the predicted relationship of donation type by low or high-warmth companies on
charitable credit received, with communal intent and effort/sacrifice simultaneously tested as
mediators. By calculating standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples, we found
an indirect effect of both communal intent and effort/sacrifice conditional on company warmth
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when tested simultaneously. As hypothesized, inferences about communal intent mediated the
effect of donation type on charitable credit for the low warmth company (indirect effect = 0.12
(95% CI [0.02, 0.22])), but not the high-warmth company (indirect effect = 0.03 (95% CI [-0.05,
0.12])). Likewise, effort and sacrifice mediated the effect for the low-warmth company (indirect
effect = 0.16 (95% CI [0.05, 0.29])), but not for the high-warmth company (indirect effect = 0.03 (95% CI [-0.13, 0.07])). The index of moderated mediation was not significant at the 95%
level of confidence. However, at the 90% level of confidence, the index of moderated mediation
was significant for both communal intent (Index = -.08 (90% CI [-0.19, -.02]) and for
effort/sacrifice (Index = -.19 (90% CI [-0.32, -0.06]).
Purchase Likelihood. A similar, although non-significant pattern emerged for purchase
likelihood. For the low-warmth company, participants reported a marginally significantly higher
likelihood of purchasing when they read about a goods donation (MGoods = 4.54, SD = 1.49) than
a monetary donation (MMoney = 4.23, SD = 1.59; t(274) = 1.66, p = .097), whereas donation type
had no effect on purchase likelihood for the high-warmth company (MGoods = 5.82, SD = 1.08 vs.
MMoney= 5.81, SD = 1.11; t(287) = .04, p = .97). While the pattern was consistent with the
charitable credit dependent variable, the interaction between donation type (goods/money) and
company image (low-warmth/high-warmth) was not significant (F(1, 561) = 1.80, p = .18).

1.8.3 Discussion
Results from Study 3B replicate the pattern observed in Study 3A; people prefer
donations of goods from low-warmth donors, but do not show this preference for high-warmth
donors. Judgments of communal intentions mediate this pattern, and in this study, effort and
sacrifice also simultaneously mediated this effect.
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In two additional studies (for full results see appendix C – Studies 6 and 7), we replicate
these patterns. In appendix study 6, we manipulate perceived warmth by using two real-world
companies: a company that is perceived as relatively low in warmth, Pepsi Co., and a company
selling similar products that is perceived as relatively high-warmth, Bolthouse Farms. In this
study, there was a significant interaction between donor warmth and donation type on charitable
credit (F(1, 471) = 6.50, p = .01, η2p = .02). Pepsi (low-warmth) received more charitable credit
(measured on a 1-5 scale in this study) when donating goods compared to money (MGoods = 3.41,
SD = 0.87, MMoney = 3.05, SD = .95; t(226) = 2.98, p =.002, d = .40), whereas Bolthouse Farms
(high-warmth) received equal (high) amounts of charitable credit for both donation types (MGoods
= 3.97, SD = 0.74 vs. MMoney = 3.98, SD = .67; t(246) = .20, p = .84). We found the same pattern
for purchase likelihood.
Due to the many potential differences besides perceived warmth between the individuals
in Study 3A (nursery school teacher and corporate manager), in appendix study 7, we also tested
an additional manipulation of warmth that described an individual donor as warm versus cold (in
a manipulation similar to Study 3B). We found the same pattern of results using this
manipulation. There was a significant interaction between donor warmth and donation type on
charitable credit (F(1, 718) = 4.95, p < .03, η2p = .01). The low-warmth individual received more
charitable credit when donating goods compared to money (MGoods = 5.28, SD = .97 vs. MMoney =
4.91, SD = 1.09; t(351) = 3.32, p < .001, d = .35). The high-warmth individual donor, however,
received equal (high) credit for donations of money and goods (MGoods = 6.10, SD = .72 vs.
MMoney = 6.02, SD = 0.72; t(367) = .94, p = .35).
Studies 3A and 3B and their replication studies show that when a donor is viewed as lowwarmth, they receive more charitable credit for a goods donation than for equivalent monetary
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donations. However, donors who are seen as high in warmth do not show this effect; they receive
equal (and high) charitable credit for donations of money or goods. This pattern fits with the
notion that judgments of warmth are used to predict intentions, with greater warmth indicating
that an actor has better, or more communal, intentions (Fiske et al. 2002). When warmth is low,
goods donations can send an additional signal of communal intent, boosting charitable credit
received.

1.9 Study 4: Monetary Donations can be Communal
The preference for goods donations from low-warmth donors documented in Studies 13B is somewhat unfortunate because for many charities, monetary donations are superior to
equivalent in-kind or goods donations. Monetary contributions are typically preferred because
cash donations provide charities with the flexibility to purchase exactly what they need when
they need it, reducing waste from unneeded or untimely goods donations (Charity Navigator
2017; Conan 2011; USAID 2017).
In Study 4, we test whether framing a monetary donation as communal increases
charitable credit for low-warmth donors in an analogous way to goods donations. We
specifically test whether framing a monetary donation as a gift increases perceptions of
communal intent, and subsequently, charitable credit. As opposed to other commodity
exchanges, gifting is valued as a symbolic gesture of caring and commitment (Belk and Coon
1993). If money can be described as a gift in a compelling way, it has the potential to be seen as
more communal and creditworthy.
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1.9.1 Methods
We recruited 650 Mechanical Turk participants, 567 of whom met our inclusion criteria
(MAge = 34.24, 61.85% female); 56 participants were removed for failing to complete the study
and 27 for failing the attention check. The study included a 2(Donation type: Goods vs. Money)
x 2(Communal frame: Control vs. Communal (Gift)) between-subjects experimental design. In
all conditions, participants read about the low-warmth donor Spades Hardware. They read that
“Spades Hardware is a large corporation that sells home improvement goods.” They then read
either 1) Money condition – “This past weekend, Spades Hardware donated $10,000 to a
humanitarian aid charity. (The charity purchased medical supplies with the $10,000)” or 2)
Goods condition – “This past weekend, Spades Hardware donated medical supplies (worth a
total of $10,000) to a humanitarian aid charity.” In the communal frame conditions, participants
also read that “The company carefully packaged the gift of $10,000 [medical supplies] and handdelivered it.” (We note that in this study, even in the monetary donation conditions we explained
that the donation was ultimately used for medical supplies to hold information about donation
use constant across conditions).
We measured charitable credit, purchase likelihood, warmth, communal intent, and
effort/sacrifice. The order of all measures was counterbalanced.

1.9.2 Results
Charitable Credit. The framing manipulation had a significant main effect; the company
whose donation was framed as a gift received more charitable credit than did the company whose
donation was not framed as a gift (F(1, 562) = 7.65, p < .01, η2p = .01). There was also a
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significant main effect for donation type; goods donations increased charitable credit (F(1, 562)
= 6.81 , p < .01, η2p = .01). Most importantly, the 2 x 2 analysis of variance revealed a significant
interaction between donation type (goods/money) and the communal frame, (F(1, 562) = 18.01,
p < .001, η2p = .03). In the control condition, the low-warmth donor received more charitable
credit for a goods donation (MGoods = 5.85, SD = .65) than an equivalent monetary donation
(MMoney = 4.36, SD = .85; t(277) = 5.33, p < .001, d = .64). However, when the donation was
framed communally, the low-warmth donor received equal credit for both donation types (MGoods
= 5.73, SD = .95 vs. MMoney = 5.86, SD = .84; t(285) = 1.20, p = .23; Figure 1.7).

FIGURE 1.7
EXPERIMENT 4: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF COMMUNAL FRAMING
AND DONATION TYPE
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Communal Intent. The communal frame had a significant main effect on communal
intent; overall the donation described as a gift was viewed as more communal than the Control
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condition counterpart (F(1, 561) = 23.36, p < .001, η2p = .04). Donation type had a marginally
significant effect; goods donations were seen as marginally more communal than donations of
money (F(1, 561) = 2.91, p = .09, η2p = .01). There was also a significant interaction between
donation type (goods/money) and the communal frame (F(1, 561) = 4.05, p < .05, η2p = .01). In
the control frame, a donation of goods versus money produced significantly higher perceptions
of communal intent (MGoods = 4.72, SD = .88 vs. MMoney = 4.39, SD = 1.02; t(275) = 2.94, p < .01,
d = .35). There was no difference in perceptions of communal intent in the communal frame
condition (MGoods = 4.97, SD = 1.19 vs. MMoney = 4.99, SD = 1.13; t(286) = -.18, p = .86).
Effort/Sacrifice. The gift-giving manipulation had a significant main effect on perceived
effort and sacrifice; the communal frame increased perceptions of effort and sacrifice compared
to the control frame (F(1, 560) = 18.78, p < .001, η2p = .03). Donation type also showed a
significant main effect; donations of goods were viewed as more effortful (F(1, 560) = 5.28, p =
.022, η2p = .01). However, we did not observe a significant interaction between donation type and
the communal frame (F(1, 560) = .13, p = .72). There was no difference in perceptions of effort
and sacrifice by donation type for the control condition (MGoods = 4.67, SD = .99 vs. MMoney =
4.49, SD = 1.11; t(275) = 1.44, p = .15), and there was a marginally significant difference in
effort perceptions for the communal-frame (gift) condition (MGoods = 5.10, SD = 1.16 vs. MMoney
= 4.86, SD = 1.21; t(285) = 1.71, p = .09).
Purchase Likelihood. There was a significant main effect of the donor manipulation on
purchase likelihood; overall participants were more likely to purchase from the company whose
donation was framed communally (F(1, 555) = 4.60, p =.03, η2p = .01). Donation type also had a
significant main effect; donations of goods led to higher purchase likelihood (F(1, 555) = 7.24, p
< .01, η2p = .01). There was a marginally significant interaction between donation type and the
46

gift-giving manipulation on purchase likelihood (F(1, 555) = 3.53, p = .06, η2p = .01). In the
control frame condition, participants were more likely to purchase from Spades Hardware after a
donation of goods (MGoods = 5.60, SD = .91) versus money (MMoney = 5.20, SD = 1.05; t(271) =
3.40, p < .001, d = .41). By contrast, in the communal frame condition, we found no difference in
purchase intentions based on donation type (MGoods = 5.60, SD = 1.06 vs. MMoney= 5.56, SD =
1.11; t(284) = .30, p = .76).
Measured Warmth. We found a main effect of the communal frame on perceived warmth
(F(1, 566) = 15.02, p < .001, η2p = .03), but a non-significant main effect of donation type on
warmth (F(1, 566) = .167, p = .68). There was no significant interaction between communal
framing and donation type on measured warmth (F(1, 566) = 1.96, p = .16).
Moderated Mediation. We conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2013model 8) to test the predicted relationship of donation type by companies who do or do not handdeliver their gifts on charitable credit received, with communal intent and effort/sacrifice as
mediators. We simultaneously tested the significance of both mediators by calculating
standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples and found that the model mediates
the effect of donation type on charitable credit (Direct effect = 0.08; 95% CI [-0.04, 0.20]). We
found that donation type produced an indirect effect of communal intent conditional on
communal frame. As hypothesized, inferences about communal intent mediated the effect of
donation type on charitable credit for the control condition (indirect effect = 0.09 (95% CI [0.03,
0.16])), but not for the communal-frame (gift) condition (indirect effect = -0.01 (95% CI [-0.09,
0.06])). Effort and sacrifice did not mediate the effect for the control condition (indirect effect =
0.05 (95% CI [-0.02, 0.12])), nor for the gift condition (indirect effect = 0.07 (95% CI [-0.004,

47

0.14])). The index of moderated mediation was significant for communal intent (Index = -.10
(95% CI [-0.21, -0.01]), but not significant for effort/sacrifice (Index = .02 (95% CI [-0.09, 0.11].

1.9.3 Discussion
In Study 4, we found once again that a low-warmth donor (Spades Hardware) received
more credit for a donation of goods than a donation of money. However, when the donations
were framed as communal (i.e., a gift), both donations were perceived to be motivated by
communal intentions and therefore creditworthy. By increasing the perceived communality of
the monetary donation, the low-warmth donor was able to receive high levels of charitable credit
for making a cash donation.

1.10 General Discussion
This research finds that donors receive charitable credit based on who they are and what
they give. High-warmth donors often receive more credit for being generous than low-warmth
donors. However, low-warmth donors can boost the charitable credit they receive by donating
goods. This article documents a novel interaction between donor traits (high- vs. low-warmth)
and donation types (goods vs. money) and is among the first to study goods donations.
Across our studies, when low-warmth donors give goods, their intentions are presumed to
be more communal, or other-oriented, than when they donate equivalent monetary amounts (or
make an unspecified donation, e.g., Study 2A). This inference about increased communal intent
boosts charitable credit, and for corporate donors, can have a positive impact on purchase
intentions as well. High-warmth donors, on the other hand, receive equal and high credit for
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either type of donation. Because high-warmth donors are presumed to have good intentions, any
act of giving is consistent with those prior assumptions.
Throughout, we additionally tested a potential role of effort and sacrifice in driving the
preference for goods donations from low-warmth donors with the rationale that consumers may
infer that donors spend more energy procuring and donating tangible goods than simply writing a
check. But, while perceptions of effort and sacrifice are sometimes important for influencing
charitable credit, in this context, they do not appear necessary for the preference for goods
donations to occur (e.g., studies 2B, 3A, and 4).
The conceptualization that trait warmth triggers strong assumptions about the nature of a
donor’s intent generates numerous predictions about the level of credit donors will receive. For
example, although we did not find a consistent effect of donation type on effort perceptions,
donation effort likely has independent effects on charitable credit when varied through other
means. If people assume that high-warmth donors have good intentions, then, similar to donation
type, donation effort may minimally impact charitable credit for high-warmth donors; highwarmth donors are likely to receive high levels of charitable credit for any magnitude of
donation effort. In contrast, low-warmth donors, whose intentions are more subject to skepticism,
may receive minimal credit for a low-effort donation, but receive more credit for sending a
stronger signal of good intentions via a high-effort donation.
These predictions are analogous to other findings in the literature in which individuals
with different traits are judged differently for the same act. For example, prior research finds that
donors with good reputations (i.e., social workers) are viewed as equally altruistic whether they
brag about their good deed or not, whereas donors with less altruistic reputations (i.e., investment
bankers) are viewed as even less altruistic when they brag about a good deed (Berman et al.
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2015, study 2). Future research should further examine these and related patterns regarding
donor warmth and assumptions about communal intent.
Throughout our studies, we find that when low-warmth donors donate goods, they are
viewed as having greater communal intent and receive greater charitable credit, however, goods
donations do not similarly improve judgments of warmth. This pattern fits with the notion that
warmth is a stable construct that varies minimally due to subtle changes or contextual factors
(Kenworthy and Tausch 2008). We do predict, however, that consistently donating goods and/or
sending other sustained signals of communal intent may improve perceptions of a donor’s trait
warmth over time.
One interesting, and perplexing, implication of the current findings is that for image
reasons, low-warmth donors may benefit from donating goods rather than money, even though
charities can often do more good with monetary donations (Conan 2011; USAID 2017). In fact,
in appendix C – study 8, we find that participants appear aware that nonprofits generally prefer
monetary donations, and yet we still frequently find more favorable evaluations of donors who
make goods donations. For low-warmth donors, such as most for-profit companies, who wish to
maximize both their impact and credit received, we propose two potential solutions. First, as in
Study 4, low-warmth donors can describe a monetary donation as a gift, and thus frame it more
communally. Alternatively, low-warmth donors can coordinate closely with charities to identify
their most pressing tangible needs, and fund those needs quickly and directly via goods
donations. Indeed, working closely with nonprofits to identify and meet their greatest needs may
serve as an additional signal to consumers of a donor’s communal intentions.
In summary, despite the fact that monetary donations are the most frequent donation type
(usa.gov 2012), and the type that charities often prefer, we find that low-warmth donors who
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donate goods receive more credit for their generosity than those who make equivalent monetary
donations. We conclude that low-warmth donors aiming to maximize both charitable credit and
actual impact may benefit from spending their philanthropic funds on donations of goods that are
coordinated with a charity’s needs, or alternatively, describing a monetary donation communally.
Future research should continue to explore our differing judgments of low-warmth versus highwarmth donors and the implications for charitable credit and sustained giving.
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Chapter 2: Why Prosocial Referral
Incentives Work: Reputational Benefits
versus Action Costs
2.1 Introduction
From evolutionary biology to neoclassical economics, many theories of human behavior
posit that humans are driven primarily by self-interest. The most effective incentives should
therefore be those that maximize material payoff to the decision maker. Indeed, self-benefiting
incentives outperform prosocial (or “other-benefiting”) incentives in many contexts: for most
reward magnitudes people exert more effort when offered selfish incentives compared to
prosocial incentives that go to charity (DellaVigna and Pope 2016; Imas 2014; Schwartz,
Keenan, Imas, and Gneezy, 2018).
However, people also frequently display significant other-regarding behavior. In dictator
games, even when there is no consequence for selfish behavior, people share on average about
25% of a given endowment (Forsythe et al. 1994). Consumers often pay more for charity-linked
products (Elfenbein and McManus 2010; Jung et al. 2017), or choose brands that make a
donation over those that provide equivalent discounts (Strahilevitz 1999).
A desire to appear generous to others is one important driver of such prosocial acts. When
generous behavior is public, people are more likely to give than when it is private (Andreoni and
Petrie 2004; Bereczkei, Birkas, and Kerekes 2007) and anonymous donations are rare (Glazer
and Konrad 1996). Reputational benefits for generous behavior have the potential to loom largest
within one’s social network. People are more generous in contexts involving their close social
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connections (Moore 2009; Small and Simonsohn 2007) potentially in part because reputation
matters most to those who know you well.
In this project, we examine how reputational concerns alter the dynamics of incentivized
behavior. For important theoretical reasons, academic research typically examines prosocial
incentives by offering rewards that aid anonymous individuals or charities (DellaVigna and Pope
2016; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Imas 2014; Yang, Hsee, and Urminsky 2014). However, when
people consider prosocial acts in the real world, the benefits often go to people whom they know.
In this research, we propose that incorporating reputational concerns into the context of incentive
design substantially alters behavior, and does so in ways that are not obvious to incentive
architects. Specifically, we examine the context of customer referral programs where companies
incentivize customers to refer others to become new customers.

2.2 Conceptual Background
2.2.1 Customer Referral Incentives
We study the role of reputational concerns in incentivized behavior within the context of
customer referrals. In referral programs, companies typically offer incentives to existing
customers for recruiting new customers. For example, Google Apps currently offers $15 to
customers for each new user they recruit, and the videogame World of Warcraft offers current
users a free month of gaming if they successfully refer their friends to buy a subscription (Gains
2017). Referral programs can be a cost-efficient method for gaining new customers (Ryu and
Feik 2007; Schmitt, Skiera, and Van den Bulte 2011); referral programs not only recruit new
customers, but referred customers tend to be of value because they feel greater trust and a
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stronger bond with firms when a friend or acquaintance is already a customer (Castilla 2005;
Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 2000; Schmitt et al. 2011).
A critical feature to consider when creating referral incentive programs is that a new
customer conversion involves two separate decisions: the referral decision and the uptake
decision. Sender-benefiting incentives may appear superior because they directly incentivize the
first decision-maker, and the process has no chance to begin if there is no referral (Bapna et al.
2014). Indeed, many firms focus on this feature. We asked a hypothesis-blind research assistant
to first, find 300 current referral incentive programs online and then, to categorize them based on
how the incentive was designed (who received the reward). This research assistant documented
351 existing referral incentive programs with the following breakdown: 40.5% offered senderbenefiting referrals while only 2.6% offered recipient-benefiting referrals (55% offered rewards
that were shared between the referrer and recipient). Note: while we are primarily interested in
comparing the recipient-benefiting and sender-benefiting incentives, because they offer a clean
conceptual separation, we also test the effectiveness of the shared incentive in two of our studies
due to the popularity of this incentive in the marketplace. Past work on referral incentives
provides further evidence that marketers tend to predict that fully recipient-benefiting referral
incentives will be ineffective. For example, Hong et al. (2017) compared fair incentives ($5 for
both referrer and recipient) to unfair incentives ($7/$3) or ($3/$7) in a field experiment with a
corporate partner. They explained this choice, stating, “We used (7, 3), (3, 7) split because we
wanted to test a bonus split that is practically relevant and is likely to be used by firms in
practice. The corporate sponsor stated that the (0, 10), (10, 0) split would be extremely harsh on
both sides and will be unlikely to be accepted by the responder and even to be spent by the
proposer” (Hong et al, 2017, p. 797).
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The current popularity of sender-benefiting referral programs indicates that incentive
architects tend to focus heavily on encouraging current customers to refer. However, we posit
that this strategy ignores two critical facets of the psychology of incentive design and prosocial
behavior. First, people care about their reputation (Fehr 2004); thus, recipient-benefiting
referrals, in providing the recipient an opportunity to earn something of value, may confer
reputational benefits to the referrer – a benefit that sender-benefiting referrals do not confer upon
the referrer. Second, action costs matter; all else equal, relative to un-incentivized behavior
change, incentives are particularly effective at prompting action when behavior change is
difficult (i.e., by increasing the impetus to shift behavior). We show that recipient-benefiting
referral programs, because they address these two important aspects of the psychology of
incentives and prosocial behavior, can outperform sender-benefiting referral programs. In the
following sections, we develop our theory through a review of prior research. We then outline
our predictions and provide an overview of our empirical work.

2.2.2 Prosocial Incentives Offer Reputational Benefits
There are numerous examples of self-benefiting financial incentives that effectively motivate
behavior. Self-benefiting financial incentives increase gym attendance (Acland and Levy 2015),
improve immunization coverage (Banerjee et al. 2010), and motivate weight loss (John et al.
2011). In direct comparisons, selfish incentives (particularly those above $2) more effectively
motivate effort than equivalent prosocial incentives that benefit charity (Imas 2014; Schwartz et
al. 2018). Similarly, people report greater happiness when they receive a selfish incentive
compared to when an equivalent donation is made in their name (i.e., when they receive a
prosocial incentive; Berman and Small 2012).
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However, as Miller (1999) states, “Homo economicus, it should not be forgotten, inhabits a
social world.” When people behave generously, they may sacrifice at a material level, but they
often receive social rewards in return such as higher status or respect (Berman et al. 2015; Flynn
2003; Flynn et al. 2006; Price 2006). Reputational rewards motivate people to behave generously
due to a strong desire for social approval (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009; Grant and Gino 2010)
and a fundamental human need to belong and maintain close personal relationships (Baumeister
and Leary 1995). Considerable experimental evidence suggests that prosocial behavior is
frequently driven by such reputational concerns (Fehr and Fichbacher 2002). For example,
generosity increases when donors are promised recognition for their contributions (Alpizar,
Carlsson, and Johansson-Stenman 2008; Andreoni and Petrie 2004; Fisher and Ackerman 1997;
Lacetera and Macis 2010), potentially explaining why anonymous donations are rare (Glazer and
Konrad 1996). Church donations increase when anonymity is reduced (and reputational benefits
are enhanced), such as when closed donation bags are replaced with open baskets (Soetevent
2005). In a related vein, charitable appeals that emphasize benefits to others are more effective
when concerns about one’s reputation are high (White and Peloza 2009).
Reputational benefits for prosociality are likely to be especially strong motivators in contexts
where people interact with members of their social network. Indeed, people tend to be more
motivated to help friends than strangers (Moore 2009; Schlenker and Britt 1999). For example,
on online dictator games involving participants’ social networks, adult participants sent
significantly more money to their close friends than to strangers (Leider et al. 2009). Individuals
are also more likely to be generous (e.g., volunteer) for a cause when they have a close personal
relationship with someone affected by that cause (Small and Simonsohn 2008). Even young
children are willing to sacrifice (receive one sticker instead of two) to benefit a friend, but will
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not similarly sacrifice to benefit a stranger (Moore 2009; see also Fehr, Bernhard, and
Rockenbach 2008). While their motives may not be purely altruistic – people expect a benefit,
though it is reputational rather than material – the outcome is other-benefiting behavior
nonetheless. Because people care deeply about the judgments of those with whom they have
personal relationships, prosocial incentives have the potential to perform well when offered
within customer referral programs.

2.2.3 Prosocial Referral Incentives address Action Costs where they are
Highest
An important feature of the two-step referral process is that there tends to be an asymmetry in
action costs between the referrer and the recipient. We define action costs as the monetary or
non-monetary (i.e., effort or time) cost necessary to comply with the task that the marketer is
requesting of you at the given stage of the referral. For the referrer, this is the cost of making the
referral; and for the recipient it is the cost of following through on the referral. The act of
referring tends to be low effort and low cost: the referrer simply sends their friend a code or
submits an email address. Recipients, however, tend to incur higher burdens; to complete a
referral, recipients must spend money on a product, download an app, or join a service (and
receive the accompanying e-mails, notifications, etc.; see Figure 2.1).

FIGURE 2.1: REFERRAL PROCESS
Referral Choice
(low action costs)

+

Recipient Uptake
(high action costs)

=

Successful
Conversions

This difference in action costs has implications for how referral programs perform at the two
decision stages in the referral process. Logically, the incentive structure of a referral program is
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likely to affect the extent to which referrers and recipients a) anticipate reputational benefits, as
well as b) are directly incented to act. Specifically, in recipient-benefiting referral programs,
referrers may anticipate the recipients to be pleased with them for providing the opportunity to
obtain a reward. Likewise, in sender-benefiting referral programs, recipients may anticipate the
referrer to be pleased with them for following through on the referral (thereby enabling the
referrer to realize the reward). However, in sender-benefiting referral programs, these anticipated
reputational benefits may be insufficient to overcome the substantial action costs faced by the
recipient. As a result, sender-benefiting referral programs may be ineffective at spurring uptake.
By the same logic, recipient-benefiting referrals may be effective at spurring uptake, because by
directly incenting uptake, they offer recipients sufficient incentive to act.

2.2.4 The Current Research
While selfish incentives have proven highly effective at motivating behavior across many
contexts, we predict that offering referrers a prosocial incentive (i.e., recipient-benefiting
referrals) will result in more new customers than offer referrers a selfish benefit (i.e., senderbenefiting referrals). We predict this pattern because: 1) at the referral stage, the cost of action is
low and customers who refer friends receive reputational benefits when making recipientbenefiting referrals, and 2) at the uptake stage, the cost of action is relatively high; therefore,
referral recipients will be more likely to require a direct incentive to follow through. We posit
that both reputational benefits and action costs affect incentivized behavior, such that referrals
designed to incentivize the recipient will result in the greatest number of new customers.
Indeed, recently published work provides suggestive evidence that recipient-benefiting
referrals can result in more new customer conversions relative to sender-benefiting referrals
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(Hong, Pavlou, Shi, & Wang, 2017; Bapna, Gupta, & Sen, 2014) – suggestive, as opposed to
definitive, because in these studies, it is unclear whether the effect is a result of the incentive
structure or selection effects. In the present paper, we show that the effect holds when
randomizing participants to role (i.e., either referrer or recipient), documenting that indeed the
division of referral incentives – to sender versus recipient – impacts their effectiveness.
However, our primary contribution is in providing a comprehensive account of when and
why these recipient-benefiting referral programs outperform those that benefit the sender. Up
until now, researchers have not uncovered an explanation for why, in this particular context,
prosocial incentives are superior to selfish incentives. The only published demonstrations of the
superiority of recipient-benefiting referral programs have been outcome-focused – either
assessing the effectiveness of recipient-benefiting programs at the referral stage (Ryu & Feick,
2007), or only testing the conversion rate of these programs (i.e., the number of new customers;
Hong et al., 2017; Bapna et al., 2014) – stopping short of testing why these effects occur. In
addressing both steps in the referral process – i.e., the referral stage and the uptake stage – we are
equipped to address this knowledge gap. Specifically, we provide an account of when and why
recipient benefiting referral programs outperform sender-benefiting programs by examining both
stages of the referral process, which invoke two countervailing forces: reputational benefits
versus action costs. As such, we add to scholarly research, offering a comprehensive account of
seemingly disparate findings in the emergent literature of customer referral programs, as well as
the literature on prosocial behavior and incentive design more generally. Importantly, we also
contribute to marketing practice, by offering evidence-based guidance on how marketers should
structure their referral reward programs for maximal impact.
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We test our account in eight studies (plus five additional studies in the appendix). The
first three studies document the basic effect. Study 1 is a field experiment with a phone app
company that varies incentive structure and measures new customer conversions. Recipientbenefiting referrals recruited more new customers relative to sender-benefiting referrals. Study 2
is another field experiment, this time with a video game rental company. Study 2 replicates the
findings from Study 1 and also tracks behavior at each decision stage (both referral and uptake
stages), showing that recipient-benefiting incentives perform as well as sender-benefiting
incentives at the referral stage, and prosocial referrals (recipient-benefiting) substantially
outperform selfish referrals (sender-benefiting) at the uptake stage. Study 3 examines the full
referral process with participants randomly assigned to either the referrer or recipient role and
begins to establish the role of asymmetric action costs in our process account. Five subsequent
experiments focus on explaining when and why recipient-benefiting referrals outperform senderbenefiting referrals. Studies 4A – 4C focus on the first stage in the process – where action costs
are typically low – indicating that recipient-benefiting programs lead referrers to anticipate
reputational benefits, in turn spurring them to act (i.e., to refer people). Studies 5A and 5B
incorporate action costs, demonstrating that when action costs are low (as is typical in the
referral stage), other-benefiting incentives are just as effective as self-benefiting incentives.
However, when action costs are high (as is typical at the uptake stage), participants are more
likely to act when they receive a direct incentive.
Following recommendations from Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2012), we report
all manipulations, all measures, and all data exclusion criteria for all studies.
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2.3 Study 1: Recipient-Benefiting Referrals Increase
Conversions
Study 1 is a field experiment with a startup company called GiftAMeal that offers a food
photo-sharing phone app. In this experiment, we test how various incentive structures influence
new customer conversions.

2.3.1 Methods
The company e-mailed 6,364 current customers, asking if each customer would refer
their friends to download the app. Customers were randomly assigned to one of four
experimental conditions: 1) control: no monetary incentive2, 2) sender-benefiting: customers
received a $5 Amazon gift card for each friend who downloaded the app, 3) recipient-benefiting:
referred friends received a $5 gift card if they downloaded the app, 4) shared: referrer and their
friend each received a $2.50 gift card if the friend downloaded the app or 5) donation:
GiftAMeal donated $5 to Feeding America for each download.
Current customers received a unique promotional code, which they could send to their
friends. All emails additionally offered a suggestion for what customers could email or text their
friends when sending the referral (for full emails in all conditions, see Appendix A), however the
company does not track individual choices (whether a given consumer chooses to refer or
follow-through on a referral). The promotion lasted two weeks, during which time referred
individuals could download the app using their friend’s code. In this study, the company tracked
new customer downloads by condition (i.e., conversions). The “conversion rate” in this, and

2

While there was no monetary incentive, in the control condition, the company donated a meal
to a family in need. This is their standard reward for referrals.
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future studies, describes the number of new customers as a percentage of the emails sent in that
condition – or in other words, how many new customers did the company get by sending N
original emails (if they send 100 emails and get 5 new customers, this would be a 5% conversion
rate).

2.3.2 Results
Table 2.1 summarizes the results. Overall, the new customer conversion rate (i.e.,
percentage of new customers based on total referral emails sent) was low (less than 1% overall),
not uncommon in field settings. Nevertheless, we detected significant differences between
experimental conditions. Referrals were more successful (resulted in a higher new customer
conversion rate) when the company offered a recipient-benefiting incentive (.94% conversion
rate) than when they were offered no incentive (.08% conversion rate; χ2 (1) = 9.41, p =.002), or
when they were offered a donation incentive; (.08%; χ2 (1) = 9.29, p = .002). The recipientbenefiting referral also had a marginally significant advantage over the sender-benefiting referral
(.39%; χ2 (1) = 2.92, p = .09). There was no difference in the conversion rate between the
recipient-benefiting and shared referral conditions (.94%; χ2 (1) = .002, p = .99). Finally, the
sender-benefiting referral performed marginally significantly better than the control condition (χ2
(1) = 2.69, p = .10).

TABLE 2.1: SUMMARY RESULTS OF ALL STUDIES
Study #

Study Type

Study 1

Field Experiment
N = 6,364

Experimental
Conditions
Control
Sender-Benefiting
Recipient-Benefiting
Shared
Donation

% Referral
Choice
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% Uptake Choice

% New Customer
Conversions
.08%a
.39%ab†
.94%b†c
.94%b†c
.08%a

Study 2

Field Experiment
N = 1,438

Control
Sender-Benefiting
Recipient-Benefiting

16.36%a
23.77%b
21.37%b

Study 3

MTurk Scenario
Experiment
N = 816

Sender-Benefiting/ Referral
Role
Recipient-Benefiting/ Referral
Role
Sender-Benefiting/ Recipient
Role
Recipient-Benefiting/
Recipient Role
Control
Sender-Benefiting
Recipient-Benefiting
Shared
Sender-Benefiting/ Named

82.21%a†

Recipient-Benefiting/ Named
Sender-Benefiting/
Anonymous
Recipient-Benefiting/
Anonymous

87.32%a
86.50%a

Study 4A

Incentivized Lab
Experiment
N = 369

Study 4B

MTurk Scenario
Experiment
N = 805

Study 4C

MTurk Scenario
Experiment
N = 583

Sender-Benefiting

Average likelihood
(not %)

Recipient-Benefiting

MTurk Scenario
Experiment
N = 824

Sender-Benefiting/ Low Cost
Recipient-Benefiting/ Low
Cost
Sender-Benefiting/ High Cost
Recipient-Benefiting/ High
Cost
Sender-Benefiting/ Low Cost
Recipient-Benefiting/ Low
Cost

3.45%a
6.61%a
16.91%b

.61%a
1.71%a
4.77%b

88.83%a†
51.74%a
62.19%b
26.37%a
64.84%b
58.06%b
56.99%b
85.29%a

24.00%a
28.07%a
69.81%b
64.71%b

6.52%a
17.58%b
39.79%c
35.48%c

74.49%b
5.22 (1.97)

5.42 (1.79)

Study 5A

Study 5B

MTurk Scenario
Experiment
N = 740

73.63 a†bc†
63.82 c†
72.38 a†bc†
81.52 a†
15.59%a
32.20%b

Sender-Benefiting/ High Cost

54.40%c

Recipient-Benefiting/ High
Cost

55.90%c

Notes: Significant differences are denoted by superscript letters – condition proportions for each
study in the same column that share a same letter are insignificant from each other at p < .05. A
dagger symbol ([†]) indicates a statistically significant difference at a p < .10 level
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2.3.3 Discussion
Results from Study 1 support the prediction that recipient-benefiting referrals result in a
higher conversion rate compared to offering either 1) no incentive or 2) a sender-benefiting
referral. It is also noteworthy that the recipient-benefiting condition outperformed another
version of an other-benefiting referral – a donation incentive, whereby an incentive is given to
charity, yet offered no incentive for a member of one’s social network. This result is consistent
with past research (Imas 2014; Schwartz et al. 2018) as well as our proposed process account:
recipient-benefiting referrals are not necessarily successful because they offer referrers a chance
to be altruistic, but rather, because they offer some kind of benefit to the referrer himself (we
posit this benefit to be reputational, and explicitly test this idea in Studies 4A-4C). Finally, it is
interesting to note that the shared incentive, which is the most commonly used referral reward
offered, did not outperform the recipient-benefiting incentive.
Study 2 aims to replicate and extend these findings by tracking behavior at both the
referral and uptake decision stages in addition to measuring total new customer conversions in
another field experiment.

2.4 Study 2: Sender-Benefiting and Recipient-Benefiting
Incentives at the Referral and Recipient Stage
Study 2 is another randomized field experiment, this time with an online video game
subscription company called Game Access. This company tracks both the referral stage (i.e., the
number of referrals made) and uptake stage (i.e., the number of referral recipients that sign up).
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2.4.1 Methods
The company randomly assigned 1,500 customers to receive one of three referral offers: 1)
control: no incentive, 2) sender-benefiting: one month free, or 3) recipient-benefiting: one month
free for the new customer. 1,438 emails were successfully delivered (4.1% bounced back,
possibly due to invalid email addresses). Current members received an email asking if they
would refer a friend to buy a membership to Game Access (See Appendix A for all emails used
in this experiment).
If a current customer chose to refer one or more friends, they clicked a link in the email
labeled “Tell your friends about Game Access,” and then entered the name and email address of
as many friends as they would like. Game Access then sent an email to each referred friend with
the subject line “I just joined a cool new service.” By sending emails directly to referral
recipients, the company could track both how many customers sent referrals as well as how
many recipients chose to follow through on those referrals by signing up.

2.4.2 Results
Table 2.1 summarizes the results.
Referral stage. At the referral stage, more customers chose to make a referral in the
sender-benefiting (23.77%) and recipient-benefiting (21.37%) conditions than in the control
condition (16.36%, χ2 (1) = 8.20, p = .004 and χ2 (1) = 3.98, p = .046, respectively). The
difference between the incentivized conditions was not significant χ2(1) = .78, p = .38). See
Figure 2.2 for all results.
Some customers chose to make multiple referrals, so next we look at the referral rate in
each condition (the number of referrals made divided by the number of customers who received
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the original email). There was a significantly higher referral rate in the sender-benefiting
(25.91%) and recipient-benefiting (28.22%) conditions than in the control condition (17.79%, χ2
(1) = 9.24, p < .01 and χ2 (1) = 14.91, p < .001, respectively). Again, there was no significant
difference between the incentive conditions (χ2 (1) = .64, p = .42).
Uptake stage. At the uptake stage, referral recipients were significantly more likely to
sign up in the recipient-benefiting condition (16.91%, 23 out of 136 referral recipients) compared
to the sender-benefiting condition (6.61%, 8 out of 121 referral recipients, χ2(1) = 6.38, p = .01)
or control conditions (3.45%, 3 out of 87 referral recipients, χ2(1) = 9.29, p < .01). There was a
non-significant difference in new customer uptake between the sender-benefiting and control
conditions (χ2(1) = 1.00, p = .32).
New customer conversions. As with the previous field experiment, the final new customer
conversion rate (i.e., percentage of new customers based on total referral emails sent) was higher
when the company offered a recipient-benefiting referral (4.77%) compared to a senderbenefiting referral (1.71%, χ2(1) = 7.03, p = .008) or no incentive (.61%, χ2(1) = 16.12, p < .001;
see Figure 2). There was a non-significant, though directional, difference in conversion rate
between the sender-benefiting and control conditions (χ2 (1) = 2.55, p = .11).
One-month follow-up. Follow-up subscription renewal data showed that the new
customer conversion rate patterns remained one month after the intervention. More new
customers renewed their membership in the recipient-benefiting condition (3.52%) compared to
the sender-benefiting condition (1.07%, χ2(1) = 6.29, p = .01) and the control condition (.35%, χ2
(1) = 9.41, p < .001). There continued to be a non-significant difference between the senderbenefiting and control conditions (χ2(1) = 1.78, p = .18).
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FIGURE 2.2
STUDY 2: REFERRAL CHOICE, UPTAKE CHOICE, AND OVERALL NEW CUSTOMER
CONVERSION RATE BY CONDITION
Referral Choice
30%
Uptake Choice
24%

25%

Conversion

Outcome (in %)

21%
20%

17%

16%
15%
10%
5%

7%
4.80%
3%

1.70%

0.60%
0%
Control

Sender-Benefiting

Recipient-Benefiting

Condition

Figure 2.2. At the referral stage, recipient-benefiting and sender-benefiting incentives lead to
more referrals than no incentive. There is no difference in referral choice between incentive
conditions. At the uptake stage, Recipient-benefiting referral incentives lead to higher uptake
than sender-benefiting incentives or no referral incentive. Overall, recipient-benefiting referrals
lead to the most new customer conversions.

2.4.3 Discussion
Study 2 provided additional support for the hypothesis that recipient-benefiting referrals
outperform sender-benefiting ones. This field experiment showed that, despite the tendency for
selfish incentives to outperform prosocial incentives in most settings, the prosocial (recipientbenefiting) incentives perform equally as well as selfish (sender-benefiting) incentives in this
context at the referral stage. However, at the uptake stage, recipients are more likely to act when
there is a selfish (recipient-benefiting) incentive offered. We propose that this pattern occurs
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because, at the referral stage, the burden of referring is low and referrers anticipate reputational
benefits from sending their friends an incentive opportunity. Therefore, we see that a recipientbenefiting or sender-benefiting referral perform equally as well at the referral stage. At the
uptake stage, however, there is a much higher burden (purchasing a $30/month membership) for
the recipient to follow through on their friend’s request. Thus, at the uptake stage, recipients are
significantly more likely to sign up when they themselves receive the incentive than when the
incentive goes to the customer who sent the referral. Studies 3-5B explore the process behind
these patterns.

2.5 Study 3: Comparing Referral versus Recipient Stages
We designed Study 3 to remove the potential for selection bias at the recipient stage by
randomly assigning participants to be either a referrer or a recipient in the same context, and
crossed that manipulation with a recipient-benefiting versus sender-benefiting referral incentive
structure. We also measure action costs at each stage. We define action costs as the effort, time,
and/or payment required to follow-through on an action. An interesting feature of the referral
context is that decision makers at each stage (the referral and uptake stage) face similar decisions
– whether to take action based on an incentive that is offered to you or to your friend; however,
we see different decision patterns at the two different stages. At the referral stage, otherbenefiting incentives perform equally as well as self-benefiting incentives. At the recipient stage,
by contrast, self-benefiting incentives outperform other-benefiting incentives (i.e., the recipientbenefiting referral is more effective at this stage). We propose that the higher cost of taking
action at the recipient stage drive the preference for self-benefiting incentives for recipients, and
we test this proposition here.
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Note that in this study only, we use labels that describe the incentive from the actor’s
perspective. Specifically, participants in both conditions received incentives that are either selfbenefiting (the participant can receive a reward) or other-benefiting (the participant’s friend can
receive a reward).

2.5.1 Methods
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2DORuhk), we
recruited 800 MTurk participants (816 participants completed the study; MAge = 35.40, 61.81%
female). The study used a 2(referral: self-benefiting vs. other-benefiting) x 2(role: referrer vs.
recipient) between-subjects design. For this study, we described a (fictitious) food delivery
service called Food2Me, that delivers from local restaurants. Participants provided their first
name and the first name of a close friend. We manipulated whether participants were in the role
of referrer or recipient within this paradigm. Participants were informed that they were part of a
referral incentive opportunity that was structured either to financially benefit the referrer or
financially benefit the recipient. In this study, the incentive was a free year of Food2Me.
After reading about the service, participants were required to correctly identify who
would receive an incentive (themselves or their friend) before they could move to the action
decision to confirm that they understood the incentive structure. Participants were then told,
“The Food2Me restaurant delivery service costs $50 per year.” They were asked if they wanted
to take action; specifically, those in the referrer condition were asked, “Would you refer
[Friend’s Name] to sign up for the Food2Me delivery service?” and those in the recipient
condition were asked, “Would you sign up for the Food2Me delivery service?” Please see Table
2 for a description of each experimental condition.
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We additionally measured how costly participants believed it would be to take the given
action. We measured “action costs” for all conditions using a three-item scale: “Referring my
friend to Food2Me [Subscribing to Food2Me] would be…” Effortful, Burdensome, Costly (1 =
Not at all, 7 = Very much so, α = .78).

2.5.2 Results
Action Costs. As expected, there was a significant main effect of participant role
(referrer/recipient) on action costs; recipients perceived the cost of taking action as higher than
referrers ((F(1, 812) = 108.72, p < .001). There was a non-significant effect of referral incentive
type on action costs (F(1, 812) = .004, p = .95). There was a significant interaction of participant
role and incentive type (F(1, 812) = 19.40, p < .001). Surprisingly, in the referrer condition,
perceived action costs were significantly higher for the self-benefiting condition (MSelf = 2.67,
SD = 1.46) than the other-benefiting referral (MOther = 2.24, SD = 1.31; t(411) = 3.17, p = .002).
However, in the recipient condition, perceived action costs were significantly higher in the otherbenefiting condition (MSelf = 3.28, SD = 1.49 vs. MOther = 3.72, SD = 1.43; t(398) = 3.06, p =
.002).
Action Choice. Table 2.1 summarizes the results. We performed a binary logistic
regression on choice to act as a function of participant role (referrer/recipient) and incentive type
(self-benefiting/other-benefiting). This analysis yielded a significant interaction between
participant role and incentive type (χ2(1) = 7.67, p = .006). Marginally significantly more
referrers chose to refer when their friend received the reward (other-benefiting referral; 88.83%)
than when they themselves received the reward (self-benefiting referral; 82.21%; (χ2(1) = 3.61, p
=.058). However, significantly fewer recipients chose to sign up when their friend received the
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reward (other-benefiting referral; 51.74%) compared to when they themselves received the
reward (self-benefiting referral; 62.19%; 2(1) = 4.46, p =.035; See Figure 2.3).

FIGURE 2.3

% Choosing to take Action

STUDY 3: CHOICE TO ACT BY ROLE AND REFERRAL TYPE
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Figure 2.3. Recipient-Benefiting incentives lead to marginally significantly higher referral
choice and significantly higher uptake choice.

2.5.3 Discussion
Study 3 replicates the pattern found in the prior field experiment and additionally begins
to demonstrate the moderating role of action costs on the effectiveness of other-benefiting and
self-benefiting incentives. Within the same referral context and design, consumers are similarly
likely (in this study, marginally significantly more likely) to take action at the referral stage,
where action costs are low, when they are offered an other-benefiting (prosocial) incentive
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compared to a self-benefiting (selfish) incentive. At the recipient stage, however, where action
costs are high, recipients are more likely to require an incentive themselves to act.
In an additional study (Appendix C, Study 1), we conceptually replicated this pattern of
referral and uptake. In this replication, we also measured the reputational benefits participants
expected to receive for taking action (referral/uptake). Consistent with our account, both referrers
and recipients believed they would receive higher reputational benefits for taking action when
offered an other-benefiting incentive compared to a self-benefiting incentive. Specifically, there
was a significant main effect of incentive type on expected reputational benefits, but participant
role did not have an effect on expected reputational benefits (the interaction was also not
significant). Therefore, even though consumers expected high reputational benefits for taking
action when offered an other-benefiting incentive regardless of referrer versus recipient role,
recipients who faced high action costs still showed a preference for the self-benefiting incentive.I
Next, we more thoroughly examine the roles of reputational benefits (Studies 4A-4C) and
action costs (Studies 5A and 5B) in the performance of sender-benefiting and recipientbenefiting referral incentives.

2.6 Studies 4A-4C: The Role of Reputational Benefits
In Studies 4A - 4C, we test the role of anticipated reputational benefits in the
performance of prosocial (i.e., recipient-benefiting) incentives at the referral stage. Study 4A is
an incentive compatible lab experiment in which we track behavior at both the referral and
uptake stages, and test whether the reputational benefits that referrers anticipate mediate their
propensity to refer. In addition, Study 4A tests two additional, complementary explanations for
why recipient-benefiting referrals perform as well as sender-benefiting referrals at the referral
stage. Specifically, Study 4A tests the role of psychological costs of sending sender-benefiting
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referrals. That is, referrers might feel guilt or discomfort when gaining a reward for referring a
friend in the sender-benefiting condition, which may in turn decrease likelihood of referring in
this condition. We also test the role of perceived social obligations. That is, referrers might
anticipate that recipients will find the referral burdensome or annoying. Such anticipated
obligations might be especially high in the case of sender-benefiting referrals where the recipient
receives no reward, once again driving down the likelihood of sending sender-benefiting
referrals (making them equivalent in success to recipient-benefiting referrals). We measure each
of these constructs at the referral stage in Study 4A, and test their relative importance in a
simultaneous mediation model.
Next, we demonstrate the role of anticipated reputational benefits at the referral stage via
moderation. In Study 4B, we vary reputational benefits by manipulating whether the referral is
made anonymously: half of the referrers are asked if they would like to send a referral in which
they are identified, enabling them to anticipate reputational benefits, while the other half of the
referrers are asked if they would like to send a referral in which they are anonymous, hindering
their expectation of reputational benefits. In Study 4C, we measure individual differences in
reputational concerns and show that they moderate the capacity for recipient-benefiting programs
to spur referrals.

2.7 Study 4A
2.7.1 Methods
At the referral stage, 369 undergraduate students participated (MAge = 19.64, 47.97% female).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four referral incentive conditions: control, senderbenefiting, recipient-benefiting, or shared. We first asked participants to provide their first name.
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Participants next completed a quick personality quiz, the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI;
Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003). We next provided participants with a brief report of their
real results regarding their extraversion/introversion scores (for full details see Appendix A).
Participants were then told that they could refer one other student to take the personality quiz by
providing the student’s university email address. Participants were given the following
information based on incentive condition: 1) control: no incentive 2) sender-benefiting: “If your
friend takes the survey you will receive a $3 electronic gift card to Starbucks,” 3) recipientbenefiting: “If your friend takes the survey he or she will receive a $3 electronic gift card to
Starbucks,” or 4) shared: “If your friend takes the survey you will each receive a $1.50 electronic
gift card to Starbucks.”
Participants then viewed the email that their friend would receive if they chose to refer. In the
control and sender-benefiting conditions, the e-mail subject line was “[Participant First Name]
thought you would enjoy this survey!” In the recipient-benefiting and shared conditions, the
subject line stated, “[Participant First Name] thought you would enjoy this survey (plus get a
Starbucks gift card)!” The email was identical in all conditions and explained that their friend
had taken a quick personality quiz as part of a study and wanted to share the link with them.
However, in the recipient-benefiting and shared conditions, it also stated, “If you take the quick
survey, you will receive a $3 ($1.50) electronic gift card to Starbucks.”
We then asked participants, “Would you like to refer a friend to take this personality quiz?”
and told them that they would need to provide their own student ID (requested for accounting
reasons), their own student email address, and one friend’s student email address, which they
could look up in the online directory. Participants chose either “Yes, I would like to refer a
friend” or “No, I would not like to refer a friend.” Participants who chose not to refer moved
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directly to the follow-up questions, whereas participants who chose to refer filled out the
information described above about their friend before continuing to the follow-up questions.
We included several follow-up questions about reputational benefits, psychological costs,
and social obligations to explore the process underlying these referral decisions. The reputational
benefit questions included, “How would your friend view you if you made this referral?”
(Generous, Helpful, Friendly, Well-Intentioned, Trustworthy, Warm, Good-natured, Likeable,
Sincere; 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much; α = .96) We also asked questions about psychological
costs: “How would you feel if you made this referral?” (Selfish, Deceitful, Guilty,
Uncomfortable, Sneaky, Conflicted; 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much; α = .89). Finally, we
measured perceptions of imposing a social obligation using the following items: “How much
would you feel like you are imposing on [friend] by sending this referral?”, “How annoyed
would [friend] be about receiving this referral?”, and “[Friend] would feel that I am taking
advantage of him/her” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so; α = .72). While we primarily discuss
process results comparing the sender-benefiting (selfish) and recipient-benefiting (prosocial)
referral conditions in the main text, process results for all conditions are reported in Appendix B.
For the uptake stage, we sent the emails shown to the original participants to each of the
referred friends (N = 186). Referred friends received the email and could choose whether to take
the personality quiz. One week after sending out the emails, participants were compensated
according to their condition and whether or not their referred friend took the survey.

2.7.2 Results
Table 2.1 summarizes the results.
Referral stage. Consistent with Study 2, there was no significant difference in the choice
to refer between the sender-benefiting (64.84%), recipient-benefiting (58.06%), and shared
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conditions (56.99%; χ2 (2) = 1.38, p = .50). Participants were more likely to refer a friend in all
incentive conditions compared to the control (no incentive) condition (26.37%; all ps < .001).
Referral process items. The reputational benefits of referring were perceived to be higher
in the recipient-benefiting condition (MRecipient-Benefiting = 4.41, SD = 1.33) relative to the senderbenefiting condition (MSender-Benefiting = 3.69, SD = 1.34; t(182) = -3.64, p < .001). Similarly,
psychological costs were perceived to be higher in the sender-benefiting condition (MSenderBenefiting

= 2.48, SD = 1.32) relative to the recipient-benefiting condition (MRecipient-Benefiting= 1.75,

SD = 1.17; t(182) = 3.98, p < .001); and social obligation was perceived to be marginally
significantly higher in the sender-benefiting condition (MSender-Benefiting = 2.98, SD = 1.34) relative
to the recipient-benefiting condition (MRecipient-Benefiting = 2.65, SD = 1.36; t(182) = 1.68, p =
.096).
Though the total effect of referral incentives on referral choice is not detectably different
from zero (the sender- and recipient-benefiting incentives lead to equal referrals), mediation can
still be present. As Hayes (2009) explains, a total effect is the sum of different paths of influence,
and these paths may cancel each other out, producing a total effect that is not detectably different
from zero (for more discussion on this topic, see: Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010). Therefore,
while the direct financial incentive is likely increasing referrals for those in the sender-benefiting
condition compared to the recipient-benefiting condition, we propose that there is an opposing
influence of reputational benefits increasing referral choice for the recipient-benefiting condition.
Using methods prescribed by Hayes (2009) we simultaneously tested the significance of all three
measured mediators by calculating standardized indirect effects for 10,000 bootstrapped samples
and found that reputational benefits mediate the effect of referral type on referral choice. We
found a statistically significant indirect effect of reputational benefits (.34; 95% CI [.11, .71]).
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The indirect effect of psychological costs was not significant (.09; 95% CI [-.45, .14]) nor was
the indirect effect of imposing a social obligation (.25; 95% CI [-.03, .64]). These results are
consistent with the notion that, while the lack of personal incentive likely decreases motivation
to refer in the recipient-benefiting condition, recipient-benefiting (vs. sender-benefiting) referrals
lead to an increased expectation of reputational benefits, which in turn increases referrals in the
recipient-benefiting condition compared to what would be expected based on previous research
about prosocial or other-benefiting incentives.
Uptake stage. Recipients were significantly more likely to follow through on the referral
in the recipient-benefiting condition (69.81%), compared to the sender-benefiting (28.07%, χ2(1)
= 41.74, p < .001) or control conditions (24.00%, χ2(1) = 14.23, p < .001). There was a nonsignificant difference in the propensity to comply between the recipient-benefiting and shared
conditions (64.71%, χ2 (1) = .30, p = .58). There was also a non-significant difference between
new customer uptake in the sender-benefiting and control conditions (χ2 (1) = .15, p = .70;
recipients in the control and sender-benefiting conditions received identical e-mails in this study,
so this lack of difference is unsurprising.
New customer conversions. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, the overall conversion rate
was higher in the recipient-benefiting condition (39.79%) than the sender-benefiting condition
(17.58%, χ2 (1) = 12.91, p < .001). There was a non-significant difference between the recipientbenefiting and shared conditions (35.48%, χ2 (1) = .38, p = .54). The control condition was
significantly less effective at bringing in new customers than any incentive condition (6.52%, χ2
(3) = 35.78, p < .001).
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2.7.3 Discussion
Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, the recipient-benefiting referral was more effective than
the sender-benefiting referral at converting new customers. Also consistent with Studies 2 and 3,
sender-benefiting and recipient-benefiting incentives were equally effective at the referral stage.
In support of our process account, the reputational benefits that referrers anticipated mediated
their propensity to refer. Although other potential process constructs such as psychological costs
and social obligations vary between sender-benefiting and recipient-benefiting referral
conditions, they do not appear to account for the influence of referral type on referral choice.
While this self-reported mediation study shows initial support, we seek stronger evidence for the
role of anticipated reputational benefits at the referral stage via moderation in Studies 4B and 4C.

2.8 Study 4B
2.8.1 Methods
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (https://bit.ly/2XadyvB), we recruited 800
MTurk participants (805 participants completed the study; MAge = 36.75, 53.18% female). The
study used a 2(referral type: sender-benefiting vs. recipient-benefiting) x 2(referrer anonymity:
identified vs. anonymous) between-subjects design. Participants were asked to give their first
name and the first name of a close friend. We then asked participants to imagine the following
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scenario, “Amazon has released a new, free loyalty program called Amazon BOLD that
showcases new products to program members. You joined the program and think it has been
great.” Participants were next told that Amazon has a referral program that gives either 1) a
sender-benefiting incentive: Participants were told they will receive a $10 Visa gift card for each
individual they refer to Amazon BOLD who then joins the program or 2) a recipient-benefiting
incentive: participants were told that each individual they refer will receive a $10 Visa gift card
if they join the program. However, in the anonymous condition, participants were also told that
the referral would be anonymous and their friend would not be told who sent it (study materials
in Appendix A). Participants were then required to correctly identify who would receive a
reward for a successful referral (themselves or their friend) before they could move to the
referral decision to confirm that they understood the incentive structure. Note: no participants
were excluded at this step, but they had to answer correctly before continuing. Finally, we asked
participants, “Would you refer your friend to Amazon BOLD”? (Yes/No).

2.8.2 Results
Table 2.1 summarizes the results. We performed a binary logistic regression on choice to
refer as a function of referral type, referrer anonymity, and their interaction. This analysis
yielded a significant interaction of referral type and anonymity (χ2(1) = 6.00, p = .014, Figure 5).
When the referral was identified – i.e., recipients would know who referred them – the
propensity to refer was equivalent across the recipient-benefiting (87.32%) and the senderbenefiting conditions (85.29%; χ2(1) = .35, p = .55). However, when the referral was anonymous,
the propensity to refer was higher in the sender-benefiting condition (86.50%) relative to the
recipient-benefiting condition (74.49%; χ2(1) = 8.87, p = .003, Figure 2.4).
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FIGURE 2.4
STUDY 4B: REFERRAL CHOICE BY REFERRAL TYPE AND ANONYMITY
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Figure 2.4. Sender-benefiting and recipient-benefiting incentives lead to equal referral choice
when the referral is not anonymous. When the referral is anonymous, sender-benefiting
incentives lead to more referrals.

2.8.3 Discussion
Study 4B finds that prosocial referrals become less effective when the ability to inform
friends of one’s prosocial act are reduced, providing evidence that reputational benefits are a key
motivator at the referral stage. By contrast, if psychological costs (e.g., guilt from profiting from
a friend with a selfish referral incentive) or concerns about social obligations (e.g., imposing
upon one’s friend with a selfish request) drove the performance of prosocial incentives at the
referral stage, we should see minimal change in recipient-benefiting referral decisions when the
referral is anonymous. In other words, these mechanisms would still be active in an anonymous
referral, and we therefore would not expect to see this interaction if they were driving the effect.
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Further, if purely altruistic motivations (i.e., the desire to help others without any concern for
personal benefit, reputational or otherwise) were responsible for the strong performance of otherbenefiting incentives at this referral stage, anonymity should also exert minimal influence on
choices.
Further attesting to the reputational benefit explanation for referrer behavior, in Appendix C
(Study 3) we report a conceptual replication of Study 4B, in which we manipulate reputational
benefits in different way. Specifically, we manipulated whether the referral recipient is a friend
(allowing for high reputational benefits) or a stranger (allowing for minimal reputational
benefits). Consistent with Study 4B, when referrers could anticipate reputational benefits – i.e.,
when asked to refer their friends – recipient-benefiting incentives were as effective as senderbenefiting incentives. However, sender-benefiting incentives were more effective when referrers
could not anticipate reputational benefits (i.e., when asked to refer a stranger).

2.9 Study 4C
2.9.1 Methods
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2GwJ1mE), we
recruited 600 MTurk participants; 583 met our pre-registered conditions of both completing the
dependent variable and using a unique location (MAge = 39.85, 62.89% female).
Participants were randomly assigned to a referral type condition (sender-benefiting or
recipient-benefiting) in a between-subjects design. They then viewed the same referral scenario
used in Study 4B (Amazon BOLD loyalty program) and were told that if they made a referral
either they would receive a $10 Visa gift card (sender-benefiting) or their friend would receive a
$10 Visa gift card (recipient-benefiting). After correctly identifying who would receive a reward
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for a successful referral (themselves or their friend) they moved to a referral likelihood question,
which asked “Would you refer your friend, [Friend’s name] to Amazon BOLD?” (1 = I definitely
would not refer my friend, 7 = I definitely would refer my friend).
Participants then completed a short distractor task in which they were asked to mentally
rotate figures. Following this task, participants completed a trait measure of concern for
reputation (the 7-item Concern for Reputation Scale; De Cremer and Tyler 2005; α = .85) which
consists of the following items: 1) I am rarely concerned about my reputation (R-scored), 2) I do
not consider what others say about me (R-scored), 3) I wish to have a good reputation, 4) If my
reputation is not good, I feel very bad, 5) I find it important that others consider my reputation as
a serious matter, 6) I try to work hard on my reputation (in my relationships with others), 7) I
find it difficult if others paint an incorrect image of me (1 = Not at all characteristic for me, 7 =
Extremely characteristic for me).

2.9.2 Results
Referral Likelihood. Table 2.1 summarizes the results. As with previous studies, there
was no significant difference in referral likelihood as a function of referral type (MSender-Benefiting =
5.22, SD = 1.97; MRecipient-Benefiting = 5.42, SD = 1.79; t(581) = 1.24, p = .22).
Moderation by Reputation Concern. We measured trait reputational concern, which did
not differ between conditions (MSender-Benefiting = 4.78, SD = 1.05; MRecipient-Benefiting = 4.87, SD =
1.02; t(581) = 1.01, p = .31). We then examined referral likelihood as a function of referral type,
trait concern for reputation, and their interaction. The interaction was marginally significant (β =
.12, t(579) = 1.72, p = .086). To identify the range of Reputation Concern for which the simple
effect of referral type was significant, we used the Johnson-Neman technique (floodlight
analysis; Spiller et al. 2013). This analysis revealed a significant positive effect of referral type
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on referral likelihood for any participants with reputational concern scores greater than 6.14 (β =
.24, SE = .12, p = .05).

2.9.3 Discussion
Across three studies, we found evidence for the role of reputational benefits in the choice to
send a recipient-benefiting (vs. sender-benefiting) referral. In an incentive compatible lab
experiment, Study 4A indicated that anticipated reputational benefits mediate the effect of
referral type on the propensity to make a referral. Studies 4B goes further, by experimentally
manipulation anticipated reputational benefits, and showing that when referrals are anonymous,
recipient-benefiting incentive programs no longer induce referrals. Finally, Study 4C also shows
that the effectiveness of recipient-benefiting programs is moderated by reputational concerns:
recipient-benefiting incentives induce those individuals who are generally concerned about their
reputation to refer while sender-benefiting incentives are less effective with this population.

2.10 Studies 5A and 5B: The Role of Action Costs
Studies 5A and 5B test the role of action costs – defined as the effort, time, and/or
payment required to comply – in the performance of self-benefiting versus other-benefiting
incentives. We have posited that at the referral stage, recipient-benefiting incentives perform as
well as self-benefiting incentives because 1) senders expect to receive reputational benefits when
making a referral with other-benefiting rewards and 2) referring is a low-cost action. If this is the
case, then increasing referrers’ action costs should render recipient-benefiting incentives less
effective relative to self-benefiting incentives. We test this proposition in Study 5A.
We have also posited that at the uptake stage, recipient-benefiting incentives outperform
self-benefiting incentives because they provide sufficient incentive for recipients – who typically
face high action costs – to act. If this is the case, then decreasing referrers’ action costs should
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reduce the relative effectiveness of recipient-benefiting incentives vis-à-vis sender-benefiting
incentives. We test this proposition in Study 5B.

2.11 Study 5A
2.11.1 Methods
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2NbUAQF), we
recruited 800 MTurk participants; 824 completed the survey (MAge = 36.47, 47.69% female).
Using the same referral scenario used in Study 4B, we had participants imagine that they
were part of the Amazon BOLD loyalty program and could refer a friend to try it as well. Again,
participants provided their own first name and the first name of a close friend. We manipulated
whether they received a sender-benefiting or recipient-benefiting referral, with an incentive of
$10 (Amazon gift card) in both conditions. In this study, we manipulated action costs by varying
the effort required to refer their friend to the service. Specifically, participants in the low-cost
condition read, “To verify that only one person uses this offer, you will need to click on the
provided link and simply type in your friend's email address.” Those in the high-cost
condition read, “to verify that only one person uses this offer, you will need to print out this
email and mail it along with your friend's e-mail address. This should be sent to Amazon
BOLD's address: 201039 5th Ave, Seattle, WA 98121. To make the effort required in the highcost condition even more salient, we additionally had these participants click through a step-bystep process of what would be required to refer someone to the loyalty program. For emails used
in all conditions, see Appendix A (full survey can be found at our open science link).
Participants were required to correctly identify who would receive an incentive
(themselves or their friend) and what was required in order to sign up (click a link or print out
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documents and mail them in) before they could move to the referral decision to confirm that they
understood the incentive structure and action costs. Participants then answered the question,
“Would you refer your friend, [Friend’s Name] to Amazon BOLD?” Participants could respond
either “Yes, I would refer my friend” or “No, I would not refer my friend.”
We additionally measured reputational benefits (How would [Friend’s name] view you
referred them to join Amazon BOLD through this referral?” - Generous, Helpful, Friendly, WellIntentioned, Trustworthy, Warm, Good-natured, Likeable, Sincere; 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very
much; α = .97). Finally, as a manipulation check, we measured action costs using the same
action costs scale used in Study 3: “Referring my friend to Amazon BOLD would be…”
Effortful, Burdensome, Costly” (α = .88).

2.11.2 Results
Manipulation Check. As expected, there was a significant main effect of the action cost
manipulation; the high cost condition was perceived as having higher action costs than the low
cost condition ((F(1, 823) = 53.28, p < .001). There was a non-significant effect of referral
incentive type on action costs (F(1, 823) = .52, p = .47). There was a significant interaction of
action cost and incentive type (F(1, 823) = 9.23, p = .002). In the high cost condition, perceived
action costs were directionally, though not significantly, higher for the recipient-benefiting
referral (MRecipient-Benefiting = 3.76, SD = 1.75) than the sender-benefiting referral (MSender-Benefiting =
3.48, SD = 1.75; t(406) = -1.62, p = .11). Surprisingly, in the low-cost condition, perceived
action costs were significantly higher in the sender-benefiting condition (MSender-Benefiting = 2.96,
SD = 1.85 vs. MRecipient-Benefiting = 2.50, SD = 1.61; t(414) = 2.68, p = .008).
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Referral choice. Table 2.1 summarizes the results. We performed a binary logistic
regression on referral choice as a function of action cost (high/low) and referral type (senderbenefiting/recipient-benefiting). This analysis yielded a significant interaction of action cost and
incentive type (χ2 (1) = 6.24, p = .013, Figure 2.5). For participants in the low-cost condition,
there was a marginally significantly higher rate of referrals in the recipient-benefiting condition
(81.52%) compared to the sender-benefiting condition (72.38%, (χ2 (1) = 2.88, p = .09),
However, when action cost was high, there was a marginally significantly higher rate of referrals
in the sender-benefiting condition (73.63%) than the recipient-benefiting condition (63.82%, χ2
(1) = 3.45, p = .06).

FIGURE 2.5
STUDY 5A: REFERRAL CHOICE BY REFERRAL TYPE AND ACTION COST
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Figure 2.5. When cost of taking action is low, there is no difference in the choice to refer for a
sender-benefiting or recipient-benefiting incentive. When the cost of taking action is high,
sender-benefiting incentives are marginally more effective for encouraging referrals.
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Reputational Benefits. As in previous studies, there was a significant main effect of
incentive type on ratings of reputational benefits; participants expected higher reputational
benefits for sending their friend a recipient -benefiting referral (vs. a sender-benefiting) referral,
(F(1, 824) = 58.11, p < .001). Action costs had no significant effect on reputational benefits,
(F(1, 824) = .003, p = .96). There was a marginally significant interaction for cost and incentive
type (F(1, 824) = 9.23, p = .08). In the high cost condition, reputational benefits were
significantly higher for the recipient-benefiting referral (MRecipient-Benefiting = 5.40, SD = 1.27) than
the sender-benefiting referral (MSender-Benefiting = 4.46, SD = 1.64; t(406) = 1.97, p = .05).
Similarly, in the low-cost condition, reputational benefits were higher for the sender-benefiting
(vs. recipient-benefiting) referral (MRecipient-Benefiting = 5.22, SD = 1.33 vs. MSender-Benefiting = 4.63,
SD = 1.53; t(414) = 4.23, p < .001).

2.11.3 Discussion
Study 5A finds that when the cost of taking action is high, self-benefiting incentives
outperform other-benefiting incentives at motivating consumers to make a referral. However,
when the cost of taking action is low, as is often the case at the referral stage, there is no
difference between the two incentive types (or in this case a marginally significant preference for
other-benefiting incentives).

2.12 Study 5B
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2.12.1 Methods
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2BHK8fj), we
recruited 800 MTurk participants; 740 met our pre-registered conditions of both completing the
dependent variable and using a unique location (MAge = 35.95, 56.22% female).
To understand the role of action costs at the uptake stage of the referral process, we had
participants imagine that a friend sent them an email asking if they would like to try Food2Me
(the same fictitious food delivery service used in Study 3). Participants provided their own first
name and the first name of a close friend. We manipulated whether they received a recipientbenefiting referral or a sender-benefiting referral. In both conditions, the incentive was a $20
Amazon gift card. We also manipulated action costs by varying the effort required to sign up for
the service. Specifically, participants in the low-cost condition read, “This is an exclusive offer to verify that only one person uses this offer, simply click this unique link to sign
up: Food2Me.com/xyq6msp204.” Those in the high-cost condition read, “This is an exclusive
offer - to verify that only one person uses this offer, print out the attached documents, fill
them out, and mail them to the Food2Me headquarters with your unique
code: xyq6msp204.” To make the effort required in the high-cost condition even more salient,
we additionally had these participants click through a step-by-step process of what would be
required to sign up for the service. For emails used in all conditions, see Appendix A (full survey
can be found at our open science link). All participants were required to correctly identify who
would receive an incentive (themselves or their friend) and what was required in order to sign up
(click a link or print out documents and mail them in) before they could move to the uptake
decision to confirm that they understood the incentive structure and action costs.
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Participants then answered the question, “Would you sign up for the Food2Me delivery
service?” Participants could respond either “Yes, I would sign up for the Food2Me delivery
service” or “No, I would not sign up for the Food2Me delivery service.”
Note that, as in Study 2, we told participants (recipients) in the sender-benefiting referral
conditions that the friend who referred them would receive a reward if they followed through on
the referral. We informed participants of this benefit to their friend to examine whether, even
when recipients know that their friend will receive an incentive (which is not always the case in
these incentive designs), prosocial sender-benefiting referrals have a minimal positive effect at
the uptake stage due to the higher burden of follow-through. We additionally measured
reputational benefits (How would your friend view you if you chose to join Food2Me through
this referral?” - Generous, Helpful, Friendly, Well-Intentioned, Trustworthy, Warm, Goodnatured, Likeable, Sincere; 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much; α = .96). Finally, as a manipulation
check, we measured action costs using the same action costs scale used in Studies 3 and 5A:
“Subscribing to Food2Me would be…” Effortful, Burdensome, Costly” (α = .81).

2.12.2 Results
Manipulation Check. As expected, there was a significant main effect of the action cost
manipulation; the high cost condition was perceived as having higher action costs than the low
cost condition ((F(1, 739) = 311.40, p < .001). There was also a significant main effect of referral
incentive type (F(1, 739) = 5.26, p = .022). There was a non-significant interaction of action cost
and incentive type (F(1, 739) = .19, p = .67). In the high cost condition, perceived action costs
were significantly lower for the recipient-benefiting referral (MRecipient-Benefiting = 4.53, SD = 1.35)
than the sender-benefiting referral (MSender-Benefiting = 4.83, SD = 1.43; t(361) = 1.97, p = .05). In
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the low-cost condition, there was a non-significant difference in perceived action costs (MSenderBenefiting

= 2.92, SD = 1.56 vs. MRecipient-Benefiting = 2.72, SD = 1.37; t(375) = 1.29, p = .20).
Uptake decision. Table 2.1 summarizes the results. We performed a binary logistic

regression on uptake decision as a function of uptake cost (high/low) and referral type (senderbenefiting/recipient-benefiting). This analysis yielded a significant interaction of action cost and
incentive type, consistent with Study 5A (χ2 (1) = 9.21, p = .002, Figure 2.6). For participants in
the high-cost condition, we observed more sign-ups for the recipient-benefiting referral (32.20%)
than the sender-benefiting referral (15.59%, (χ2 (1) = 21.42, p < .001), consistent with Studies 24A as well as typical incentivized behavior. However, when uptake cost was low, there was no
difference in uptake choice by those in the recipient-benefiting condition (55.90%) versus the
sender-benefiting condition (54.40%, χ2 (1) = .86, p = .77), consistent with referral choice in
previous studies.

FIGURE 2.6
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Figure 2.6. Recipient-Benefiting incentives are more effective when the cost of taking action
(uptake) is high. When cost of taking action is low, there is no difference in the choice to
following through for a sender-benefiting or recipient-benefiting incentive.

Reputational Benefits. There was a significant main effect of incentive type on ratings of
reputational benefits; participants expected higher reputational benefits for following through on
a sender-benefiting (vs. recipient-benefiting) referral, (F(1, 739) = 19.90, p < .001). Action cost
also had a marginally significant main effect on reputational benefits, (F(1, 739) = 3.64, p =
.057). There was a non-significant interaction for cost and incentive type (F(1, 739) = 2.35, p =
.13). In the high cost condition, reputational benefits were significantly higher for the senderbenefiting referral (MSender-Benefiting = 5.01, SD = 1.38) than the recipient-benefiting referral
(MRecipient-Benefiting = 4.72, SD = 1.35; t(361) = 1.97, p = .05). Similarly, in the low-cost condition,
reputational benefits were higher for the sender-benefiting (vs. recipient-benefiting) referral
(MSender-Benefiting = 5.34, SD = 1.25 vs. MRecipient-Benefiting = 4.76, SD = 1.26; t(375) = 4.46, p <
.001).

2.12.3 Discussion
Study 5B finds that when the cost of taking action is high, as is often the case at the
uptake stage, self-benefiting incentives are a more effective motivator despite recipients
expecting higher reputational benefits for other-benefiting incentives. However, when action
costs are low, there is no significant difference in the choice to act (follow-through on a referral)
when offered a self-benefiting or other-benefiting incentive. An additional study replicated this
pattern using the monetary cost of uptake (a $2 service vs. a $100 service) as an alternative
manipulation of action costs; please see Appendix C –Study 4.
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Studies 5A and 5B provide evidence for the predicted role of action costs on the
effectiveness of prosocial and self-benefiting incentives. The results suggest that, in the context
of one’s social network, when the cost of acting is low (e.g., simply referring a friend or clicking
to sign up), consumers are equally motivated by prosocial and self-benefiting incentives.
However, in the same context, when the cost of acting is high (e.g., following through on a
typical referral), consumers are more motivated by self-benefiting incentives. Therefore, when
uptake costs are high, which is often true at the recipient stage, companies may benefit from
using recipient-benefiting referrals. Recipient-benefiting referrals provide a low-cost way for
referrers to gain reputational benefits and for recipients to overcome the typically high cost of
uptake with a personal incentive.

2.13 General Discussion
People commonly believe that behavior is strongly influenced by self-serving stakes (e.g.,
monetary incentives; Miller and Ratner 1996; 1998) and research has shown that such incentives
can effectively motivate behavior (Schwartz et al. 2018). Much of this research demonstrating
the effectiveness of selfish incentives relative to prosocial incentives compares self-benefiting
incentives with a contribution to a charity or unknown individual (e.g., Eckel and Grossman
1996; Imas 2014). We find that in the context of customer referrals, which directly involves
one’s social ties, prosocial incentives are a powerful motivator and can be equally as powerful as
self-benefiting incentives. The present research builds on related work on customer referral
rewards, which primarily examines the first stage of the referral process (the customer’s choice
to refer a friend) and the role of social distance at this stage (Hong et al. 2017; Ryu and Feick
2007). This paper goes on to provide a comprehensive account for why these rarely used
92

recipient-benefiting referrals might outperform sender-benefiting referrals by independently
assessing both stages of the process (and randomly assigning participants to both stages in
multiple studies). Specifically, previous work finds that shared or recipient-benefiting incentives
become more effective when the recipient is a strong social tie (Hong et al. 2017; Ryu and Feick
2007). We extend this theoretical framework by examining the specific role of reputational
benefits in motivating action at the referral stage – customers are motivated to refer because they
want their social network to view them favorably. We additionally find evidence that the cost of
action plays an important role in the effectiveness of prosocial incentives; when action costs are
high (i.e., at the uptake stage), incentives that benefit social network members become relatively
less effective than equivalent selfish incentives. By directly testing mechanisms at both stages of
the referral process, we add to the understanding of the complex referral process.
This work additionally builds on research designed to understand how people care about their
own versus others’ outcomes (Andreoni, Rao and Trachtman 2017; Berman and Small 2012;
Dana, Weber and Kuang 2007; DellaVigna, List and Malmendier 2012). We find that when it
comes to decisions to refer a friend to a new product or service, people are just as likely to act
when offered other-benefiting or self-benefiting incentives; however, this high value on the
prosocial option is tenuous. If the recipient is not a friend, if the recipient friend does not know
the source of the prosocial act, or if the costs of being generous to a friend are high, relative
preference for the prosocial incentive declines. In some respects, the fragility of prosocial
preferences in this domain reflects a dispiriting pattern, illustrating stark limits and self-serving
boundaries of human generosity. However, we also note that in this context, the actors in the
exchange have demonstrated no clear need for assistance. Recipient neediness is often cited as
individuals’ highest prosocial priority (Cryder, Botti, and Simonyan 2017), and is likely to be
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particularly motivating when occurring within one’s social circle (Small and Simonsohn 2007).
Therefore, although we find prosocial preferences to exist only narrowly in this context, and
potentially with minimal “pure” altruism (Andreoni 1988; Batson, Early and Salvarani 1997)
toward the other person, we expect prosocial preferences to be substantially more robust in other
contexts when a clear need for help exists.
In Studies 2 and 3, we also examine the effectiveness of an incentive that is shared between
the referrer and the recipient. We find that shared incentives perform equally as well as purely
other-benefiting incentives at both the referral and uptake stages. Because multiple features
change at once when offering a shared incentive, it remains unclear what drives the performance
of the shared incentive. One possibility is that, at the referral stage, including any incentive
component that rewards the recipient is sufficient to achieve the performance of the recipientonly incentive, even if the size of the recipient’s incentive is small. Another possibility is that the
smaller incentive size for the recipient pushes down performance of the shared incentive, but
offering individuals an opportunity to have a shared experience (a shared incentive in this case)
with a member of their social network exerts a positive force back upwards. Additional processes
could be contributing to the performance of the shared incentive as well, and future research
could attempt to understand exactly what drives the performance of the shared incentive.
This work can be extended to several other interesting areas for future research. For example,
all studies in this paper examine the effect of conditional referral incentives (participants are only
rewarded for successful referrals). Future research might investigate unconditional referral
incentives, which reward referrals regardless of recipient follow-through. Further, while we find
consistent results across a range of reasonable consumer incentive sizes (e.g., a $3 Starbucks gift
card and a $50 food delivery service), it is possible that incentives of an even greater magnitude
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would provide different results. Interestingly, some past research finds that reward magnitude
moderates the effect of incentive type on effort, showing that other-benefiting incentives are
more effective than self-benefiting incentives when the stakes are low (i.e., $0.50), but are
relatively less effective when the stakes are high (i.e., $2.00; Imas 2014). According to this work,
our range of incentives should all be high stakes, and therefore we might expect self-benefiting
incentives to be more effective at both stages. However, this previous work looks at incentives
that are given anonymously and therefore do not activate the anticipated reputational benefits
that motivate action in the current context. It is still possible that there is a limit to the effect of
these reputational benefits, and at a certain magnitude, a sender-benefiting incentive would
consistently be more effective than recipient-benefiting incentives at the referral stage. For
example, employers and property owners may offer employee or tenant referral rewards valued
at hundreds or even thousands of dollars. Future work might further test the role of incentive
magnitude on the effectiveness of these incentives in a referral context.
We additionally test our theory across a range of consumer products and services (e.g.,
photo-sharing app, videogame rentals, and food delivery service) and consistently show that
recipient-benefiting referral incentives overall lead to a greater number of new customers than
sender-benefiting referral incentives. However, we acknowledge that this paper does not cover
all consumer contexts and that there may be other important moderators for companies to
consider. Sender-benefiting referral incentives may be even more effective at the referral stage,
for example, in social consumer contexts where the referrer has an additional incentive to get
their friends to join (e.g., team sport leagues or collaborative online gaming). The present
studies also primarily focus on positive consumer experiences, but it would be interesting to
explore referral choice for other consumption experiences. For example, do recipient-benefiting
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incentives continue to outperform sender-benefiting incentives when the referrer had a bad
experience with the product or when a company has received negative press? We tested the latter
in an initial study and do not find an interaction of incentive type and negative press on the
choice to refer (see Appendix C –Study 5). However, future work might further explore the
boundaries of both incentive size and consumer context on the effectiveness of recipientbenefiting (vs. sender-benefiting or shared) referral incentives. Finally, these studies suggest that
customers choose to refer their friends when offered a recipient-benefiting referral incentive,
because they anticipate that they will receive reputational benefits for making this type of
referral. Future studies might examine actual responses to receiving these referrals – that is, do
recipients truly view their friends more favorably when they send recipient-benefiting referrals?
From a practical perspective, this research suggests that companies looking to get the largest
possible return on their referral investment may want to adopt a partly or purely recipientbenefiting referral incentive designs to recruit new customers. Despite consistent findings in this
research that recipient-benefiting referrals outperform their sender-benefiting counterparts,
sender-benefiting referral offers are more common in marketing practice (please see page 6).
These patterns suggest that incentive architects do not have clear insights into the interplay of
reputational benefits and action costs in this context. Future research could work to uncover the
reasons why marketers do not accurately predict incentive dynamics in this, and other related
contexts (e.g., competitor referrals; Blanchard, Hada, Carlson 2018), providing conceptual as
well as practical insight about areas where incentive design can be improved.
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Appendices
3.1.1

Chapter 1: Appendix A

Below we report additional findings that were not reported in the article
Additional Results from correlational study in the Theoretical Background


Participants: Recruited 105 Mechanical Turk participants, 96 of whom met our
inclusion criteria (MAge = 33.6, 57.3% female); five participants were removed for failing
to complete the study (i.e., incomplete data) and four for failing the attention check.

Company

Average Trait
Warmth

Average
Communal
Intent

Correlation

Sig. (2-tailed)

Amazon

5.30

4.10

0.402

p < .001

Apple

4.16

3.94

0.222

p = .027

Coca-Cola

4.70

3.75

0.415

p < .001

General Electric

4.39

3.59

0.378

p < .001

Google

4.74

3.55

0.151

p = .136

IBM

4.39

3.75

0.262

p = .009

Mercedes

4.15

3.46

0.358

p < .001

Microsoft

4.31

3.79

0.489

p < .001

Samsung

4.43

3.73

0.397

p < .001

Toyota

4.58

3.74

0.333

p = .001

Total

4.51

3.74

0.335

p < .001

Additional Results from Study 1
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the items for
charitable credit, warmth, communal intent, and competence loaded onto separate factors, each
with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor loaded the six warmth traits (α = .96), the second
factor loaded all six competence items (α = .94), the third factor loaded the five charitable credit
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items (α = .91). In this analysis, two of the five communal intent items did not clearly load onto
any of the factors, however the five items still formed a reliable scale (α = .80).
Mediation. We also conducted a mediation analysis with purchase likelihood as the outcome
variable and found that perceptions of communal intent partially mediated the effect of
manipulated donor warmth on purchase likelihood. Using methods prescribed by Hayes (2013 –
Model 4) we tested the significance of communal (vs. exchange) intent as the mediator by
calculating standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples and found that
communal intent partially mediates the effect of donor warmth on purchase likelihood (Indirect
effect = 0.26; 95% CI [0.13, 0.42]; direct effect = 0.36; 95% CI [0.10, 0.62]). This pattern
remains significant when we control for competence and perceived wealth (indirect effect = 0.13;
95% CI [0.03, 0.25]; direct effect = 0.31; 95% CI [0.03, 0.25]).
Additional Results from Study 2A
We were interested in what participants in the unspecified (control) condition assumed that the
company donated. Therefore, in the control condition, we asked participants “What do you think
Spades Hardware donated to the food bank” (1. Money, 2) Goods, or 3) I’m not sure; choices
randomized). 55.97% guessed money, 29.85% guessed goods, and 14.18% selected that they
were not sure.
Additional Results from Study 2B
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the items for
charitable credit, communal intent, and effort/sacrifice loaded onto 3 separate factors, each with
eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor loaded all five charitable credit measures (α = .90),
the second factor loaded the five effort/sacrifice items (α = .92), and the third factor loaded all
five communal intent items (α = .82).
Additional Results from Study 3A
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the items for
charitable credit, communal intent, effort/sacrifice, warmth, and competence loaded onto five
separate factors, each with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor loaded all six competence
measures (α = .94), the second factor loaded all six warmth items (α = .92), the third factor
loaded all five charitable credit items (α = .89), the fourth factor loaded the five effort/sacrifice
items (α = .88), and the fifth factor loaded the five communal intent items (α = .82)
Moderated Mediation. We also conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2013-model 8)
controlling for both competence and perceived wealth and found a similar pattern. We tested the
significance of both mediators by calculating standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped
samples and found that the model mediates the effect of donation type on charitable credit (direct
effect = 0.12; 95% CI [-0.02, 0.25]). More specifically, we found that donation type produced an
indirect effect of communal intent on charitable credit that was conditional on individual
warmth, but found no indirect effect of effort/sacrifice. As hypothesized, inferences about
communal intent mediated the effect of donation type on charitable credit for the low-warmth
individual (indirect effect = 0.12 (95% CI [0.02, 0.25])), but not for the high-warmth individual
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(indirect effect = 0.01 (95% CI [-0.08, 0.09])). Effort and sacrifice did not mediate the effect for
the low-warmth individual (indirect effect = 0.06, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.14]), nor for the high-warmth
individual (indirect effect <.001, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.06]). The index of moderated mediation was
not significant at the 95% level of confidence. However, at the 90% level of confidence, the
index of moderated mediation was significant for communal intent (Index = -.11 (90% CI [-0.24,
-.01]) but not for effort/sacrifice (Index = -.05 (90% CI [-0.13, 0.02]).
Additional Results from Study 3B
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the items for
charitable credit, communal intent, warmth, and effort/sacrifice loaded onto four separate factors,
each with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor loaded the six warmth traits (α = .96), the
second factor loaded all five charitable credit items (α = .93), the third factor loaded the five
effort/sacrifice items (α = .92), and the fourth factor loaded all five communal intent items (α =
.88).
Moderated Mediation. We also conducted a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes 2013-model 8)
controlling for both competence and perceived wealth and found a similar pattern. We test the
predicted relationship of donation type by low or high-warmth donors on charitable credit
received, including both communality and effort/sacrifice as mediators. We tested the
significance of both mediators by calculating standardized indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped
samples and found that the model mediates the effect of donation type on charitable credit (direct
effect = 0.11; 95% CI [-0.01, 0.24]). We found an indirect effect of communal intent conditional
on warmth, but no indirect effect of effort/sacrifice. As hypothesized, inferences about
communal intent mediated the effect of donation type on charitable credit for the low-warmth
company (indirect effect = 0.16 (95% CI [0.07, 0.28])), but not for the high-warmth company
(indirect effect = 0.02 (95% CI [-0.07, 0.11])). Effort/sacrifice did not mediate the effect for the
low-warmth company (indirect effect = 0.05 (95% CI [-0.01, 0.11])), nor for the high-warmth
company (indirect effect = -0.01 (95% CI [-0.07, 0.04])). The index of moderated mediation was
significant for communality (Index = -.15 (95% CI [-0.30, -0.03]), but not significant for effort
(Index = -.06 (95% CI [-0.15, 0.01].

Additional Results from Study 4
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the items for
charitable credit, warmth, and effort/sacrifice loaded onto separate factors, each with eigenvalues
greater than 1. The first factor loaded the six warmth traits (α = .94), the second factor loaded all
five charitable credit measures (α = .89), the third factor loaded the five effort/sacrifice items (α
= .85). In this analysis, two of the communal intent items did not clearly load onto any of the
factors, however the five items were still reliable (α = .80).

3.1.2

Chapter 1: Appendix B

Below we report all measures collected in each study:
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Study 0 (in introduction)
 Trait Warmth: “To what extent do the following traits describe (company) in general?”
(1= Does not describe [company], 7 = Describes [company] very well)
o Friendly
o Well-intentioned
o Trustworthy
o Warm
o Good-natured
o Sincere
 Communality “Please rate how strongly you agree with the following statements about
[company]” (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree)
o The company did not expect to receive any benefits from helping
o The company helped to respond to others' needs
o The company has a genuine desire to help others
o The company helped with hopes of benefiting themselves
o The company helped in order to get ahead
 Attention Check
o Research in decision making shows that people, when making decisions and
answering questions, prefer not to pay attention and minimize their effort as much
as possible. Some studies show that over 50% of people don't carefully read
questions. If you are reading this question and have read all the other questions,
please select the box marked 'other' and type 'decision making' in the box below.
Do not select "company descriptions." Thank you for participating and taking the
time to read through the questions carefully! What was this study about?
 Company descriptions
 Political preferences
 Predictions of a friend’s behavior
 Other ____________
Study 1
 Charitable Credit: “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics
below as a result of their donation?” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so)
o Generous
o Helpful
o Charitable
o Beneficial
o The extent to which they made the world a better place
 Communality “Please rate how strongly you agree with the following statements about
Spades’ motives:”
 Trait Warmth
 Competence traits: “To what extent do the following traits describe Spades Hardware in
general?” (1= Does not describe [company], 7 = Describes [company] very well)
o Capable
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o Efficient
o Skillful
o Competent
o Intelligent
o Confident
Wealth Perception: “How wealthy do you think Spades Hardware is?” (1=Not at all
wealthy, 7=Extremely Wealthy)
Purchase Likelihood “Imagine that you live near a Spades Hardware store. Please rate
how likely would you be to go to Spades Hardware next time you need home
improvement goods” (1 = Not at all likely, 7 = Very likely)
How much would you estimate Spades Hardware's donation was worth? (Free Response)
Attention Check (with “company donations” as option A)

Study 2A
 Charitable Credit: “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics
below?”
 Purchase Likelihood
 Control condition only: What do you think Spades Hardware donate to the food bank?
o Money
o Goods
o I’m not sure
 Control condition only: How much would you estimate Spades Hardware's donation was
worth? (Free Response)
 Who would be able to get more canned food for $2,000?
o Spades Hardware
o The food bank
o They can get the same amount
 Attention Check (with “company donations” as option A)
Study 2B
 Charitable Credit: “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics
below as a result of their donation?” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so)
 Communality
 Effort
o Spades Hardware put a lot of effort into this donation
o Spades Hardware worked hard on this donation
o Spades Hardware put thought into this donation
 Sacrifice
o How big was Spade Hardware’s sacrifice when making this donation?
o Spades Hardware sacrificed when making this donation.
 Purchase Likelihood
 Attention check (with “company donations” as option A)
Study 3A Pre-test
 Trait Warmth
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Attention Check (with “people judgments” as option A”)

Study 3A
 Charitable Credit: “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics
below as a result of their donation?” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so)
 Communality
 Effort and Sacrifice
 Trait Warmth
 Competence traits
 Wealth Perception
 Attention Check (with “donations” as option A)
Study 3B Pre-test
 Trait Warmth
 Attention Check (with “company descriptions” as option A)
Study 3B
 Charitable Credit: “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics
below?”
 Communality
 Effort and Sacrifice
 Purchase Likelihood
 Trait Warmth
 Attention check (with “company donations” as option A)
Study 4
 Charitable Credit “How favorably do you view Spades Hardware on the characteristics
below as a result of their donation?” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so).
 Communality
 Effort and Sacrifice
 Purchase Likelihood
 Trait Warmth
 Attention check (with “company donations” as option A)

3.1.3

Chapter 1: Appendix C

Below are additional studies
Appendix Study 1 – No donation, goods donation and monetary donation

102

This study tests whether consumers judge a low-warmth donor (a company) more
favorably for a donation of goods than for a donation of money. We also compare donations of
both money and goods to making no donation at all in a third “Control” condition.

Methods
We recruited 330 Mechanical Turk participants, 274 of whom met our inclusion criteria
(MAge = 34.39, 48% female); 45 participants were removed for failing to complete the study (i.e.,
incomplete data) and 11 for failing the attention check. Participants were told to imagine the
following scenario: “Spades Hardware is a small hardware chain. While Spades Hardware
doesn't have the selection of larger chains, the prices are reasonable and they provide good
service.” Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: 1) Control condition – no further
information given, 2) Money donation condition – “This past weekend Spades Hardware donated
$1,000 to a local foodbank”, or 3) Goods donation condition – “This past weekend Spades
Hardware donated boxes of canned food (worth $1,000) to a local foodbank.”
In all conditions, participants indicated the charitable credit that they would award to the
donating company using the five item scale of charitable credit. We also measured purchase
likelihood by asking participants “Please rate how likely you would be to go to Spades Hardware
next time you need home improvement goods” (1 = Not at all likely, 7 = Very likely).

Results
Charitable Credit. Planned comparisons revealed that participants gave the company
more charitable credit for donating goods (MGoods = 5.79, SD = .88) than for donating money
(MMoney = 5.47, SD = .78; t(180) = 2.53, p = .01, d = .38). In addition, both treatments performed
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better than the control (no donation) condition (MControl = 4.98, SD = .91), which provided the
company with less charitable credit than either the goods (t(178) = 3.95, p = .001, d = .59) or the
money donation conditions (t(182) = 6.14, p < .001, d = .91).

APPENDIX STUDY 1: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONATION
TYPE
Control
Money

7

Charitable Credit

6.5

Goods

6
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
3

Donation Condition

NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean

Purchase Likelihood. Using planned comparisons, we found that participants indicated a
significantly higher likelihood of purchasing from Spades Hardware when they donated goods
(MGoods = 5.78, SD = .98) compared to when they donated money (MMoney = 5.44, SD = 1.00;
t(180) = 2.37, p = .02, d = .35) or made no donation (control condition; MControl = 5.34, SD =
1.27; t(182) = 2.67, p = .008, d = .40). Interestingly, participants reported an equal likelihood of
purchasing from Spades Hardware whether Spades donated money or made no donation at all
(t(178) = .57, p = .57).
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Discussion
Consistent with our hypothesis, we observe a significant increase in the charitable credit
that a company receives when donating goods versus money. Although consumers may
sometimes assume that charities can buy goods cheaply through special deals or quantity
discounts, we actually see that companies receive more credit for giving goods rather than their
equivalent cash value. We also found that both types of donation resulted in more favorable
evaluations than making no donation at all.

Appendix Study 2: Donation Value
While we explicitly state the value of the donations in the goods and monetary donation
conditions in study 2A, it is possible that participants still feel a goods donation is worth more
than a monetary donation. This study was designed to assess whether our results are explained by
participants perceiving the goods donation to be of greater value than the monetary donation.
Specifically, will we still find that goods donations receive more charitable credit than monetary
donations when the goods donation has a lower value?

Methods
We recruited 300 Mechanical Turk participants, 262 of whom met our inclusion criteria
(MAge = 34.55, 54.54% female); 27 participants were removed for failing to complete the study
(i.e., incomplete data) and 11 for failing the attention check. Participants were told to imagine the
following scenario: “Spades Hardware is a large corporation that sells home improvement
goods.” Participants were then assigned to one of three conditions: 1) Monetary donation – “This
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past weekend Spades Hardware donated $1,000 to a foodbank”, 2) equivalent goods donation –
“This past weekend Spades Hardware donated $1,000 worth of canned food to a food bank,” or
3) smaller goods donation – “This past weekend Spades Hardware donated $900 worth of
canned food to a food bank.”
In all conditions, participants indicated the charitable credit that they would award to the
donating company using the five item scale of charitable credit. We also measured purchase
likelihood by asking participants “Please rate how likely you would be to go to Spades Hardware
next time you need home improvement goods” (1 = Not at all likely, 7 = Very likely).

Results
Charitable Credit. Planned comparisons revealed that participants gave the company
equal charitable credit for donating $1,000 worth of goods (M = 5.69, SD = .77) compared to
$900 worth of goods (M = 5.53, SD = 1.02; t(187)= 1.23, p = .22). However, both goods
donations performed better than the monetary ($1,000) donation condition (M = 4.79, SD =
1.00), which provided the company with less charitable credit than either the equivalent value
($1,000) of goods (t(166)= 6.62, p < .001, d = 1.03) or the lower value ($900) of goods (t(165)=
4.70, p < .001, d = .73).
Purchase Likelihood. Planned comparisons revealed that participants reported equal
likelihood of purchasing from the company that donated $1,000 worth of goods (M = 5.48, SD =
1.12) compared to the company that donated $900 worth of goods (M = 5.46, SD = 1.17 t(186)=
0.13, p = .896). Again, both goods donations performed better than the monetary donation
condition (M = 5.04, SD = 1.19); participants were less likely to purchase in the monetary
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donation condition than the equivalent value ($1,000) of goods condition (t(165)= 2.46, p < .02,
d = .38) or the lower value ($900) of goods condition (t(163)= 2.28, p < .03, d = .36).

Discussion
This study finds that companies that make goods donations receive greater charitable
credit (and purchase intentions) than monetary donations, even when the goods donation has a
lower cash value than the monetary donation. This supports our theory that low-warmth donors
receive greater charitable credit for donations of goods (vs. money) because goods signal
communal intent, and not because the goods donations are perceived as having a higher value.

Appendix Study 3: Mere Mention of Money
Methods
For this study we recruited 555 Mechanical Turk participants, 497 of whom met our
inclusion criteria (MAge = 33.1, 41% female); 41 participants were removed for failing to
complete the study (i.e., incomplete data) and 17 for failing the attention check. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions and told to imagine the following
scenario about a fictional store: “Spades Hardware, a home improvement store, donated either 1)
‘$50', 2) ‘$50 worth of canned food’, 3) or ‘a box of canned food’ to their local food bank”. The
second and third conditions were both included to test whether simply mentioning the monetary
value of the donation was sufficient to alter a preference for corporate donations of goods.
In all conditions, participants indicated the charitable credit that they would award to the
donating company along with purchase likelihoods. We also asked participants in the “box of
canned food” condition to estimate what the box of canned food donation is worth. Participants
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could enter any value that they wished, and also had an option to select “I have no idea” if they
did not have an estimate.

Results
Charitable Credit. Spades Hardware received more charitable credit for donating goods
than for donating money, regardless of whether the monetary value of the goods donation was
specified or not. Planned comparisons revealed that participants gave the company more
charitable credit for donating the box of goods (MBoxofGoods = 6.05, SD = 1.59) than for donating
$50 (MMoney = 5.25, SD = 1.81; t(326)= 4.28, p < .001, d = .47). They also gave the company
more charitable credit for donating $50 of goods (M$50ofGoods = 5.74, SD = 1.79) than for donating
$50 (t(330) = 2.51, p < .02, d = .28). The donation of a “box of canned food” was viewed as
directionally, but not significantly, more charitable than “$50 worth of canned food” (t(332) =
1.67, p = .10).

APPENDIX STUDY 3: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONATION
TYPE
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Goods-donation Value. When participants in the “Box of canned food” condition
estimated how much the box was worth, 35/165 reported that they had no idea and 129/165
estimated the value. Those who estimated the value reported a mean value of $50.45 and a
median value of $30. These values tend to match or fall below the $50 value donated in the
money condition, suggesting that higher perceived donation value could not account for the
increase in charitable credit for corporate donations of goods between the $50 and “box of
canned food” conditions.
Purchase Likelihood: Participants reported equal likelihood of purchasing from Spades
Hardware based on donation type (F(2, 494) = .55, p = .46).

Discussion
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Consistent with our hypothesis, we observe a significant increase in the charitable credit
that a company receives when donating goods versus money. While there is evidence in the
literature that simply mentioning monetary value highlights exchange norms (e.g., Heyman and
Ariely 2004), we observe that this difference in charitable credit due to donation type persists
even when the monetary value of a goods donation is specified. In addition, most participants in
the “box of food” condition estimate the box’s value to be less than $50, allowing us to conclude
that even when the donation amount was not specified, the preference for goods donations did
not occur due to a high estimation of the goods-donation value.

Appendix Study 4. Robustness Check: Communal (vs. Exchange) Orientation and
Company-Donation Fit
This appendix study was designed to replicate our findings from study 2B using a smaller
donation amount ($1,000) and two additional goods donations (lumber and food). We also
explored the robustness of the effect by changing cause urgency, shifting the donation recipient
to natural disaster victims. In addition, we varied whether this effect strengthened, weakened, or
remained constant when the donated goods were relevant to the company’s product offerings.
Some previous research suggests that companies are evaluated more favorably for donating to a
cause that fits their brand image (Chang and Chen 2009; Nan and Heo 2007). Here, we test if the
same beneficial inferences occur when the type of goods donated fits closely with the brand or
company.

Pre-test Methods
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We first conducted a pre-test in which we recruited 251 undergraduate students from a
private Midwestern university 239 of whom met our inclusion criteria (MAge = 20.11, 47%
female). Twelve participants were removed for failing to complete the study and there was no
attention check in this pre-test. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three betweensubjects conditions and asked to imagine a scenario about the fictional company, Spades
Hardware. The scenario stated that, “This past weekend, a tornado hit your neighboring town,
causing destruction to homes and local businesses and leaving many injured and displaced.” It
then stated that Spades Hardware store helped in the relief efforts by donating either 1) money
donation – “$1,000”, 2) relevant goods donation – “$1,000 worth of lumber”, or 3) irrelevant
goods donation – “$1,000 worth of canned food” to the cause. Participants rated companydonation fit by indicating how strongly they agree with the following statements “The donation
made sense coming from Spades Hardware” and “the donation was appropriate coming from
Spades Hardware” (1 = Strongly disagree to 9 = Strongly agree). These two items were highly
correlated (r = .88, p < .001), and were combined to create a company-donation fit measure.

Pre-test Results
The pre-test verified that participants believed the donation of lumber was more highly
related to the donor (Spades Hardware) than the donation of canned food. Spades Hardware’s
donation of lumber (MLumber = 6.59, SD = 2.15) scored higher on the company-donation fit
measure compared to the donation of food MFood = 3.19, SD = 2.02; t(159) = 10.38, p < .001, d =
1.65).

Main Study Methods
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For the main study, we recruited 307 Mechanical Turk participants, 268 of whom met our
inclusion criteria (MAge = 37.64, 62% female). Seventeen participants were removed for failing to
complete the study and 22 for failing the attention check. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of the three conditions from the pre-test and were then asked to rate Spades Hardware on the
same dimensions as in study 2B: charitable credit, communality, and perceived effort and
sacrifice. Purchase likelihood was not measured in this study. The order of all of these measures
was counterbalanced.

Main Study Results
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Factor analysis with varimax rotation confirmed that the
items for charitable credit, communality, and the effort/sacrifice constructs loaded onto three
separate factors, each with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor loaded all five charitable
credit measures (α = .92), the second factor loaded the five effort and sacrifice questions (α =
.90), and the third factor loaded all five items related to communality (α = .78).
Charitable Credit. In this study we again found that the company received more
charitable credit when donating goods than when donating an equivalent value of money,
echoing the initial effect from our other studies. Planned comparisons revealed that participants
attributed more charitable credit to Spades Hardware for donations of food (MFood= 5.76, SD =
.95) than for donations of money (MMoney = 5.19, SD = 1.28; t(177) = 3.34, p = .001, d =.50).
They also reported higher charitable credit for donations of lumber (MLumber= 5.54, SD = 1.05)
than donations of money (t(175) = 1.96, p = .05, d =.30). The company-donation fit, however,
seemed to have little influence on charitable credit, Spades Hardware received statistically
equivalent levels of charitable credit when donating food and lumber (t(178) = 1.46, p = .15).
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Communal Intent. The donation of food (MFood = 5.27, SD = 1.04) was perceived to be
directionally more motivated by communal norms than the equivalent monetary donation
(MMoney = 4.93, SD = 1.16; t(177) = 1.40, p = .16 ). The other goods donation, lumber (MLumber =
5.17, SD = 1.09) was judged as significantly more motivated by communal intentions than the
monetary donation (t(175) = 2.05, p =.04, d=.31). There was a non-significant difference in the
perceptions of communality between the two goods donations (t(178) = .62, p = .53).
Effort and Sacrifice. The donation of food (MFood =4.54, SD = 1.42) was seen as
significantly more effortful than the monetary donation (MMoney = 3.86, SD = 1.28; t(177) = 3.30,
p =.001, d =.50). The other goods donation, lumber (MLumber = 4.32, SD = 1.47) was also rated
more effortful than the monetary donation (t(175) = 2.18, p =.03, d = .33). However, there was a
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non-significant difference in the perceptions of effort and sacrifice between the two goods
donations (t(178) = -1.09, p = .28).
Mediation. The mediation analysis revealed a significant mediating role of communal
intent as well as effort on charitable credit. Due to insignificant differences on all three
dependent variables between the two groups who evaluated goods donations, results from the
lumber and food conditions were combined into one goods-donation category. We tested for
significant mediation by calculating indirect effects for 5,000 bootstrapped samples (Hayes
2013- model 4). When both mediators were tested in the same model, the model mediated the
effect of donation type on charitable credit (Total indirect effect = 0.16; 95% CI [0.07, 0.26];
direct effect = 0.06; 95% CI [-0.05, 0.17]). We find a statistically significant indirect effect of
communal intent (0.04; 95% CI [0.01, 0.10] and a statistically significant indirect effect of the
effort and sacrifice measure (0.11; 95% CI [0.05, 0.20]).

Discussion
This study demonstrated further support for the mediating role of communality on the
effect of donation type on charitable credit. In this study, effort/sacrifice also plays a significant
mediating role. In short, we find that perceptions of effort and sacrifice can (but do not always)
play a mediating role linking donations of goods to greater charitable credit. Perceptions of a
company’s communality played a significant mediating role across studies.

Appendix Study 5. Corporate (low-warmth) versus Individual (high-warmth) Donors
This study begins to explore the notion that donor image, specifically the extent to which
a donor is high versus low in warmth, influences the preference for goods donations. Study 2B
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highlighted how perceptions that a donation is communal versus exchanged-based in nature
underlies the preference for goods donations by low-warmth donors. In this study we propose
that differences in donor warmth alternatively allows or inhibits this effect from emerging.
For-profit companies are viewed as low in warmth, (Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner 2010), a
trait judgment that is linked with competitive and market-focused intentions (Fiske et al. 2007).
Corporate donations of money may fit with existing assumptions that companies are donating to
receive something in return, allowing minimal charitable credit to be received. By contrast,
individuals are viewed as fundamentally social and warm (Haslam 2006), and thus more likely to
be perceived as having genuine interest to help others when giving any type of donation. We
therefore predict that while the preference for goods donations may emerge for corporate donors,
individual donors will be less susceptible to image concerns when donating money, and thus will
receive high levels of charitable credit regardless of donation type.

Post-test Methods
A post-test gauged whether judged warmth was indeed different for the company (Spades
Hardware) and the individuals (the Jones Family) that were compared in the main study.
Participants read the vignette for the company or individual without the description of the
donation. We recruited 106 Mechanical Turk participants, 98 of whom met our inclusion criteria
(MAge = 33.6, 45% female). Six participants were removed for failing to complete the study and
two for failing the attention check. Participants were asked “to what extent do you think the
following traits describe the Jones family (Spades Hardware) in general?” (1 = Does not describe
the Jones family [Spades Hardware], 7 = Describes the Jones family [Spades Hardware] very
well). To assess this construct, we used the warmth scale from Fiske et al. (2002), which
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included the following items: friendly, well-intentioned, trustworthy, warm, good-natured, and
sincere (α = .96). In a between-subjects design, participants rated either the Jones Family or
Spades Hardware on these six items presented in a randomized order.

Post-Test Results
Participants considered the Jones Family to be significantly warmer (MIndividual = 5.03, SD
= 1.00) than Spades Hardware (MCorporation = 4.56, SD = 1.13; t(97) = 2.20, p = .03, d =.45).

Main Study Methods
For study 3, we recruited 470 Mechanical Turk participants, 436 of whom met our
inclusion criteria (MAge = 37.8, 48% female); 25 participants were removed for failing to
complete the study and nine for failing the attention check. The study included a 2 (Donation
type: Money vs. Goods) x 2 (Donor Type: Low-Warmth--Company vs. High-Warmth-Individuals) between-subjects experimental design. All participants read a brief vignette
describing either a fictional company (Spades Hardware) or a fictional set of individuals (the
Jones family) that recently donated either 1) a monetary donation – “$50” or 2) a goods donation
– “a box of canned food” to their local food bank.
All participants then rated the donor (the company or individual) on charitable credit.
Participants in the company conditions also reported purchase likelihood.

Main Study Results
Charitable Credit. The donor type manipulation had a significant main effect; overall the
Jones family (high-warmth) received more charitable credit for their donation than did Spades
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Hardware store (low-warmth; F(1, 432) = 65.51 , p < .001). Donation type did not show a
significant main effect (F(1, 432) = .28 , p = .60). Most importantly, a 2 x 2 analysis of variance
revealed a significant interaction between donor type (low-warmth—corporation vs. highwarmth—individuals) and donation type (money vs. goods; F(1, 432) = 29.94, p < .001).
Consistent with previous studies, Spades Hardware received significantly more charitable credit
for donating goods (MCorporationGoods = 5.89, SD = 1.80) than for donating money (MCorporationMoney
= 5.00, SD = 2.09; t(208) = 3.31, p < .001, d = .46). This pattern was not observed for the Jones
family, however, who actually received significantly more charitable credit for donations of
money (MIndividualsMoney = 7.18, SD = 1.40) compared to donations of goods (MIndividualsGoods =
6.52, SD = 1.69; t(224) = 3.17, p < .001, d = .42).
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Goods

Purchase Likelihood. Participants reported marginally higher purchase likelihood for
Spades Hardware when the company donated goods (MCorporationGoods = 5.73, SD = 1.97)
compared to when the company donated money (MCorporationMoney = 5.23, SD = 2.03; t(206) =
1.82, p = .07).

Discussion
Results from this study support the notion that the effect of donation type on charitable
credit is more likely to occur for companies, who are typically viewed as low-warmth, than for
individuals, who are generally viewed as high in warmth. Once again for a company, we find
that donating goods (rather than money) results in higher regard for the company, as indicated
both by measurements of charitable credit and purchase likelihood. This effect did not hold for
individual donors, however. A post-test confirmed that the corporation in our study was judged
as relatively low in warmth whereas the individuals were judged as relatively high in warmth.

Appendix Study 6. Real-world Corporate Donors
This study was designed to replicate the findings from study 3B using real world lowand high-warmth corporate donors.

Pre-test Methods
Prior to the study, we pre-tested two companies, Bolthouse Farms and Pepsi—both of
which are successful beverage corporations, on the extent to which they were viewed as warm.
In a between-subjects study, 121 participants (recruited using Mechanical Turk) rated one of the
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companies on the extent to which the 12 traits of warmth and corporate-ness describe the
company.

Pre-test Results
Participants considered Bolthouse Farms (MBolthouse Farms = 5.23, SD = 1.20) to be
significantly warmer than Pepsi (MPepsi = 4.02, SD =1.72; t(117) = 4.73, p < .001, d =.88).

Main Study Methods
The main study involved 475 participants (MAge = 31.3, 51% female; recruited 525, 24
removed for incomplete date, 26 removed for failing attention check). The study was a
2(Company: Pepsi Co. vs. Bolthouse Farms) x 2(Donation: Money vs. Goods) between-subjects
experimental design. Participants were asked to imagine one of the following scenarios: “This
past weekend, PepsiCo, a large multinational beverage corporation, donated $1,000 (“boxes of
canned food worth $1000”) to the food bank by their headquarters” or “This past weekend,
Bolthouse Farms, a farm-based fresh juice company, donated $1000 (“boxes of canned food
worth $1,000”) to the food bank by their headquarters”.
Participants were then asked to rate the two companies on the seven items of charitable
credit used in all previous studies, purchase likelihood for the donating company, how large they
believed the company is, and how familiar they are with the donating company (all on a 1-5
scale).

Main Study Results

119

Charitable Credit. The donor manipulation had a significant main effect; overall
Bolthouse Farms, the high-warmth company received more charitable credit for their donation
than Pepsi, the low-warmth company (F(1, 471) = 91.00 , p < .001). A 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a
significant interaction between donation type (money/goods) and donor image (lowwarmth/high-warmth; F(1, 471) = 6.50, p =.01). This interaction remains significant even when
we control for both familiarity and perceived size of the two companies (F(1, 460) = 4.29, p =
.04). Consistent with previous findings, the goods donation performed better than a monetary
donation for the company with a low-warmth image, Pepsi (MGoods = 3.41, SD = .87, MMoney =
3.05, SD = .95; t(226) = 2.98, p = .002, d = .40), but not for Bolthouse Farms, which has a highwarmth image (MGoods = 3.97, SD = .74 vs. MMoney = 3.98, SD = .67; t(246) = .20, p = .84).

APPENDIX STUDY 6: CHARITABLE CREDIT AS A FUNCTION OF DONOR AND
DONATION TYPE

5

Money

Charitable Credit

4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
Pepsi (Low-Warmth)

Bolthouse Farms (High-Warmth)

Donor

NOTE: Error bars represent standard errors of the mean
120

Goods

Purchase Likelihood. There was also a significant interaction between donor and
donation type on purchase likelihood (F(1, 469) = 34.47, p < .001). Participants were more likely
to purchase Pepsi products after a donation of goods (MGoods = 3.23, SD = 1.17) versus money
(MMoney = 2.92, SD = 1.13; t(223) = 2.03, p =.02, d = .27). We found no difference in purchase
intentions for Bolthouse Farms based on donation type (MGoods = 3.74, SD = .81 vs. MMoney =
3.67, SD = .82; t(244) = -.06, p = .56).

Appendix Study 7. Replication of 3A
This appendix study was designed to replicate the findings of study 3A about individual
donors using a manipulation similar to that from study 3B for companies.
Pre-test Methods
We first conducted a pre-test in which we recruited 100 Mechanical Turk participants, 87
of whom met our inclusion criteria (MAge = 34.56, 66.7% female). Eight participants were
removed for failing to complete the study (i.e. incomplete data) and five for failing the attention
check. The pre-test measured the perceived warmth of an individual named Joe Jones. In the
high-warmth condition, participants read, “Joe Jones is a friendly person. He is always warm
and welcoming toward his neighbors and focuses on serving his community.” In the low-warmth
condition, participants read, “Joe Jones is an unfriendly person. He is always cold and
indifferent toward his neighbors and focuses on getting ahead.” Participants then rated Joe Jones
on warmth.

Pre-test Results
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The descriptions used in the pre-test successfully manipulated donor image. Participants
rated Joe Jones as warmer in the high-warmth condition (MHigh-Warmth = 6.30, SD = .70) compared
to the low-warmth condition (MLow-Warmth = 2.07, SD = 1.00; t(85) = 20.03, p < .001).

Main Study Methods
We recruited 800 Mechanical Turk participants, 722 of whom met our inclusion criteria
(MAge = 33.01, 49.5% female); 53 participants were removed for failing to complete the study
and 25 for failing the attention check. We tested trait warmth as a moderator by describing the
donor (now an individual, rather than a company) in each vignette as having either a low-warmth
or high-warmth image, using the same wording as in the pre-test. Participants were then
informed that this past weekend, Joe Jones donated either 1) a monetary donation – “$100” or 2)
a goods donation – “a box of canned food worth $100” to his local food bank.
We measured charitable credit and the perceived wealth of the donor. Participants also
rated the donor on trait warmth. The order of all these measures was counterbalanced.

Main Study Results
Warmth Manipulation Check. The high-warmth individual (MHigh-Warmth = 6.07, SD = .83)
was perceived as warmer than the low-warmth individual (MLow-Warmth = 3.36, SD = 1.24; t(720)
= 34.56, p <.001). We find a main effect of the warmth descriptions on perceived warmth (F(1,
718) = 1194.20, p < .001). We again observe that donation type did not exert a main effect on
warmth (F(1, 718) = 1.45, p = .23) nor did we observe an interaction between donation type and
manipulated donor warmth on measured warmth (F(1, 718) = .58, p = .45). This provides further
evidence that warmth is a relatively stable trait which is not influenced by donation type,
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exhibiting distinct patterns compared to the other constructs under study such as charitable
credit.
Charitable Credit. The donor manipulation had a significant main effect on charitable
credit; the high-warmth individual received more charitable credit for his donation than the lowwarmth individual (F(1, 718) = 211.67, p < .001). Donation type also had a significant main
effect; donations of goods were rated more favorably than donations of money (F(1, 718) =
10.52, p = .001). Most importantly, a 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between
donation type (money/goods) and donor warmth (low-warmth/high-warmth), F(1, 718) = 4.95, p
< .03. When the individual donor was described as having a low-warmth image, he received
more charitable credit for a donation of goods than a donation of money (MGoods = 5.28, SD = .97
vs. MMoney = 4.91, SD = 1.09; t(351) = 3.32, p < .001, d = .35). The high-warmth individual
donor, however, received equal credit for donations money and goods (MGoods = 6.10, SD = .72
vs. MMoney = 6.02, SD = .72; t(367) = .94, p = .35).

APPENDIX STUDY 7: CHARITABLE CREDIT FOR INDIVIDUAL DONORS AS A
FUNCTION OF DONATION TYPE AND DONOR WARMTH
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Appendix Study 8: Signaling Communal Intentions with Monetary Donations
Methods
We recruited 800 Mechanical Turk participants, 730 of whom met our inclusion criteria
(MAge = 38.31, 55.3% female); 48 participants were removed for failing to complete the study
and 22 for failing the attention check. The study included a 2 (Donation: Money vs. Goods) x 2
(Control vs. Monetary Donations Preference) between-subjects experimental design. In the
control conditions, participants read that PepsiCo, a large multinational beverage corporation,
recently made a monetary donation of $10,000 (or medical supplies worth $10,000) to an
international humanitarian aid charity.” In the experimental conditions, participants first read that
“An international humanitarian aid charity recently made the following request: ‘Although
donations of items such as food, blankets, or medical supplies are appreciated, monetary
donations are the best way to help us help people the most. Monetary donations allow us
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to purchase exactly what is needed when it is needed.’” They then read that PepsiCo donated
either $10,000 or medical supplies worth $10,000 to the charity.
We measured charitable credit and purchase likelihood in this study as well as warmth
items. We also measured communality and effort and sacrifice. The order of all these measures
was counterbalanced. Finally, participants responded to a manipulation check. First we asked
“Do you think the charity in this study prefers to receive donations of money or donations of
goods?” (1= Strongly prefers donations of Money, 7 = Strongly prefers donations of Goods). We
then asked “Do you think charities in general prefer to receive donations of money or donations
of goods?” (1= Charities strongly prefer donations of Money, 7 = Charities strongly prefer
donations of Goods). This second question was used to measure participants’ assumptions about
donation type in a more general sense, and also see if this varied by condition.

Results
Manipulation Check. Confirming the manipulation, in response to the question “Do you
think the charity in this study prefers to receive donations of money or donations of goods?” (1 =
Strongly prefers donations of Money, 7 = Strongly prefers donations of Goods) participants who
read the nonprofit statement requesting money reported a stronger preference for money than
those in the control group (MControl= 2.99, SD =1.49 vs. MStatement = 1.84, SD = 1.27; t(700) =
9.93, p < .001, d = .75). The manipulation had a directional, though non-significant, effect on the
perception that charities in general prefer monetary donations to goods donations (MControl= 2.54,
SD = 1.30 vs. MStatement = 2.36, SD = 1.35; t(697) = 1.63, p = .10). It is also interesting to note
that for both the charity mentioned in the study and charities in general, participants in the
control condition rated that charities prefer donations of money compared to goods (In
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comparison to scale midpoint of 4, specific charity: M = 2.99, SD = 1.57; t(336) = 12.28, p <
.001, d = 1.34; charities in general: M = 2.54, SD = 1.46; t(343) = 19.05, p < .001, d = 2.06).
Charitable Credit. The nonprofit statement manipulation had a significant main effect on
charitable credit; adding the nonprofit statement that they prefer monetary donations
interestingly led to higher levels of charitable credit overall (F(1, 729) = 29.55, p < .001). This
main effect may have occurred because both goods and money were mentioned as being helpful
in the charity statement. Donation type did not have a significant main effect (F(1, 729) = .001, p
= .98). Most importantly, a 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between donation
type (money/goods) and presence of the money-preferred statement (absent/present; F(1, 729) =
10.31, p < .001). Consistent with our previous studies, in the control condition, PepsiCo received
more charitable credit for a donation of goods than a donation of money (MGoods = 4.81, SD =
1.39 vs. MMoney = 4.50, SD = 1.32; t(360) = 2.18, p = .03, d =.23). However, when participants
first read the nonprofit’s request for monetary (rather than goods) donations, PepsiCo received
more credit for donations of money (MMoney-Statement = 5.32, SD = 1.14) than donations of goods
(MGoods-Statement = 5.02, SD = 1.28; t(369) = 2.38, p = .018, d = .25).

APPENDIX STUDY 8: CHARITABLE CREDIT FOR PEPSI AS A FUNCTION OF
DONATION TYPE AND NONPROFIT STATEMENT
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Purchase Likelihood. We found no main effect of nonprofit statement on purchase
likelihood (F(1, 720) = .67, p = .41), nor was there a main effect of donation type on purchase
likelihood (F(1, 720) = 2.02, p = .16). There was also no significant interaction between the
presence of a nonprofit statement and donation type on purchase likelihood (F(1, 720) = .76, p =
.39). In the control condition, the monetary donation (MMoney = 3.79, SD = 1.88) showed
marginally lower purchase likelihood than the donation of goods (MGoods = 4.22, SD = 1.83;
t(356) = 1.62, p =.10). There was a non-significant difference between the two donation types
following the nonprofit statement (MMoney-Statement = 4.04, SD = 1.78 vs. MGoods-Statement = 4.11, SD
= 1.93; t(364) = .40, p = .69).
Discussion
We found that the company (PepsiCo) received more credit for a donation of goods than
a donation of money, in line with our previous findings. However, this was no longer the case
when participants first read that the charity in question requested a monetary donation. Following
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an explicit request for monetary donations, PepsiCo received more credit for responding to the
charity’s needs directly and sending money instead. By increasing the perception that the
company was responding to a charity’s needs, we saw an increase in the positive evaluation that
the company received for donating. We also found a main effect of the nonprofit statement,
suggesting that any interaction with the nonprofit (responding to their request for donations)
improved the overall evaluations of the company.
It is also interesting to note that, based on our follow-up measures, participants generally
believe that charities prefer donations of money to donations of goods. This acts as additional
evidence that the results across our studies are not due to a widespread belief that donations of
goods are preferred and therefore companies should receive more charitable credit for goods
donations. Instead, despite the understanding that charities typically prefer monetary donations,
our studies have shown that low-warmth companies and individuals typically receive more credit
for donations of goods. Consistent with recent research (Berman et al. 2015; Lin-Healy and
Small 2013; Newman and Cain 2014), the motivations behind a donation can be more important
than the impact of the donation itself when granting charitable credit.

3.2.1

Chapter 2: Appendix A

Below we report study materials
STUDY 1
Control condition:

Sender-Benefiting referral condition:
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Recipient-Benefiting referral condition:

Shared referral condition:
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Donation referral condition:
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STUDY 2
Control condition:

Referrer email

Recipient email
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Sender-Benefiting condition:
Referrer email

Recipient email
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Recipient-Benefiting condition:
Referrer email

Recipient email
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STUDY 4A:
Personality quiz test results:
You are somewhat more Extroverted:

This means you like getting energy from active involvement in events and having a lot of
different activities. You are excited when you're around people and you like to energize other
people. You like moving into action and making things happen. You generally feel at home in
the world. You often understand a problem better when you can talk out loud about it.

You are both Extroverted AND Introverted:

You are a balance of both Extroversion and Introversion, sometimes referred to as an
"Ambivert". Ambiverts have introverted and extroverted traits, but neither trait is dominant. As a
result, they have more balanced or nuanced personalities. Ambiverts move between being social
or being solitary, speaking up or listening carefully with greater ease than either extroverts or
introverts.

You are somewhat more Introverted:

Don't confuse introversion with shyness or reclusiveness. They are not related. Being an introvert
means that you like getting your energy from dealing with the ideas, pictures, memories, and
reactions that are inside your head, in your inner world. You often prefer doing things alone or
with a few people you feel comfortable with. You take time to reflect so that you have a clear
idea of what you'll be doing when you decide to act. Ideas are almost solid things for you.
Sometimes you like the idea of something better than the real thing.

Note: These results were adapted from the Myers & Briggs Foundation
(http://www.myersbriggs.org/my-mbti-personality-type/mbti-basics/extraversion-orintroversion.htm)
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Control and Sender-Benefitnig condition recipient e-mails:
______________________________________________________________________________
_______
From: CBlabWUSTL@gmail.com
Subject: _____________ thought you would enjoy this survey!

Your friend, ______________, just took a quick personality quiz as part of a study at WashU and
they wanted to share the link with you! You can take the survey by using this
link www.linkwillgohere.com and entering this code _____________.

______________________________________________________________________________
_______

Recipient-Benefiting condition recipient e-mail:
______________________________________________________________________________
_______
From: CBlabWUSTL@gmail.com
Subject: _____________ thought you would enjoy this survey (plus get a Starbucks gift card)!

Your friend, ______________, just took a quick personality quiz as part of a study at WashU and
they wanted to share the link with you! You can take the survey by using this
link www.linkwillgohere.com and entering this code -------------.

If you take the quick survey, you will receive a $3.00 electronic gift card to Starbucks.
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______________________________________________________________________________
_______
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Shared condition recipient e-mail:
______________________________________________________________________________
_______
From: CBlabWUSTL@gmail.com
Subject: _____________ thought you would enjoy this survey (plus get a Starbucks gift card)!

Your friend, ______________, just took a quick personality quiz as part of a study at WashU and
they wanted to share the link with you! You can take the survey by using this
link www.linkwillgohere.com and entering this code __________.

If you take the quick survey, you will receive a $1.50 electronic gift card to Starbucks.

______________________________________________________________________________
_______
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STUDY 5A

High cost/Sender-Benefiting referral
______________________________________________________________________________
__
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com>
To: [Participant]
Subject: Download Food2Me!

Dear [Participant],

[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $5. Sign up
today and [Friend] will receive a receive a $20 gift card to Amazon for referring you!

This is an exclusive offer - to verify that only one person uses this offer, print out the attached
documents, fill them out, and mail them to the Food2Me headquarters with your
unique code: xyq6msp204.
Food2Me address: 201039 5th Ave, Seattle, WA 98121
______________________________________________________________________________
__

High cost/Recipient-Benefiting referral
______________________________________________________________________________
__
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From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com>
To: [Participant]
Subject: Download Food2Me!

Dear [Participant],

[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $5. Sign up today
and you will receive a $20 gift card to Amazon for joining!
This is an exclusive offer - to verify that only one person uses this offer, print out the attached
documents, fill them out, and mail them to the Food2Me headquarters with your
unique code: xyq6msp204.
Food2Me address: 201039 5th Ave, Seattle, WA 98121
______________________________________________________________________________
__

Low cost/Sender-Benefiting referral
______________________________________________________________________________
__
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com>
To: [Participant]
Subject: Download Food2Me!

Dear [Participant],

[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $5. 5. Sign up
today and [Friend] will receive a $20 gift card to Amazon for referring you!
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This is an exclusive offer - to verify that only one person uses this offer, simply click this
unique link to sign up: Food2Me.com/xyq6msp204.
______________________________________________________________________________
__

Low cost/Recipient-Benefiting referral
______________________________________________________________________________
__
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com>
To: [Participant]
Subject: Download Food2Me!

Dear [Participant],

[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $5. Sign up
today and you will receive a $20 gift card to Amazon for joining!
This is an exclusive offer - to verify that only one person uses this offer, simply click this
unique link to sign up: Food2Me.com/xyq6msp204.
______________________________________________________________________________
__

STUDY 5B

Referrer role/Sender-Benefiting referral
You joined a food delivery service called Food2Me which delivers food from your favorite local
restaurants for $50/year.
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Food2Me sends you an email, asking if you would like to refer a friend to join the service. If
your friend signs up, Food2Me will give you a free year of delivery.

If you chose to refer your friend, [Friend], Food2Me would send [Friend] the following email:

______________________________________________________________________________
__
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com>
To: [Friend]
Subject: Download Food2Me!

Dear [Friend],

[Participant] might like it too! Food2Me delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an
annual fee of $50. Download the app using this link and [Participant] will receive a free
year of Food2Me deliveries!
______________________________________________________________________________
__

Referrer role/Recipient-Benefiting referral
You joined a food delivery service called Food2Me which delivers food from your favorite local
restaurants for $50/year.
Food2Me sends you an email, asking if you would like to refer a friend to join the service. If
your friend signs up, Food2Me will give you a free year of delivery.

If you chose to refer your friend, [Friend], Food2Me would send [Friend] the following email:
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______________________________________________________________________________
__
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com>
To: [Friend]
Subject: Download Food2Me and get a free year of delivery!

Dear [Friend],

[Participant] might like it too! Food2Me delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an
annual fee of $50. Download the app using this link and you will receive a free year of
Food2Me deliveries!
______________________________________________________________________________
__

Recipient role/Sender-Benefiting referral
______________________________________________________________________________
__
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com>
To: [Participant]
Subject: Download Food2Me!

Dear [Participant],

[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $50. Download the app
using this link and [Friend] will receive a free year of Food2Me deliveries!
______________________________________________________________________________
__
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Recipient role/Recipient-Benefiting referral
______________________________________________________________________________
__
From: Food2Me <Food2Me@delivery.com>
To: [Participant]
Subject: Download Food2Me and get a free year of delivery!

Dear [Participant],

[Friend] has been using our new food delivery app, and thought you might like it too! Food2Me
delivers food from your favorite local restaurants for an annual fee of $50. Download the app
using this link and you will receive a free year of Food2Me deliveries!
______________________________________________________________________________
__

3.2.2

Chapter 2: Appendix B

Below we report additional analyses

STUDY 4A:

Referral Results:
Condition

N

Referral
Choice

Reputational
Benefits

Psychological
Costs

Social
Obligations

Control

93

26.37%

3.56 (1.26)

2.43 (1.27)

3.49 (1.43)
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Selfish

91

64.84%

3.69 (1.34)

2.48 (1.32)

2.98 (1.34)

Prosocial

93

58.06%

4.41 (1.33)

1.75 (1.17)

2.65 (1.36)

Shared

93

56.99%

4.14 (1.33)

2.07 (1.20)

2.71 (1.34)

Shared referral vs. Sender-Benefiting referral results
As with the recipient-benefiting incentive, participants felt that the reputational benefits
of referring were higher in the shared condition (MShared = 4.14, SD = 1.33) than the senderbenefiting condition (MSender = 3.69, SD = 1.34; t(182) = 2.29, p = .023). Participants also
reported higher psychological costs in the sender-benefiting condition (MSender = 2.48, SD =
1.32) compared to the shared condition (MShared = 2.07, SD = 1.20; t(182) = 2.21, p =.029). There
was a non-significant difference in reported social obligation for the two conditions (MSender =
2.98, SD = 1.34) compared to the prosocial condition (MShared = 2.71, SD = 1.36; t(182) = 1.36, p
= .18). We simultaneously tested the significance of all three measured mediators by calculating
standardized indirect effects for 10,000 bootstrapped samples (Hayes 2009) and found that
reputational benefits mediate the effect of referral type on referral choice. We found a
statistically significant indirect effect of reputational benefits (.19; 95% CI [.02, .47]). The
indirect effect of psychological costs was not significant (-.09; 95% CI [-.37, .03]) nor was the
indirect effect of imposing a social obligation (.21; 95% CI [-.07, .57]).

Recipient Uptake:
Condition

N

Recipient
Uptake

Imposing

Annoyed

Enjoy

Control

6

24%

2.83 (2.32)

2 (1.27)

3.8 (1.30)

145

Selfish

16

28.07%

1.56 (1.50)

1.5 (1.51)

4.38 (1.31)

Prosocial

37

69.81%

1.48 (.91)

1.45 (1.06)

4.41 (1.38)

Shared

33

64.71%

1.35 (.63)

1.23 (.59)

4.81 (1.27)

Follow up Questions:




How much did you feel like your friend was imposing on you by sending this quiz? (1 =
Not at all, 7 = Very much so)
How annoyed were you about receiving this quiz from your friend? (1 = Not at all, 7 =
Very much so)
How much did you enjoy this personality quiz (1 = Did not enjoy at all, 7 = Very much
enjoyed it)

3.2.3

Chapter 2: Appendix C

Below we report additional studies

APPENDIX STUDY 1

This appendix study was designed to replicate Study 3. Note – as with Study 3, in this
study we label the incentive from the participants’ perspective as either self-benefiting or otherbenefiting.

Methods
We recruited 800 MTurk participants (803 participants took the survey; MAge = 36.90,
66.29% female). This study involved a 2(incentive: self-benefiting vs. other-benefiting) x 2(role:
referrer vs. recipient) between-subjects design. This study used the same materials as Study 3. In
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addition to measuring action choice, we measured action costs (α = .81), expected reputational
benefits (α = .96), relationship benefits (α = .87) and psychological costs (α = .94).

Results
Action Choice. We observed a significant interaction between participant role
(referrer/recipient) and incentive type (self-benefiting/other-benefiting; χ 2 (1) = 11.51, p = .001).
For participants in the referrer condition, we observed more participants choosing to refer for an
other-benefiting incentive (90.59%) than a self-benefiting incentives (83.74%; (χ 2 (1) = 4.24, p
=.038). For participants in the recipient condition, we observed more participants choosing to
follow-through for a self-benefiting incentive (59.60%) than an other-benefiting incentive
(46.23%; (χ 2 (1) = 7.12, p =.008).
APPENDIX STUDY 1: CHOICE TO ACT BY INCENITVE (SELFBENEFITING/OTHER-BENEFITING) AND ROLE (REFERRER/RECIPIENT)
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Action Costs. We observed a significant main effect of incentive type on ratings of action
cost; other-benefiting incentives were viewed as a lower cost than self-benefiting incentives (F(1,
791) = 13.41, p < .001). Participant role also has a significant main effect; taking action in the
recipient role was perceived as a greater burden than taking action in the referrer role (F(1, 791)
= 253.78, p < .001). There was also a significant interaction between incentive and role; F(1,
796) = 14.21, p < .001). Specifically, in referrer condition, there was no difference in perceived
cost of taking action (referring) between the two incentives (MSelf = 2.08, SD = 1.28 vs. MOther =
2.07, SD = 1.28; t(397) = .08, p = .93). In the recipient condition, action cost was significantly
higher when offered an other-benefiting incentive (MOther = 4.03, SD = 1.53) compared to a selfbenefiting incentive (MSelf = 3.29, SD = 1.50; t(391) = -4.84, p < .001).
Reputational Benefits. There was a significant main effect of incentive type on ratings of
reputational benefits; participants expected higher reputational benefits when offered an otherbenefiting (vs. self-benefiting) incentive (F(1, 792) = 34.56, p < .001). Participant role, however,
did not have a significant main effect on reputational benefits (F(1, 792) = .42, p = .52). There
was a non-significant interaction for role and incentive type (F(1, 792) = 1.14, p = .29). In the
referrer condition, reputational benefits were significantly higher for the other-benefiting
incentive (MOther = 5.44, SD = 1.49) than the self-benefiting incentive (MSelf = 4.79, SD = 1.29;
t(398) = -3.87, p < .001). Similarly, in the recipient condition, reputational benefits were higher
for the other-benefiting incentive (MOther = 5.40, SD = 1.16 vs. MSelf = 4.95, SD = 1.29; t(391) = 3.64, p < .001).
Relationship Benefits. We observed a significant main effect of incentive type on ratings
of relationship benefits; following through with an other-benefiting referral resulted in higher
relationship benefits than self-benefiting referrals (F(1, 795) = 30.15, p < .001). There was also a
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significant effect of participant role on relationship benefits (F(1, 795) = 5.97, p = .015).
However, there was a non-significant interaction between the incentive type and role (F(1, 795)
= .09, p = .76). For participants in the referrer condition, relationship benefits were significantly
higher for the other-benefiting incentive than the self-benefiting incentive (MOther = 4.62, SD =
1.09 vs. MSelf = 4.22, SD = .95; t(399) = -4.64, p < .001). Similarly, participants in the recipient
condition, believed that relationship benefits would be higher when offered an other-benefiting
incentive (MOther = 4.76, SD = 1.00 vs. MSelf = 4.41, SD = .78; t(393) = -3.92, p <.001).
Psychological Costs. There was a marginally significant main effect of incentive type on
psychological costs (F(1, 791) = 2.84, p = .092) and a significant main effect of participant role
on psychological costs (F(1, 791) = 10.52, p = .001). We also found a significant interaction
between incentive and role; (F(1, 791) = 20.89, p < .001). For participants in the referrer
condition, psychological costs were significantly higher for the self-benefiting incentive than the
other-benefiting incentive (MSelfish = 2.45, SD = 1.61 vs. MProsocial = 1.85, SD = 1.41; t(392) =
3.91, p <.001). For participants in the recipient condition, psychological costs for not following
through were higher for the other-benefiting incentive (t(391) = -2.42, p = .016).

APPENDIX STUDY 2
This appendix study was designed to replicate Study 4B.

Methods
The study used a 2(rewards: sender-benefiting vs. recipient-benefiting) x 2(control vs.
anonymous) between-subjects design. 580 Mechanical Turk participants (MAge = 35.01, 58.72%
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Female) completed the study. This study used the same materials as Study 4B. We additionally
measured relationship benefits, psychological costs, and social obligations (see Appendix Table
2 for follow-up results). We did not measure reputational benefits, because half of the
participants made anonymous referrals.

Results
We found an interaction between referral condition (control/anonymous) and reward type
(sender-benefiting /recipient-benefiting; X2 (1) = 6.58, p = .01). For participants in the control
condition, we observed an equal number of referrals for the recipient-benefiting (88.74%) and
the sender-benefiting referral reward (89.26%; χ 2 (1) = .01, p = .89). However, when the referral
was anonymous, the sender-benefiting reward (92.62%) was significantly more successful than
the recipient-benefiting reward (75.57%; χ 2 (1) = 15.54, p < .001).

APPENDIX STUDY 2: REFERRAL CHOICE BY REWARD AND ANONYMITY
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% Choosing to Refer

95
90

92.62
89.26

88.74

Sender-Benefiting
Recipient-Benefiting

85
80

75.57

75
70
Named

Anonymous

APPENDIX TABLE 2
Anonymity
Condition

Named

Anonymous

Referral Reward
Condition

Relationship
Benefits

Psychological
Costs

Social
Obligations

(1-7)

(1-7)

(1-7)

4.15

2.42

3.08

(.69)

(1.56)

(1.67)

RecipientBenefiting

4.41**

1.67***

2.59**

(.89)

(.95)

(1.59)

SenderBenefiting

4.11

2.23

2.83

(.72)

(1.47)

(1.73)

4.33*

1.89*

2.81

(.77)

(1.28)

(1.67)

SenderBenefiting

RecipientBenefiting

† p<.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p<.001; these significance notations refer to differences in mean
evaluations for sender-benefiting referral rewards compared to recipient-benefiting referral rewards
with standard deviations in parentheses. A° symbol next to the variable name indicates that there is a
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significant interaction between anonymity condition and referral reward condition on this variable at
a p < .05 level.

APPENDIX STUDY 3
As additional evidence for the role of reputational benefits in the choice to make a recipientbenefiting (vs. sender-benefiting) referral, we manipulated the relationship between referrer and
recipient. We expect that, because the potential for reputational benefits is substantially reduced
when the recipient is a stranger (instead of a friend), the performance of recipient-benefiting
referrals will decline relative to sender-benefiting referrals in this case.
Methods
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2V0j1De), we
recruited 800 MTurk participants (810 participants completed the study; MAge = 35.91, 61.54%
female). The study used a 2(referral: sender-benefiting vs. recipient-benefiting) x 2(referral
recipient: friend vs. stranger) between-subjects experimental design. We used the same context
as in Study 4A (Amazon BOLD referral), and the same incentive (a $10 Visa gift card). All
participants were asked to give their first name and the first name of a close friend. We showed
participants a sample referral email that Amazon was interested in sending to either 1) their close
friend or 2) “a potential customer” (whom the participant does not know). In both conditions, we
used the participant’s name in the sample email (e.g., One of our customers, Rosie, has been
using our new loyalty program, Amazon BOLD, and wanted to share the savings with you!).
Participants were then required to correctly identify who would receive a reward for a successful
referral (themselves or the recipient) before they could move to the referral decision to confirm
that they understood the incentive structure. We then asked, “Would you refer your friend [name
of close friend inserted]/this potential customer, to Amazon BOLD”? (Yes/No).
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Results
A binary logistic regression was performed on the choice to refer as a function of referral
recipient type (friend/stranger) and incentive type (sender-benefiting/recipient-benefiting). This
analysis yielded a significant interaction of recipient and incentive type (χ2 (1) = 14.85, p <
.001). For participants in the friend condition, we observed an equal number of referrals for the
recipient-benefiting (87.75%) and the sender-benefiting referral (87.00%, χ2 (1) = 0.05, p = .82).
This pattern is consistent with results from studies 2 and 3. However, when referring a stranger,
the sender-benefiting incentive (82.76%) was significantly more successful than the recipientbenefiting incentive (54.73%, χ2 (1) =35.78, p < .001), consistent with standard incentivized
behavior.
APPENDIX STUDY 3: REFERRAL CHOICE BY REWARD AND RECIPIENT
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APPENDIX STUDY 4
This appendix study was designed to replicate Study 5B with an additional manipulation
of action cost.

Methods
As outlined in our pre-registered research plan (available at https://bit.ly/2GQ33ru), we
recruited 800 MTurk participants; 818 completed the study (MAge = 35.52, 50.86% female).
To further understand the uptake stage of the referral process, we had participants
imagine that a friend sent them an email asking if they would like to try Food2Me (the same food
delivery service described in Studies 3 and 5A). Participants provided their own first name and
the first name of a close friend. We manipulated whether the referral was recipient-benefiting or
sender-benefiting. We also manipulated action costs by directly varying the cost of uptake ($2 or
$100 per year to join).
Participants then read, “The Food2Me restaurant delivery service costs [$100/$2] per
year and you may cancel at any time. Would you sign up for the Food2Me delivery service?
Remember if you join, [you/Friend] get(s) a free year of deliveries!” Participants could respond
either “Yes, I would sign up for the Food2Me delivery service” or “No, I would not sign up for
the Food2Me delivery service.”
Note that, as in Study 2, 3, 5A, and 5B, we told participants (recipients) in the senderbenefiting referral conditions that the friend who referred them would be rewarded if they
followed through on the referral. We informed participants of this benefit to their friend to
examine whether, even when recipients know that their friend will receive an incentive (which is
not always the case in these incentive designs), sender-benefiting referrals have a minimal
positive effect at the uptake stage due to the higher burden of follow-through. Participants were
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required to correctly identify who would receive an incentive (themselves or their friend) before
they could move to the uptake decision to confirm that they understood the incentive structure
before making their uptake choice. Finally, as a manipulation check, we measured action costs (α
= .78).
Results
Manipulation Check. As expected, the high cost condition was perceived as having
higher action costs than the low cost condition (MHigh-Cost = 3.83, SD = 1.39 vs. MLow-Cost = 2.41,
SD = 1.46; t(816) = 1.431, p <.001).
Uptake decision. We performed a binary logistic regression on uptake decision as a
function of uptake cost (high/low) and referral type (sender-benefiting/recipient-benefiting). This
analysis yielded a significant interaction of uptake cost and incentive type (χ2 (1) = 5.49, p =
.019, Figure 8). For participants in the high-cost condition, we observed more sign-ups for the
recipient-benefiting referral (51.94%) than the sender-benefiting referral (34.76%, (χ2 (1) =
12.37, p < .001), consistent with Studies 2-3 as well as typical incentivized behavior. However,
when uptake cost was low, there was no difference in uptake choice by those in the recipientbenefiting condition (69.84%) versus the sender-benefiting condition (69.50%, χ2 (1) = .004, p =
.95).
APPENDIX STUDY 4: UPTAKE CHOICE BY ACTION COST (HIGH/LOW) AND
INCENITVE (SENDER-BENEFITING/RECIPIENT-BENEFITING)

155

Sender-Benefiting

% Choosing to Sign up

100%

Recipient-Benefiting
80%

69.5%

60%
40%

69.8%

51.9%
34.8%

20%
0%
High Cost

Low Cost

APPENDIX STUDY 5
This exploratory study was designed to test whether the attractiveness of a service
moderates the effect of sender-benefiting and recipient-benefiting incentives on referral choice.
Specifically, if a company has received negative press, do sender-benefiting incentives become
more effective at motivating referrals, because the referring customer needs an additional nudge
to refer? Alternatively, are recipient-benefiting incentives more effective for companies that have
received negative press because the sender anticipates that the positive response from sending a
reward will balance out the unfavorable response of referring a brand that is viewed negatively?
To test this question, we varied the referred service using two rideshare companies: Lyft (the
desirable company, reinforced by telling participants, truthfully, that the company had received
widespread positive press) versus Uber (the undesirable company, reinforced by telling
participants, truthfully, that the company had received widespread negative press).

Methods
We recruited 915 MTurk participants (MAge = 38.45, 55.25% female). The study used a
2(referral: sender-benefiting vs. recipient-benefiting) x 2(service: negative press [Uber] vs.
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positive press [Lyft]) between-subjects experimental design. All participants were asked to give
their first name and the first name of a close friend. We had participants imagine the following:
“You have been using Uber [Lyft], an alternative to taxicabs, which sends a driver directly to
your location”. Participants in the Uber condition then read the following: “While Uber is a
convenient service, lately they have received widespread negative press for having a toxic work
culture and not offering their employees the same benefits that their competitors provide”. Those
in the Lyft condition read, “Lyft is a convenient service and lately they have
received widespread positive press for having a good work culture and offering their employees
better benefits than their competitors”. Participants were then told that the service has a
promotion that is either sender-benefiting (“gives you a $10 Visa gift card for every person that
you refer to Uber [Lyft] who then takes their first Uber [Lyft] ride”) or recipient-benefiting
(“gives a $10 Visa gift card to each individual that you refer to Uber [Lyft] who then takes their
first [Uber] Lyft ride”). Participants read a sample email that would be sent to their friend if they
chose to refer. In both conditions, we used the participant’s name in the sample email (e.g.,
Rosie, has been riding with Lyft and thought you might enjoy it too. They then read, “Imagine
that your friend, [Friend’s name], has never used Uber [Lyft] before. Would you refer [Friend’s
name] to Lyft?” Participants could respond either “Yes, I would refer my friend” or “No, I would
not refer my friend”.
We used two additional measures to verify that our negative press manipulation was
successful by asking “How do you feel about the driving app, Uber [Lyft]”, 1) “I would be proud
to support Uber [Lyft]” and 2) “Uber [ Lyft] is a good company” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much
so; α = .92).
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Results
Manipulation Check. As expected, there was a main effect of the negative press
manipulation; Uber was viewed more negatively than Lyft ((F(1, 911) = 219.11, p < .001). There
was no main effect for the incentive type on the evaluation of the company (F(1, 911) = .01, p =
.92). There was a non-significant interaction of negative press and incentive type (F(1, 911) =
.08, p = .78). In the Uber (negative press) condition, there was a non-significant difference in
perception of the company between incentive types (MRecipient-Benefiting = 3.77, SD = 1.52 vs.
MSender-Benefiting = 3.81, SD = 1.48; t(457) = .26, p = .79). In the Lyft (positive press) condition,
there was also a non-significant difference between incentive types (MRecipient-Benefiting = 5.19, SD
= 1.31 vs. MSender-Benefiting = 5.17, SD = 1.34; t(451) = -.14, p = .89).
Referral decision. A binary logistic regression was performed on the choice to refer as a
function of incentive type (sender-benefiting/recipient-benefiting) and the press manipulation
(negative/positive. This analysis did not yield a significant interaction of incentive type and press
manipulation (χ2 (1) = 2.20, p = .14). For participants in the Uber (negative press) condition, we
did not observe a difference in referral choice for the recipient-benefiting (70.94%) and the
sender-benefiting incentive (65.35%, χ2 (1) = 1.66, p = .20). When referring to a company with
positive press (Lyft), the recipient-benefiting incentive (90.75%) was significantly more
successful than the sender- benefiting incentive (81.86%, χ2 (1) = 7.33, p = .007).

APPENDIX STUDY 5: REFERRAL CHOICE BY REWARD AND SERVICE
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Discussion
To summarize, this study found no interaction of incentive type and negative press on the
choice to refer a friend to a company. Future work might continue to explore boundary
conditions: Are there companies or products for which sender-benefiting incentives are more
effective at motivating customers to refer than recipient-benefiting incentives?
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